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This thesis is a study of the response of the Coalition government (2010-2015) to the crises in 
Libya and Syria. It examines the key drivers of British policy in both cases, focusing 
particularly on government attitudes towards the use and non-use of military force. While 
existing academic literature has discussed the ‘‘liberal conservative’’ approach of the 
Conservatives who led the Coalition, there has been very little empirical analysis of British 
involvement in the Libyan conflict of 2011 and even less on the government’s response to the 
Syrian civil war. The primary contribution of this thesis is to therefore fill this gap in our 
understanding of an important area of contemporary British foreign policy. This research 
employs a historical methodology to reconstruct the development of British policy and analyse 
the motivations and structural pressures that explain the decisions (and non-decisions) that were 
made during this period. It draws heavily on primary sources including parliamentary debates, 
the inquiries carried out by House of Commons committees, public statements made by 
Downing Street, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, in addition to statements, 
speeches and interviews given by key government ministers. Existing research has not yet taken 
advantage of the availability of these sources. In addition to providing a detailed empirical 
analysis of British policy toward the crises in Libya and Syria, this research also identifies a 
wider theme. Specifically, this thesis argues that Britain’s approach to both conflicts can be 
characterised by the presence of a particular world-view and a corresponding set of assumptions 
about the use and non-use of military force in situations of perceived humanitarian necessity. 
Importantly, these beliefs show strong parallels with the approach of the Blair governments and 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Methodology 
 
The Arab Spring protests of 2011 spawned civil wars in Libya and Syria, posed major dilemmas 
for the international community and brought to the fore debates and divisions over the question 
of military intervention.1 The Libyan crisis unfolded at a frenetic pace. By the end of February, 
after just a week of unrest, much of the eastern half of the country fell to opposition groups, 
aided by significant military defections. Yet by mid-March the regime’s security forces were 
poised to retake the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, threatening the prospect of a humanitarian 
catastrophe and significant loss of life. In responding to the Libyan crisis, the British 
government under David Cameron played a major role in mobilizing a diplomatic coalition in 
favour of intervention against the regime of Colonel Gaddafi which led to the passage of UN 
Resolution 1973 in March 2011. A US-led intervention quickly established a military no-fly 
zone and aided the liberation of Benghazi, before America withdrew to a less prominent role, 
leaving Britain and France as the most visible leaders of the coalition. Ostensibly operating 
under the mandate of UN 1973, a NATO-led military operation played a controversial role in 
assisting the success of rebel forces in the conflict, culminating in the takeover of Tripoli in 
August and the capture and killing of Gaddafi in October.  
In Syria, the violent response of the government of Bashar Assad to what were initially largely 
peaceful protests gradually dragged the country toward civil war, creating arguably the worst 
humanitarian disaster of the twenty-first century. On this occasion, and partly in consequence of 
disagreements over NATO actions in Libya, the international community was unable to agree 
on how to respond and no intervention was forthcoming. This did not prevent the growing 
internationalisation of the conflict, with several states playing a role in supporting either side in 
                                                          
1Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, ‘‘The New Politics of Protection? Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect,’’ International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 825-850; Tim Dunne and Jess Gifkins, 
‘‘Libya and the State of Intervention,’’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 5 (2011): 515-
529; Aidan Hehir, ‘‘The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council and the Responsibility 
to Protect,’’ International Security 38, no. 1 (2013): 137-159; Justin Morris, ‘‘Libya and Syria: R2P and 
the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum,’’ International Affairs 89, no. 5 (2013): 1265-1238.  
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the civil war. While not among the primary actors in this unfolding cataclysm, Britain was 
consistently at the forefront of efforts to condemn and isolate the Assad regime in both the UN 
and the EU and joined other Western governments in calling for the departure of Bashar Assad 
in August 2011. Britain helped secure multiple rounds of EU sanctions and tabled three 
resolutions at the UN Security Council that were blocked by Russian and Chinese vetoes. In 
June 2013 Britain played the leading role in lifting the EU’s arms embargo against Syria and 
government ministers publicly spoke in favour of providing military support to opposition 
groups. In August 2013, following the large-scale use of chemical weapons in Damascus, the 
British government pledged to join the US in a round of airstrikes against the Assad regime. 
Were it not for overwhelming opposition from Parliament, the Coalition government would 
almost certainly have participated in its second humanitarian intervention in the Middle East. 
On 29 August 2013, the House of Commons inflicted the first defeat on a British government 
on a foreign policy issue since 1782.2  
This thesis is a study of the response of the Coalition government to the crises in Libya and 
Syria. It examines the key drivers of British policy in both cases, focusing in particular on 
government attitudes toward the use and non-use of military force. For Libya, the analysis in 
this thesis is limited to the period between late December 2010, when the Arab Spring first 
erupted, and October 2011, when military action culminated in the death of Gaddafi. For Syria, 
the timeframe is extended to cover the period up until August 2013, which brought to a halt the 
government’s efforts to find a more interventionist approach to that conflict. To extend the 
timeframe beyond this would necessarily lead to a dilution in the detail and depth of analysis 
and would also invite consideration of a further set of issues, including for example the 
government’s counter-terrorism policy in response to the emergence of Islamic State. 
In addition to providing a detailed empirical analysis of these two cases, this research also 
highlights a wider theme. Specifically, this thesis argues that Britain’s approach to both crises 
                                                          
2 The History of Parliament, ‘‘The House of Commons and Foreign Policy: Lord North and Yorktown,’’ 




can be characterised by the presence of a particular world-view and a corresponding set of 
assumptions about the use and non-use of military force in situations of perceived humanitarian 
necessity. It was these wider beliefs and predispositions, shared by Prime Minister Cameron 
and other key members of his government, including Foreign Secretary William Hague and 
Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, which best accounts for British policy toward Libya and 
Syria. Importantly, these beliefs were largely at odds with many of the self-images presented by 
key government figures, which often emphasised pragmatism, conservatism and a traditional 
conception of national interest.  
This thesis argues, in contrast, that many key players within the Coalition government, and 
David Cameron in particular, were remarkably close to the ‘‘liberal interventionism’’ of the 
New Labour period. In both Libya and Syria, British foreign policy was primarily driven by 
what can be broadly described as ‘‘humanitarian’’ objectives, by a persistent moral fervour on 
the part of Cameron and other leading members of his government and by an ideological 
solidarity with the opponents of the dictatorships who were presumed to represent the idealistic 
promise of the ‘‘Arab Spring.’’ As the following chapters will show in more detail, British 
policy in both cases was underpinned by an optimistic and almost Manichean framing of the 
conflicts, alongside a set of interventionist instincts. Non-military options tended to be viewed 
as forms of ‘‘inaction’’ and British policy objectives, to the extent that these were properly 
defined, amounted to an agenda of democratic regime change. This approach was as 
impracticable as it was idealistic, but it reflected an ideological predisposition that brokered few 
alternatives. In addition, this thesis also shows how the world-views of a particular generation 
of political leaders were profoundly shaped by the legacy of Bosnia. The lessons they drew 
from that conflict displaced the more cautionary tales that others were drawing from the 
experience of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This introductory chapter serves two main purposes. Firstly, it reviews the existing literature on 
British policy in the cases of Libya and Syria. This brief review demonstrates that such a 
literature barely exists. Academic literature on Britain’s decision to intervene in the Libyan 
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revolution in 2011 is quite limited, while literature on British policy throughout the subsequent 
period of that conflict is non-existent. Academic literature on Britain’s policy toward the Syrian 
conflict is almost exclusively focused on Parliament’s decision to vote against a possible 
military deployment in response to the use of chemical weapons in August 2013. This literature 
is motivated by a desire to understand how and why Parliament voted against military action 
and the implications of this decision, rather than understanding why the government favoured 
taking this option to begin with. Furthermore, an exclusive focus on this episode leaves the 
prior development of British policy, including the imposition of strong sanctions, the decision 
to publicly call for the departure of the Assad government in August 2011 and the decision to 
lift the EU arms embargo in June 2013, all unexplored. This brief literature review therefore 
establishes the empirical contribution that this thesis can make. 
Secondly, this chapter outlines and defends the historical methodology that has been employed 
for this research. It compares and contrasts this approach with the theories of ‘‘Foreign Policy 
Analysis,’’ showing both the differences and the similarities in terms of methodological starting 
points. It defends an approach that is primarily empirical, evidence-based and inductive in its 
reasoning. This section also briefly describes the key sources of evidence that have been 
consulted in the course of this research and their strengths and limitations. As a work of 
contemporary political history, this thesis is built on the basis of detailed scrutiny of 
parliamentary debates, press briefings and government statements and the evidence sessions of 
parliamentary committees. It argues that the latter in particular are a rich and powerful source of 
evidence for understanding contemporary British foreign policy and are significantly under-
utilised in the existing literature. The use of source material employed in this thesis therefore 
further enhances the empirical contribution of this research.  
Literature Review 
 
The ‘‘Arab Spring,’’ the name given to the wave of protests that began in Tunisia in December 
2010 and swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in early 2011, must 
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rank as one of the most important and impactful developments of the early twenty first century. 
It unseated longstanding autocrats, provoked civil wars in at least two countries and has been 
the incubator of both democracy and Salafist extremism. Taking placing in a region that is 
geographically proximate to Europe and where Britain has enduring strategic and commercial 
interests, it must also rank as one of the greatest challenges faced by British foreign policy since 
the end of the Cold War. It was commonplace for government ministers to suggest parallels 
between the Arab Spring and the fall of the Berlin Wall, with Foreign Secretary William Hague 
declaring in May 2011 that the unrest was ‘‘the most important development of the early 21st 
century, with potential long term consequences greater than either 9/11 or the global financial 
crisis in 2008.’’3 
The fact that so little academic work has been carried out in examining Britain’s response to the 
Arab Spring and the crises it generated is therefore noteworthy. There has been some literature 
on the response of Western governments in general,4 or that of the European Union,5 but these 
general accounts are relatively thin on detail. On British policy specifically,  Jamie Gaskarth 
and Philip Leech have made an important contribution.6 They argue that Britain’s response to 
those countries most affected by the unrest, including Libya and Syria, can be best explained by 
the presence or absence of close security ties. The absence of such ties in the case of Libya and 
Syria explains why Britain was able to strongly condemn the governments of Colonel Gaddafi 
and Bashar Assad, while the presence of such ties with the Khalifa regime explains why Britain 
remained largely supportive of the monarchy in Bahrain. However, this approach does not set 
                                                          
3 William Hague, ‘‘We Will Continue to Fight Against Terrorism Wherever it Rears its Head,’’ 5 May 
2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-will-continue-to-fight-against-terrorism-wherever-it-
rears-its-head 
4 Daniel Byman, ‘‘Explaining the Western Response to the Arab Spring,’’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 
36, no. 2 (2013): 289-320. 
5 Tobias Schumacher, ‘‘The EU and the Arab Spring: Between Spectatorship and Actorness,’’ Insight 
Turkey, 13, no. 3 (2011): 107-119; Rosemary Hollis, ‘‘No Friend of Democratization: Europe’s Role in 
the Genesis of the ‘Arab Spring,’’’ International Affairs 88, no. 1 (2012): 81-94; Andreas Boogaerts, 
‘‘Beyond Norms: A Configurational Analysis of the EU’s Arab Spring Sanctions,’’ Foreign Policy 
Analysis 14, no. 3 (2018):  408-428. 
6 Philip Leech and Jamie Gaskarth, ‘‘British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring,’’ Diplomacy & 
Statecraft 26, no. 1 (2015): 139-160. 
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out to identify any causal mechanisms and is only able to explain how a particular outcome was 
possible, not why it happened. Furthermore, as it presents the response to both Syria and Libya 
as belonging in the same category, it cannot explain the differences between the two. For some 
commentators, the fact that Britain intervened in Libya whilst failing to do so in Syria is good 
evidence of inconsistency or double standards.7 
Some scholarship has examined the decision to intervene in Libya in March 2011. Davidson 
provides the most detailed academic analysis of British decision-making.8 He argues that the 
‘‘initial causal factors,’’ those factors present at the outset of the crisis, included an international 
norm, a threat to prestige and a threat to national interest (primarily the threat of refugees). 
Considerations about the costs and efficacy of any action being proposed were ‘‘contributory 
factors’’ that emerged during the crisis, while support from the opposition party and wider 
international community were also important ‘‘prerequisite factors.’’ Yet while Davidson 
provides the most sophisticated analysis of British policy, his primary purpose was to develop a 
nomothetic model of foreign policy decision-making for all states. Davidson also examines both 
British and French policies, and therefore does not have space for a more in-depth study of the 
range of evidence available to consider British decision making. 
Echoing some of the broader issues that this thesis attempts to address, there is some literature 
which studies the response to events in Libya by locating it within a wider thematic context 
concerning contending approaches to the use of force. Daddow and Schnapper, for example, 
working within the ‘‘interpretive approach’’ of Bevir and Rhodes, identify a single tradition of 
thinking that has guided British foreign policy throughout the post-war period.9 This ‘‘bounded 
liberal tradition’’ is typified by pragmatism or scepticism toward grand designs, instinctive 
Atlanticism, support for a global free trade regime and anti-appeasement. The Libyan episode is 
                                                          
7 For example, Zoe Holman, ‘‘The Price of Influence: Ethics and Foreign Policy in the Arab Middle East 
After Iraq,’’ Contemporary Levant 1, no. 1 (2016): 12-24. 
8 Jason Davidson, ‘‘France, Britain and Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis,’’ Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 26, no. 2 (2013): 310-329. 
9 Oliver Daddow and Pauline Schnapper, ‘‘Liberal Intervention in the Foreign Policy Thinking of Tony 
Blair and David Cameron,’’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 2 (2013): 330-349. 
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understood as consistent with this wider tradition, and its occurrence therefore evidence of its 
durability and the continuity it brings to British foreign policy. Ralph, meanwhile, uses a 
comparison of the use of force in Iraq and Libya to introduce a conceptual framework inspired 
by English School thinking.10 This framework can be used to locate the beliefs of both Tony 
Blair and David Cameron, with the latter’s decision to intervene in Libya seen as consistent 
with a ‘‘liberal internationalist’’ position, in contrast to the more hawkish ‘‘neoliberal 
internationalism’’ that underpinned Blair’s case for the Iraq invasion. None of these authors 
analyse the decision to intervene in detail and it is this empirical gap that this thesis seeks to fill. 
There has been almost no analysis of British policy toward Libya following the liberation of 
Benghazi.11 Yet having sanctioned force primarily in response to the threat to that city, Britain 
continued to wage war on behalf of the Libyan revolution for a further eight months, stretching 
both the UN mandate and its own military capabilities to breaking point. The reasons the British 
government chose to sustain this action are not self-evident. Nor do the more general debates 
about intervention shed any light on the more specific means for which different types of 
military force are deployed. Answers to these questions are both important in their own right 
and surely necessary to feed into those wider themes that the existing literature has attempted to 
address. 
The main sources about this episode currently available are a small handful of ‘‘inside stories,’’ 
including the investigation by The Guardian newspaper,12 Matthew D’Ancona’s In It 
                                                          
10 Jason Ralph, ‘‘The Liberal State in International Society: Interpreting Recent British Foreign Policy,’’ 
International Relations 28, no. 1 (2014): 3-24. See also Tim Oliver, ‘‘Interventionism by Design or 
Failure: The Coalition and Humanitarian Intervention,’’ The Political Quarterly 86, no. 1 (2015): 110-
117. 
11 Ralph briefly reflects upon NATO’s continuing efforts to defeat Gaddafi’s forces, albeit from a 
normative perspective. See Ralph, ‘‘The Liberal State,’’ 14-16. The only serious scrutiny of Britain’s 
subsequent involvement in the conflict is provided by think tanks and members of the NGO community. 
See Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen, eds. Short War, Long Shadow; The Political and Military 
Legacies of the 2011 Libyan Campaign (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2012); Christina 
Goulter, ‘‘The British Experience: Operation Ellamy,’’ in Precision and Purpose; Airpower in the 
Libyan Civil War, edited by Karl Mueller (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 153-182.  
12 Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt ‘‘David Cameron’s Libyan War: Why the PM Felt Gaddafi Had To 
Be Stopped,’’ The Guardian, 2 October 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/02/david-
cameron-libyan-war-analysis; Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt ‘‘How David Cameron Swept Aside 
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Together,13 Anthony Seldon and Peter Snowden’s Cameron At 10,14 and Mark Muller-Stuart’s 
Storm in the Desert.15 These accounts provide a more detailed reconstruction of British policy 
behind the scenes and make interesting claims about the differing views of those within 
government but do not offer scholarly analysis. They share in common a narrative that 
foregrounds the role of David Cameron, creating the impression of a strong-willed Prime 
Minister who overruled the sceptics in order to prevent ‘‘another ‘Srebrenica.’’’ This, in short, 
is the relatively straightforward answer to the question ‘‘why did Britain intervene in Libya?’’ 
This thesis will test these claims against a wider and more systematic overview of the available 
documentary evidence in chapters two and three. 
Turning to the Syrian conflict, we find almost no analysis of British policy prior to the Ghouta 
attacks of August 2013. There are two major exceptions to this. Firstly, the work of Christopher 
Phillips looks at the international reaction to the Syrian uprising and the response of major 
outside actors to that conflict.16 Phillips treats Britain as a secondary actor in this story, a state 
which cannot influence the conflict directly but must instead do so indirectly, through its 
relationships with the major protagonists.17 While this work provides a good overview of the 
‘‘Western’’ response to the conflict, in particular the decision of Western governments to call 
for regime change in August 2011, it is not therefore an especially thorough or informative 
account of British policy. Instead, it provides an account of US policy which is occasionally 
interspersed with interesting anecdotes about debates and decisions in London. Secondly, the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Sceptics Over Libya Campaign,’’ The Guardian, 2 October 2011, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/02/pm-libya-sceptics-gadaffi-queen; Nicholas Watt, 
‘‘David Cameron on Libya: We Are Not the ‘Pull up the Drawbridge Generation,’’’ The Guardian, 2 
October 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/wintour-and-watt/2011/oct/02/libya-muammar-
gaddafi 
13 Matthew D’Ancona, In It Together; The Inside Story of the Coalition Government (London: Penguin, 
2014), 159-184. 
14 Anthony Seldon and Peter Snowdon, Cameron at 10; The Inside Story 2010-2015 (London: William 
Collins, 2015), 97-114. 
15 Mark Muller Stuart, Storm in the Desert; Britain’s Intervention in Libya and the Arab Spring 
(Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2017) Kindle. 
16 Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria; International Rivalry in the New Middle East (London: Yale 
University Press, 2016). 
17 Ibid., 8.  
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work of Ralph, Holland and Zhekova provides a thorough and exhaustive study of the 
parliamentary record prior to the House of Commons vote in August 2013.18 However, while 
this both provides an essential contribution to an understanding of Britain’s Syria policy and 
addresses some of the wider questions surrounding the ideational underpinnings of foreign 
policy, the primary focus of this article is on the ‘‘discursive context.’’19 The motivations 
behind policy are not directly addressed here.  
Rather than understanding the reasons the government favoured military action in Syria in 
August 2013, scholars of British foreign policy have instead chosen to focus on the reasons 
Parliament voted against these proposals and the longer-term implications of the House of 
Commons’ veto.20 This literature has been widened by those who are interested in this episode 
less because of what it tells us about the role of Parliament in British policy, but more simply 
because of what it might reveal about the role of parliaments in foreign policy at a more general 
level.21 Given that the Syrian conflict arguably stands out as the worst humanitarian disaster of 
the twenty-first century, it surprising that there has been no attempt as yet seriously to examine 
and analyse British policy toward it. Aside from the article by Ralph, Holland and Zhekova 
cited above, the only accounts of British policy toward Syria for this period are again provided 
by D’Ancona and Seldon and Snowdon.22  
                                                          
18 Ralph, Holland and Zhekova, ‘‘Before The Vote.’’ 
19 Ibid., 896. 
20 James Strong, ‘‘Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary 
Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq,’’ British Journal of Politics and International Relation 17, no. 
4 (2015): 604-622; James Strong, ‘‘Interpreting the Syria Vote: Parliament and British Foreign Policy,’’ 
International Affairs 91, no. 5 (2015): 1123-1139; Jamie Gaskarth, ‘‘The Fiasco of the 2013 Syria Votes: 
Decline and Denial in British Foreign Policy,’’ Journal of European Public Policy 23, no. 5 (2016): 718-
734; Patrick Mello, ‘‘Curbing the Royal Prerogative to Use Military Force: The British House of 
Commons and the Conflicts in Libya and Syria,’’ West European Politics 40, no. 1 (2017): 80-100; Sam 
Goodman, The Imperial Premiership; The Role of the Modern Prime Minister in Foreign Policy Making, 
1964-2015 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 5-33. 
21 Juliet Kaarbo and Daniel Kenealy, ‘‘‘No Prime Minister’: Explaining the House of Commons’ Vote on 
Intervention in Syria,’’ European Security 25, no. 1 (2016): 28-48; Juliet Kaarbo and Daniel Kenealy, 
‘‘Precedents, Parliaments and Foreign Policy: Historical Analogy in the House of Commons Vote on 
Syria,’’ West European Politics 40, no. 1 (2016): 62-79. 
22 D’Ancona, In It Together, 355-362, 378-388; Seldon and Snowdon, Cameron at 10, 325-345.  
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So far there have been no book-length studies of the foreign policy of the Cameron 
governments, but there are some articles that provide a more general overview, exploring the 
level and extent of continuity between the Coalition and its predecessor governments, 
particularly on issues such as human rights and intervention.23 Naturally, such accounts cannot 
ignore or bypass the Libyan intervention as a defining episode in recent British foreign policy. 
Elsewhere, more up-to-date book-length studies of British foreign policy have often mentioned 
the Libyan intervention and the parliamentary vote on Syria in passing.24 The works cited above 
all highlight the further need for detailed empirical investigation. Both Daddow and Honeyman 
see Libya as ‘‘cautiously realist’’25 and as evidence of a return to a more pragmatic tradition in 
British foreign policy,26 whereas Houghton and Sanders see it as evidence of ‘‘liberal 
intervention.’’27 Garnett, Mabon and Smith go further still, drawing parallels between Cameron 
and the neoconservatives of the George W Bush administration.28 In sum, this thesis is mapping 
what is largely unchartered empirical terrain. It represents a first attempt at a work of 
contemporary political history on a topic that has not yet been explored in a detailed way.  
Chapter Two provides some contextual background by examining two rival philosophical 
traditions in British foreign policy. It unpacks the traditional description of British foreign 
policy as ‘‘pragmatic,’’ analysing the key components of this approach and its affinities with 
realism and philosophical conservatism. It then outlines some of the key aspects of the ‘‘liberal 
interventionist’’ philosophy that enjoyed its heyday under New Labour. This definitional 
                                                          
23 Matt Beech and Paul Munce, ‘‘The Place of Human Rights in the Foreign Policy of Cameron’s 
Conservatives: Sceptics or Enthusiasts?’’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations 21, no. 1 
(2019): 116-131; Oliver Daddow, ‘‘The Use of Force in British Foreign Policy: From New Labour to the 
Coalition,’’ Political Quarterly 84, no. 1 (2013): 110-117; Anne Peltner, ‘‘Competing Norms and 
Foreign Policy Change: Humanitarian Intervention and British Foreign Policy,’’ International Politics 
54, no. 6 (2017): 745-759; Victoria Honeyman, ‘‘From Liberal Interventionism to Liberal Conservatism: 
The Short Road in Foreign Policy from Blair to Cameron,’’ British Politics 12, no. 1 (2017): 42-62. 
24 Jamie Gaskarth, British Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 110-111; David Sanders and David 
Houghton, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role; British Foreign Policy Since 1945, 2nd edition (London: 
Palgrave, 2017), 189-190; Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon and Robert Smith, British Foreign Policy since 
1945 (London: Routledge, 2018), 303-315.  
25 Daddow, ‘‘Use of Force,’’ 110. 
26 Honeyman, ‘‘From Liberal Interventionism,’’ 54-57. 
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ground-clearing goes further than the existing literature by defining and historicising two 
categories whose meanings have been taken for granted by current scholarship. The chapter 
concludes by briefly discussing the ‘‘liberal conservatism’’ of the Coalition government, which 
was conceived as middle ground between the conservative ‘‘pragmatism’’ and ‘‘liberal 
interventionism.’’ This discussion provides a conceptual framing for locating some of the wider 
arguments that emerge from this thesis and is revisited in the concluding chapter. 
Chapter Three focuses on the government’s decision to intervene in Libya in March 2011 and in 
doing so it draws upon new evidence. Chapter Four is occupied with the equally important task 
of understanding why, having achieved the objective of preventing a massacre in Benghazi, 
Britain continued its military involvement in that conflict. It further analyses other aspects of 
British policy to Libya in this period, showing how and why force was used in more specific 
instances and interrogating the government’s attitude toward the possible diplomatic 
alternatives. Chapter Five turns to the Syrian conflict. It provides an analysis of British policy in 
the period between March 2011 and July 2012, showing the various steps taken to isolate and 
condemn Damascus in addition to explaining how and why Britain was largely unable to adopt 
a more interventionist position. Chapter Six shows how both Cameron and Hague came to 
favour intervention via proxy and reconstructs the British role in lifting the EU’s arms embargo 
in preparation for this step. It also reveals the details of a lesser known instance of 
parliamentary obstructionism, showing how the House of Commons effectively blocked the 
government’s efforts to arm the opposition just two months before the more emphatic vote 
against air strikes. Chapter Seven analyses the government’s response to the Ghouta attacks in 
August 2013. Rather than explaining how the vote was lost, it instead investigates why the 
government favoured a military response to begin with. Each of these chapters makes a 
worthwhile contribution in its own right but taken together they provide the basis for drawing a 
wider set of conclusions about the role of force in contemporary British foreign policy and the 





Mainstream IR tends to look for explanations of state behaviour in the international system, 
rather than providing analysis at the level of foreign policy decisions within states.29 In contrast, 
a study of foreign policy must contend much more closely with the agential side of the equation 
as foreign policy is, by its very nature, a purposeful activity.30 A more fruitful starting point 
might therefore be the sub-discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). FPA broke away from 
mainstream IR assumptions in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In particular, the foreign policy 
‘‘decision-making approach’’ developed in the mid-1950s by Snyder and colleagues has 
bequeathed a series of ‘‘middle range theories,’’ each of which examines a key aspect of the 
foreign policy process.31 FPA opened up the black box of the state, dispensing with the 
assumption that it could be treated as a unitary, rational actor, and began to examine in greater 
depth the processes by which decisions were made.32 It challenged the assumption implicit in 
much IR theory that the international environment could be straight forwardly mediated by 
those making foreign policy decisions, showing how psychological factors shaped the decisions 
of individuals and small groups.33 It shifted the analytical focus to the individual decision-
maker or the small group as the unit of analysis, making this rather than an abstract conception 
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of the state ‘‘the ground’’ of international politics.34 This move implicitly promoted more multi-
causal or ‘‘multifactorial’’ analyses, as the foreign policy decision-maker is understood as the 
point of intersection at which multiple factors or variables are at work, located at both the 
domestic and international level.35  
There are, however, a number of issues with situating the current research within this tradition. 
As Steve Smith explained in his attempt to introduce FPA into the study of British foreign 
policy, the explicit goal of all FPA work is the creation of ‘‘general theory’’ by focusing on 
‘‘the regularities and patterns that exist for all states.’’36 Individual countries and cases are 
examined not as ends in themselves, but in order to develop or discover more generalizable 
patterns. As these are the focus of the FPA scholar, it must be assumed in advance that such 
generalizable patterns are both present and causally dominant. It is an approach that therefore 
automatically excludes contingency, idiosyncrasy and an understanding of historical context. 
Secondly, despite its undoubted commitment to multicausal analysis, the goal of theoretical 
integration has so far eluded the advocates of FPA.37 The middle range theories cannot all be 
integrated into a single framework so the researcher must know and decide, in advance of the 
empirical investigation, which causal factor or variable they are going to focus on. Finally, FPA 
has undoubtedly suffered from its ethnocentrism, specifically its focus on a US experience. 
Many of those scholars who have a detailed understanding of how British foreign policy works 
have contended that models and ideas derived almost exclusively from American foreign policy 
cannot be wholly transferable to the British context.38  
This research shares some of the analytical choices made by scholars working within the 
‘‘foreign policy decision-making’’ tradition but employs an historical methodology. The first 
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component to this methodology concerns the relative trade-off between theory and empirical 
work. Some would argue that history contains theory in disguise, and that without making these 
theories explicit, historians can do little but to add detail rather than explain how foreign 
policies work.39 How much time and attention should be given to theory has been a highly 
contentious issue in the study of British foreign policy and British IR more broadly.40 The study 
of British foreign policy has always been well-populated by historians.41 While many of these 
scholars have liked to brand themselves as anti-theoretical or carrying out purely empirical 
work, it is more realistic to say that they simply devote far less time to the explicit discussion of 
theoretical and methodological issues.42 The contention implicit in this historical approach, or 
of those scholars who are primarily interested in conducting empirical work, is that given the 
unavoidable constraints of time and resources, we are best served by focusing our attention 
almost entirely on the business of gathering evidence and mastering the detail, even if this 
leaves our theoretical arguments somewhat less sophisticated than they might otherwise be. 
A second key component of the historical approach is the emphasis it places on evidence. As 
John Tosh explains, ‘‘the first test by which any historical work must be judged is how far its 
interpretation of the past is consistent with all the available evidence.’’43 This is not to accuse 
others of making assertions without evidence, but it is undoubtedly the case that historians 
expect one another to pass a higher evidential threshold than their equivalents in IR theory or 
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political science.44 Alongside this demand, there is a preference for primary sources, those 
sources of evidence that were produced at the time of the events being analysed.45 Cumulative 
work thus takes place within the parameters of an implicit agreement that evidence trumps 
theory and that it is historical evidence, specifically the quantity and quality of sources that can 
be marshalled in support of an argument, that determines whether a piece of research should be 
taken seriously.  
The third component of the historical approach concerns how this evidence is to be interpreted. 
As is implicit in the above description, this is primarily an inductive approach. Generalised 
principles or observations are not out of the question, but they are built from the bottom-up, 
from observing the particular before making grand sweeping statements. Deductive reasoning, 
which is far more typical in IR, works from general principles. For example, scholarship might 
assume that states act in accordance with an abstract category identified as a ‘‘role in the 
world’’ and working within this assumption, evidence will be sought to show the validity of 
such an interpretation.46 Such an approach can easily lapse into working backwards from a 
conclusion. As Zara Steiner admitted, international historians ‘‘are suspicious of general 
theories concerning historical processes and view attempts to reduce the relations between 
highly complex and inconsistent human beings to formulae and games with considerable 
scepticism.’’47 Rather than forcing events into preconceived categories, it is far more productive 
to attempt to allow the historical evidence to speak for itself. 
Of course, it is far from self-evident how this idea can be translated into practice. In addition to 
the preference for inductive reasoning, three further methodological starting points help support 
this goal. Firstly, this thesis adopts an ‘‘historicist’’ approach in the sense of emphasising the 
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importance of time and place, and of context, in understanding specific events. Only a detailed 
understanding of a particular case will permit sufficient familiarity with the context in which the 
events took place.48 Historians tend to prioritise the unique and the particular.49 Yet properly 
understood, this historical approach merely means giving idiosyncrasy and contingency its due, 
rather than assuming a priori that the causal mechanisms involved in any given instance will 
belong to a category of universal regularities that will be observable for all states.  
A second methodological principle that shapes how the evidence is interpreted is the 
commitment to reconstructionism. This means using the sources for the purposes of 
reconstructing the world as it appeared to decision-makers at the time, on the assumption that 
this is the most effective means of understanding either the perceptions that led to the foreign 
policy decisions, or the outcomes that resulted. This is clearly an area where there is much 
common ground between the historian and the FPA scholar. The ‘‘decision making approach’’ 
of Snyder and colleagues explicitly advocates ‘‘the re-creation of the ‘world’ of the decision-
makers as they view it.’’50 Similarly, in Harold and Margaret Sprout’s seminal contribution to 
FPA, the distinction between an ‘‘operational’’ and a ‘‘psychological’’ environment makes 
clear it is primarily in the domain of the latter that we are to find our understanding of events.51 
In this area, as with many others, the historians and the FPA scholars have far more in common 
with one another than either do with the IR theorists.  
A final methodological principle that shapes the process of evidence interpretation is more 
difficult to codify. This principle was in fact best defended by Hedley Bull during IR’s ‘‘Second 
Great Debate.’’ There is an acceptance that the business of historical interpretation is sometimes 
messy and not always in conformity with what we might intuitively feel is ‘‘scientific.’’ As Bull 
famously argued in his defence of a ‘‘classical’’ approach to the study of international politics, 
there is simply no escaping from the need to rely on the individual judgement of the 
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researcher.52 From an historical perspective, it is an immersion in the historical detail and the 
sources pertaining to the research topic that helps sharpen and refine this judgement. In 
summary, the methodological approach adopted here places most of the emphasis on empirical 
rigour ahead of theoretical sophistication. It aims to develop a narrative that is supported by the 
historical evidence, with the latter category referring to the primary sources that are available. It 
favours a process of inductive reasoning that is historicist, reconstructionist and accepting that 
in the last resort, its conclusions are to a significant extent dependent on the judgement of the 
individual scholar and his or her assessment of the available evidence.  
In addition to these methodological principles, a number of analytical choices have shaped the 
development of this research. Much like FPA, historians often hone their analytical lenses upon 
the individuals tasked with making foreign policy decisions. For the present work, this 
analytical choice is provisional. The focus of the narrative shifts as and when appropriate, in 
line with where the evidence takes us, toward an understanding of the questions that are the 
focus of each individual chapter. In many of the chapters in this thesis, much of the focus is on 
the views and motivations of David Cameron and William Hague. This is less of a theoretical 
choice and more a reflection of the empirical fact that these two individuals occupied the 
dominant role in shaping British policy. In the main though, this research shares with FPA the 
notion that the foreign policy decision-maker is the point of intersection for the many factors 
that shape decisions and outcomes. This leads to an approach that is unapologetically statist and 
‘‘governmentalist.’’53 It assumes that in matters of high politics, particularly decisions about the 
use and non-use of military force, senior members of the government have meaningful agency 
and that it is they who must ultimately decide (or not) how to respond to foreign policy crises of 
the kind that are discussed in this research. Key areas of foreign policy are still dominated by a 
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relatively small circle of elites and foreign policy as a domain of governmental activity is in 
some sense meaningfully distinct from domestic policy.54  
This more general claim about foreign policy decision-making is in fact consistent with the 
literature on the making of British foreign policy, which has generally painted a picture of 
executive dominance, particularly in crisis situations.55 An alternative perspective suggests that 
in a world of ‘‘interdependence,’’ these assumptions must be radically revised as the distinction 
between foreign and domestic disintegrates and decision-making is spread across layers of 
multilateral cooperation.56 This argument holds more power when it comes to Britain’s relations 
with other states in the OECD world, where there are highly institutionalised forms of 
cooperation in a range of areas. Many other aspects of the foreign policy portfolio remain 
susceptible to executive dominance and decisions about military intervention stand out in 
particular.57 As Hague explained before the Foreign Affairs Committee in September 2011, ‘‘a 
sudden military crisis is of course something dealt with in national capitals.’’58  
Sources 
 
This research has been ‘‘source oriented.’’59 This means allowing the sources to shape the 
inquiry, rather than fixing a narrowly defined question from the outset. To the extent that some 
themes have been highlighted more than others, that is a reflection of what has emerged from 
the evidence, not a choice that was made to privilege a specific issue in advance. Such an 
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approach necessarily involves modifying the research objectives in the course of carrying out 
the research. 
 The main source for much of the research carried out for this thesis has been Hansard. There is 
a growing body of literature on contemporary British foreign policy which has drawn on this 
material.60 This recent trend is not disconnected from the growth in parliamentary power in 
British foreign policy. A political convention has been established where the Commons now 
votes on possible military deployments.61 In parallel with this development, there are signs of a 
diminution of bipartisanship and, for the period examined in this thesis, the government lacked 
the inbuilt majority that other post-war British governments have taken for granted.62 These 
developments have made Parliament a far more important arena of contestation in British 
foreign policy, a development that is at odds with its traditionally peripheral role.63  
Existing literature has used Hansard primarily as a source for understanding parliamentary 
attitudes towards issues such as the use of force or Britain’s role in the world. It is self-evidently 
a useful source for understanding the discursive, ideological and domestic political context for 
British foreign policy. In the words of Jamie Gaskarth, parliamentary debates can provide the 
researcher with a ‘‘window into the social construction of British foreign policy.’’64 Yet unlike 
the works cited above, the approach taken in this thesis must take advantage of this source not 
simply for the less complex task of assessing parliamentary attitudes, but instead for 
understanding governmental motivations. This is more difficult because ministers face greater 
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constraints than other members of the legislature and either domestic political context, 
diplomatic environment or security considerations may prevent them from speaking truthfully. 
Assessing the veracity of official statements is a task that reinforces the need for understanding 
the context and for cross-referencing with other sources.  
Despite these difficulties, this research is conducted on the basis that while official statements 
made before parliament might sometimes be misleading, it will be rare to find instances of 
outright lying. Official utterances are also capable of revealing things other than what is 
intended by those who make them.65 The language used by policy-makers often reveals in 
subtle ways the interpretive framework through which they perceive the world and the policy 
dilemmas that emerge from it. Further, rather than solely examining the more prominent 
debates as is typical for most research, the conclusions are formed on the basis of a careful 
examination of every single foreign policy statement pertaining to Libya, Syria or the wider 
context of the Arab revolutions. This includes not simply oral statements and debates, but also 
written statements and parliamentary written answers. A weakness with this approach is that 
Parliament is not in session all year around. There are periods where there is no parliamentary 
discussion of impending decisions. This occurred, for example, in the build up to the passage of 
sanctions against the Gaddafi regime in February 2011 and at the time of the chemical attacks in 
Ghouta in August 2013. 
A second source that has been consulted for this research can be labelled as ‘‘official 
announcements.’’ This category includes official statements, press releases and transcripts of 
media appearances. These are now accessible and searchable through a single website and use 
of the internet allows for a more systematic and thorough use of this digital archive than might 
otherwise be possible.66 In the course of this research every ‘‘announcement’’ containing the 
word ‘‘Libya’’ between December 2010 and October 2011 has been consulted. For Syria, the 
time frame is extended to August 2013. Ideally, these sources can supplement analysis of the 
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parliamentary record but this source of evidence becomes especially useful during those periods 
where Parliament is not in session. Interpreting these sources again requires an appreciation of 
context. For example, a press conference with the president of the United States is not the same 
as a more informal interview in a less guarded setting.  
A third source consulted has been the inquiries of the parliamentary committees. The growth of 
the committees’ power and influence is part of the trend in favour of increased parliamentary 
oversight already commented on, yet it has largely escaped attention from scholars of foreign 
policy. The committees provide an arena for the scrutiny and discussion of British foreign 
policy that is less partisan than the Commons and its membership contains many who bring a 
genuine expertise to bear on the subject matter. The evidence sessions, including both written 
and oral submissions, in addition to the reports of the committees, provide a fascinating level of 
insight into contemporary foreign policy, often going beyond what might be available from the 
parliamentary debates. When used in conjunction with the evidence from other documentary 
sources, the work of the committees provides a far more in-depth and complete picture of 
events. This source remains largely untapped within the literature on contemporary British 
foreign policy and certainly for the cases analysed in this thesis. 
There are two types of inquiry that the committees regularly carry out. The first is subject-
specific. An inquiry will be held, sometimes after the events in question, with a mandate to 
investigate a specific theme or relationship. The analysis of the Libya intervention in this thesis 
has benefited substantially from the Defence Committee’s inquiry into military operations in 
Libya and above all, from the Foreign Affairs Committee’s (FAC) 2015 inquiry into the Libyan 
war.67 The latter inquiry provides a unique insight into the recollections and thoughts of some of 
the key players within the Coalition government throughout the Libyan conflict, including the 
Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and Chief of Defence Staff among others. It is not simply 
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a self-favouring selection of their own recollections as the witnesses are forced to go through a 
rigorous interrogation by the committee members.  
The second type of inquiry carried out by the committees is a more ad hoc arrangement. The 
FAC holds a rolling inquiry, entitled ‘‘Developments in UK Foreign Policy’’ which typically 
meets on a biannual basis and discusses three or four of the most pressing issues in foreign 
policy at that time. Unlike the more formal inquiries, which include lengthy written submissions 
and are concluded with detailed reports, these rolling inquiries simply provide oral testimony 
from key participants, in this case the Foreign Secretary of the day. The Liaison Committee 
occupies a similar function for the Prime Minister. These evidence sessions typically only take 
place on a biannual basis and some are more useful and relevant than others, depending on 
whether the session coincides with a key stage in the development of policy. On many 
occasions, however, this provides a highly valuable source of evidence to supplement what is 
already available from other sources. For example, the FAC’s rolling inquiry met at the very 
time the British diplomatic delegation was pushing for a no-fly zone over Libya at the UN and 
David Cameron’s appearances before the Liaison Committee provide some of the most 
thorough scrutiny of his views on the Syrian conflict. In addition to these three main types of 
documentary sources, relevant policy papers (referred to as command papers) and other 
miscellaneous sources of documentation (e.g. publicly released intelligence assessments) have 
also been consulted. Interviews with participants have not been carried out in the course of this 
research, mainly owing to time, access and cost. However, this work is primarily a piece of 
documentary research and the testimony provided to the parliamentary committees, referred to 
above, does in fact include extensive interviews with policy-makers. 
This research has also made extensive use of a limited number of political memoirs. It is not 
surprising that the key participants in the development of British policy are mostly yet to 
publish their own accounts, given many of them are still continuing their political careers or 
have only recently left office. However, we do have the memoirs of the Chief of Defence Staff, 
the government’s senior military adviser and a permanent member of the newly established 
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National Security Council, the nexus of foreign policy decision-making.68 Lord Richards’ 
memoirs cover the full period examined in this research and he makes some remarkable claims 
about the nature of British policy in both Libya and Syria. We also have the memoirs of several 
of the key players in the Obama administration in this period.69 As well as the value of 
providing an intimate portrayal of discussions within the US government, these accounts often 
shed important light on the development of British policy, given the close relationship between 
the two countries. David Cameron’s memoirs are due to be released on 19 September 2019 and 
will no doubt provide a stimulus for strengthening, refining and perhaps even revising some of 
the arguments advanced here. Unfortunately it has not been possible to take advantage of their 
release with the submission deadline so close. 
A fifth potential source of evidence has already been discussed in the literature review. The 
‘‘insider’’ stories have certainly provided some interesting details about events behind the 
scenes and are therefore especially intriguing given the lack of access to the official government 
record. Despite the obvious limitations of these accounts, there is no doubting the value of a 
narrative that has been composed on the basis of consultation with those who were close to or 
directly involved in the making of key decisions. Much like political memoirs, they often 
provide a useful overview of the climate of ideas. A sixth source of evidence is contemporary 
newspaper reports and other media outputs. This thesis does not attempt to carry out a 
systematic survey of contemporary press reporting, but it does use the contemporary record to 
strengthen an understanding of the domestic political context, to provide informed speculation 
of differing views within government and, on occasion, help fill in some of the blanks left by 
the documentary record.  
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In addition to the above-named sources, a number of secondary sources have proven of 
significant value. For the Libyan conflict, research by Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent 
Pouliot was very useful for understanding the diplomatic machinations at the UN and Britain’s 
role in them.70 Peter Cole and Brian Quinn’s edited volume was very useful in understanding 
the broader interactions between the international community and the actors inside Libya, 
particularly as regards the civilian side of the intervention.71 Mark Muller’s Stuart’s book, 
already referred to under the category of ‘‘insider stories’’ is also deserving of special mention 
here. While not an academic piece, it provided highly detailed and informed analysis about the 
relationship between the British government and the Libyan opposition, information that would 
not be available in almost any other source.72 For the Syria conflict, the work of Christopher 
Phillips provided a thorough overview of the international diplomacy around the conflict and 
the position taken by key outside states.73 Finally, it is worth acknowledging the value of the 
reports produced by the International Crisis Group (ICG). For both Libya and Syria, these 
reports provided a thorough overview of events on the ground and the international reaction at 
any given stage in the conflict, often supplemented by conversations with officials and 
diplomats belonging to Western governments, including Britain.  
Taken together, these sources are of much value in overcoming some of the unique obstacles 
that face a work of contemporary history. The changes to the power and role of Parliament 
mentioned above make both Hansard and the work of the committees a far more valuable 
source of evidence than might have been the case in previous eras.74 There has been a general 
cultural trend within Western governments away from a traditional preoccupation with secrecy 
and in favour of greater levels of openness. No doubt this development has been facilitated by 
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the impact of the internet. Twenty first century technology both forces governments to produce 
more information and at the same time makes the historian’s task of accessing that information 
easier and quicker than ever before. There is also the recent trend in publishing, particularly in 
the United States, with individuals often publishing their own accounts within months of 
leaving office. For all these reasons, now is arguably a better time than any before to be 
producing a work of contemporary political history.   
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Chapter Two: Background and Context 
 
Each of the main chapters in this thesis is specifically focused on one aspect of British policy in 
relation to either Libya or Syria. However, there are several recurring themes. Taken together, 
these chapters feed into a wider argument about the use of force in contemporary British foreign 
policy. In order to make this argument, this chapter sets out some necessary background that 
can serve as a conceptual framing for these themes. It does this by reviewing some of the 
literature on British foreign policy and what this can usefully reveal about the ideas and 
philosophies that have shaped its practice, particularly in relationship to the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes. 
The first section discusses the role of ‘‘conservative pragmatism.’’ Scholarship has often 
described British foreign policy as traditionally operating in accordance with a ‘‘pragmatic’’ 
approach.75 This chapter will draw on this literature to provide a clearer illustration of the main 
elements or components of this ‘‘pragmatic’’ approach. It argues that ‘‘pragmatism’’ is not 
apolitical or non-ideological in the manner its proponents would sometimes argue, but is instead 
indicative of a particular philosophy or world-view. While not entirely incompatible with liberal 
approaches to foreign policy, existing scholarship has been right to point to the stronger overlap 
between this pragmatic approach and the ideas of realism, both intellectually and in practice.76 
Underlying both is a set of conservative assumptions, justifying the label of ‘‘conservative 
                                                          
75 Fred Northedge. Descent from Power; British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973 (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1974), 24; Frankel, British Foreign Policy, 77; Christopher Hill, ‘‘The Historical Background: 
Past and Present in British Foreign Policy,’’ in British Foreign Policy; Tradition, Change and 
Transformation, eds. Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988) 40; 
Clarke, British External Policy-Making, 106; John Coles, Making Foreign Policy; A Certain Idea of 
Britain (London: John Murray, 2000) 33-58; Robert Self, British Foreign & Defence Policy Since 1945; 
Challenges & Dilemmas in a Changing World (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 33. 
76 Ian Hall and Nicholas Rengger, ‘‘The Right That Failed? The Ambiguities of Conservative Thought 
and the Dilemmas of Conservative Practice in International Affairs,’’ International Affairs 81, no. 1 
(2005): 69-82; Self, Foreign & Defence Policy, 31-34;  Beech, ‘‘Traditions and Ideas,’’; Jamie Gaskarth, 
‘‘Interpreting Ethical Foreign Policy: Traditions and Dilemmas for Policymakers,’’ British Journal of 




pragmatism.’’ Although this approach does not automatically lead to a consistent attitude 
toward the use of force, it generally discourages interventionist tendencies, particularly 
tendencies that are rooted in arguments about ethics and values. The non-interventionist 
approach of the Major government toward the conflict in Bosnia was illustrative of this 
tendency.  
The second section discusses the emergence of ‘‘liberal interventionism’’ during the New 
Labour period. It shows that despite the common usage of this label to describe the approach of 
the Labour government and Tony Blair in particular, it is generally poorly defined in the 
existing literature. This section therefore confronts these definitional issues head on, outlining 
some of the main elements of the liberal interventionist approach and differentiating it from the 
wider tradition of liberal thinking from which it has emerged. It rejects the commonplace 
assumption that liberal interventionism can be reduced to a ‘‘doctrine’’ and suggests again that 
it should be seen as part of a broader philosophy or world-view. While some have sought to 
outline this philosophy in reference to more abstract taxonomies that have been developed in IR 
theory, this chapter attempts to develop an historical interpretation, one that shows the 
interrelationship between the ideas and the context in which they were developed.  Taken 
together, the first two sections constitute a conceptual framing for the wider argument put 
forward in this thesis. 
The concluding section outlines the importance of the ‘‘liberal conservative’’ approach that 
members of the Conservative Party promised in opposition and after coming to power in May 
2010. Drawing on existing academic literature and some of the more prominent foreign policy 
speeches and policy documents available from this period, it shows that liberal conservatism 
was presented as an approach that sought to combine realism and idealism. When placed in its 
proper historical context, it can be read as an attempt to articulate a position that was a middle 
ground between conservative pragmatism and liberal interventionism. Liberal conservatism, as 
articulated by both David Cameron and William Hague, was equivocal concerning its attitude 
toward the use of force. However, the overall thrust of the rhetoric suggested a fundamental 
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departure from the liberal interventionist ethos of the New Labour era and an approach that 
would be far more cautious and restrained in this regard. 
Conservative Pragmatism 
 
Successive generations of scholarship have emphasised the role of a tradition of ‘‘pragmatism’’ 
in shaping British foreign policy.77 In the context of British foreign policy, this label denotes 
something more than is intended by its colloquial usage. Instead, pragmatism can be seen as an 
interrelated set of axioms and principles that tend to exist alongside a particular world-view. 
The first component of this pragmatism is its empiricism.78 As Christopher Hill explains, 
‘‘pragmatism should mean a willingness to face facts and to accept an unavoidable change 
without fuss.’’79 Implorations to focus on the facts are also typically accompanied by a hostility 
to what are regarded as ‘‘grand designs,’’ a phrase used to capture the pragmatist’s celebrated 
suspicion of ideology.80 Regardless of the presence or absence of any such ideology, 
pragmatism as a ‘‘method’’ tends to rely on ad hoc solutions and discourage any over-arching 
sense of strategic vision.81 As a deputy under-secretary in the Foreign Office, quoted by 
Michael Clarke, said:  ‘‘our skill is in not having a grand strategic concept.’’82   
The second key component of this tradition is its consequentialism. Policy options are assessed 
not upon the basis of their intuitive appeal or the extent to which they conform with rules and 
principles, but on a sober calculation of their likely consequences. Malcolm Rifkind, who 
served as both Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary under the Major government, identifies 
this aspect as key to his self-description as a ‘‘pragmatic politician,’’ explaining how policy 
options should be considered, ‘‘on the basis of the likely consequences of the policy one 
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chooses and not simply on perceived ethical or moral considerations.’’83 The third key 
component of the pragmatic tradition is its conservatism. What is presented as a non-ideological 
approach is often simply a reified version of the common sense and taken for granted 
assumptions of a particular point in time. As Frankel argues in his sophisticated discussion of 
the role of ‘‘pragmatism’’ in British foreign policy, many of those who claim to be pragmatic 
‘‘simply follow conventional wisdom and pursue antiquated theories.’’84  
This pragmatic philosophy has a strong overlap with the ideas of realism. Pragmatism can often 
be invoked in support of policy positions that would resonate just as easily with a liberal 
philosophy of international politics, but recent scholarship has in general rightfully highlighted 
the greater overlap with realism.85 Empiricism and consequentialism both lend themselves 
easily to realist modes of reasoning but both pragmatism and realism draw upon an underlying 
tradition of philosophical and political conservatism to such an extent that it might be more 
sensible to speak of a tradition of ‘‘conservative pragmatism.’’ This is an approach that shares 
with the realist tradition a recurring emphasis on interests. National interest is a concept that 
still retains its prominence in both popular and scholarly discussions of British foreign policy,86  
and in the tradition of conservative-pragmatism there is a disproportionate focus on this concept 
and its ability to serve as guide to decision-making.  More importantly, this approach tends to 
take for granted a particular view of national interest, one that is status quo oriented and 
narrowly defined.87 While there is an equally long tradition of presenting British interests as 
synonymous with the interests of the rest of humanity, this conservative pragmatic tradition, 
with its more narrow vision of national interest, is comfortable embracing the logic of 
realpolitik and prioritising British ‘‘interests’’ ahead of other considerations. In Percy 
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Craddock’s The Defence of British Interests, which provides an overview of his time as a 
foreign policy adviser during the governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, there is, 
for example, almost no reference to the subject of human rights.88   
The underlying pessimism means that despite its empiricism, the conservative-pragmatic 
tradition is one that has at its core a bleak perspective on human nature and a world-view that 
envisions, at best, a gradual evolutionary change in global order and more often, a persistence 
with an unjust status quo. This leads to a foreign policy outlook that is routinely lacking in 
ambition in its efforts to change the external environment. Lord Carrington, for instance, who 
served as Foreign Secretary under the first Thatcher government explained that, ‘‘I am a 
pragmatist, I have found all my life that the gulf between what is theoretically desirable and 
what is practically attainable is so wide that it is sensible to concentrate almost exclusively on 
the latter.’’89 None of this leads automatically to a particular disposition toward the use of force 
and there is little within this tradition of thinking that speaks directly to issues like humanitarian 
intervention. Yet it is self-evidently the case that the above principles can be more faithfully 
recruited to argue against such interventions than they could be harnessed in their favour. It is 
by drawing upon ideas similar to those outlined above that Conservatives have traditionally 
warned against humanitarian intervention.90 
All of this was borne out under the Major government in the mid-1990s. The genocide in 
Rwanda, which claimed the lives of 800,000 people in just one hundred days, barely registered 
on the radar of British political elites.91 In Bosnia, Britain was more closely involved, but the 
international community’s response proved inadequate to stem the tide of ethnically-motivated 
killings. This culminated in the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, when a poorly defended UN ‘‘safe 
haven’’ was overrun and 8,000 Muslim men and boys were murdered. In the build up to these 
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events, British policy, under the stewardship of Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, had 
consistently opposed new and greater forms of intervention such as the preferred US strategy of 
‘‘lift and strike.’’ Critics of British policy blame this philosophy for allowing crimes against 
humanity in Europe. 92 In his scathing and polemical attack on what he describes as Britain’s 
‘‘unfinest hour,’’ historian Brendan Simms points the finger of blame for British policy at the 
‘‘profoundly conservative philosophical realism of its practitioners.’’93 
Liberal Interventionism 
 
Liberal interventionism drew on a tradition of idealist or liberal thinking, but it emerged as a 
distinct approach in British foreign policy in the context of events in Bosnia and other post-
Cold War developments such as globalization. In political discourse, the term was used to refer 
to an approach which embraced a greater willingness to intervene in the sovereign affairs of 
other states, often with military force, in order to prevent humanitarian crises and promote 
‘‘liberal’’ values such as human rights and democracy.94 This approach was strongly associated 
with the policies of the New Labour period and Tony Blair in particular and the Labour Prime 
Minister was happy to accept this as an appropriate label for his views.95   
Blair’s speech to the Chicago Club during NATO’s Kosovo campaign in 1999, referred to as 
the ‘‘Doctrine of the International Community,’’ was seen as a seminal statement of this 
position.96 In this speech, Blair located the Kosovo war and the justifications for it within a 
framework which provided what many took to be a radical defence of military interventionism. 
Interdependence and globalization, he suggested, forced a fundamental rethink of some of the 
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key principles that had guided the foreign policies of Western governments. He declared NATO 
action to be part of a ‘‘just war’’ that was being fought solely in the name of ‘‘values.’’ In his 
memoirs, Blair described this speech as advancing, ‘‘a very simple notion: intervention to bring 
down a despotic dictatorial regime could be justified on grounds of the nature of that regime, 
not merely its immediate threat to our interest.’’97 While Kosovo was seen as the ‘‘high point’’ 
of liberal intervention,98 a similar set of ideas and beliefs underpinned subsequent interventions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, where military force was motivated by a mixture of security, 
humanitarian and political goals, with no shortage of idealistic rhetoric to serve as 
justification.99  
Liberal interventionism is often used in academic discussion of British foreign policy, but much 
like the frequent references to ‘‘pragmatism,’’ scholarship tends to take for granted the meaning 
of this label. For example, in the most cited article on the ideas that have influenced the 
approach of the Coalition government to foreign policy, Matt Beech twice uses the phrase 
‘‘muscular liberal interventionism’’ but does not define this term.100 In one of the first book-
length studies of the Cameron-Clegg government, Rhiannon Vickers’ chapter on foreign policy 
twice refers to ‘‘liberal interventionism’’ without providing any definition.101 Oliver Daddow 
and Pauline Schnapper102 and Victoria Honeyman103 also do not define the term, despite using it 
in the title of their articles. In some instances, liberal interventionism is used interchangeably 
with ‘‘humanitarian intervention.’’ In an edited volume on the history of humanitarian 
intervention, Matthew Jamison’s chapter on the post-Cold War period generally treats the two 
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as one and the same, while briefly describing liberal intervention as ‘‘intervention to safeguard 
and promote liberal democratic freedoms.’’104 Similarly, in a recent article on the role of human 
rights in the foreign policy of the Cameron governments, Matt Beech and Paul Munce explain 
in a footnote how they asked their interview participants what they felt about ‘‘liberal 
intervention’’ despite referring only to humanitarian intervention in the text of their article.105  
 
On the occasions it is more clearly defined, it has been reduced to a simple ‘‘doctrine’’ or a set 
of criteria governing the use of force. An attempt at a definition is provided by David Lipsey, 
who writes that: 
 
The doctrine of liberal interventionism states that national and international goals can be 
advanced by decisions by countries, individually or collectively, to intervene militarily in the 
internal affairs of other states. Such interventionism, moreover, can be justified not only when 
the intervening power’s or powers’ national interests are at stake, but also in the interests of the 
people of the country concerned. In particular, intervention can be right when human rights are 
being denied, either by repressive state authorities or as a side-effect of internal conflict.106 
 
On other occasions, scholarship will address the same themes and issues that are implicitly 
associated with liberal intervention but will do so under the banner of terms such as 
‘‘cosmopolitan liberal internationalism,’’107 or ‘‘neoliberal internationalism.’’108 Lawrence 
Freedman’s description of ‘‘liberal warfare’’ is typical: 
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Wars conducted in pursuit of a humanitarian agenda, and which are likely to lead to pressures 
for domestic political reform and reconstruction, I call liberal wars. The ideal type of liberal war 
is that it is altruistic in inspiration and execution. Such a war would focus on the balance of 
power within a state rather than between states and can be presented as rescuing whole 
populations, or particularly vulnerable sections, from tyrannical governments or social 
breakdown […] Liberal wars are not pursued in the name of strategic imperatives but because 
values are being affronted. Interests might be involved at the margins, but these are unlikely to 
count as ‘vital’, except in the most enlightened terms.109  
 
Taken together, this scholarship assumes three important things. Firstly, academic discussion of 
liberal interventionism takes for granted the basic idea that it is both idealist and hawkish. 
Secondly, these discussions take place on the presumption that ideas matter. Whether or not 
such literature is written from a constructivist perspective, liberal interventionism is implicitly 
presented as a set of ideas that has played a significant role in shaping foreign policy decisions 
and outcomes. Thirdly, much of this literature represents an attempt to discern the presence or 
absence of a distinctive approach to foreign policy, usually through a close focus on the New 
Labour period and the campaigns in Kosovo and Iraq. In light of the definitional and conceptual 
problems highlighted above, the following represents an attempt to move toward a more 
coherent, nuanced and historicist interpretation of liberal interventionism. While it is fairly 
commonplace for the literature to treat it as a simple ‘‘doctrine’’ or a set of criteria,110 it is 
preferable to interpret it as a broader philosophy or world-view, within which is nestled a 
particular disposition toward the use of force. As has been argued by Freedman, the author of 
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much of the Chicago speech, the problem with criteria or ‘‘tests’’ is that different individuals 
will draw different interpretations even when applying the same criteria.111  
 
Liberal interventionism shares with the wider liberal tradition an idealistic philosophy which is 
often universalistic and, at times, teleological. It is idealistic in its tendency to see events 
through the lens of its own progressive aspirations for human development. From this 
perspective, global order is constituted not by states, but by individual human beings. Such a 
perspective naturally aligns with a vision that promotes individual human rights and issues of 
justice ahead of the stability of the states-system and the institutions that sustain it.112 The 
promotion of human rights and democracy is one area where there is clear evidence of 
universalising tendencies as these political projects are taken to represent the natural aspirations 
of all people everywhere and as trans-historical solutions to complex global problems.113 This 
tends toward teleology when its adherents see these aspirations not simply as preferable and 
desirable long-term outcomes, but as part of a predestined path toward the fulfilment of a 
progressive agenda. For example, even after the problems unleashed by the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Blair still presented this as a key element in his own definition of ‘‘liberal 
intervention,’’ telling an audience in 2011 that ‘‘freedom is not a passing phase of history, it is 
an existential human impulse. It’s not a condition defined by one era, but the condition that 
defines the human spirit…’’114 Such idealistic rhetoric can easily translate into Manichean 
thinking, a tendency to split complex local conflicts into black and white categories, the one 
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representing the march of this human spirit and those opposing it seen as evil.115 The idealistic 
tenets described above might echo familiar themes to emerge in critiques of liberal thinking, yet 
they need to be understood in the specific context of post-Cold War optimism. It is no 
coincidence that the ideas associated with liberal interventionism emerged in a climate of 
ideological self-confidence, reflected in claims of an ‘‘end of history’’ and the calls from some 
intellectuals for a revitalised form of imperialism.116 Even when not advocating military 
intervention, liberal interventionists position themselves on an ideological moral high ground 
from which they strongly condemn those who transgress liberal norms in international society. 
 
Relatedly, a second key feature of liberal interventionism is the extent of its ambition and its 
confidence in the utility of military force to achieve its goals. There are clear parallels here with 
neoconservatism, the controversial ideology of the George W Bush administration with which 
Britain became closely aligned. The ‘‘neocons’’ promoted the unilateral use of US military 
power to establish democratic governments across the Middle East, a project that quickly 
became bogged down in the sectarian-fuelled civil war in Iraq. While this was clearly an 
ideology that was shaped by a specifically American context, neoconservatism inspired the 
creation of the Henry Jackson Society in Britain, which found powerful supporters on both 
sides of the partisan divide.117 At a more abstract level, Blair and others were certainly 
comfortable with this hawkish idealism.118 Although its proponents often rightly pointed out 
that such ideas were largely derived from liberal or idealist traditions of foreign policy thinking, 
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it is perhaps in this enthusiasm for military solutions that it departs so sharply from the liberal 
traditions that had shaped the Labour Party’s approach to world order. A key component of 
Labour’s liberal internationalism has been an anti-militarist streak. This tendency has 
manifested itself in different ways, but it has sometimes led to a suspicion of the use of force as 
an instrument of foreign policy.119 The Blair governments, in contrast, demonstrated a far 
greater faith in the value and utility of force.120 As Rhiannon Vickers observed in her lengthy 
history of Labour’s approach to foreign policy, ‘‘one of the biggest surprises of the Blair years 
was that he came to believe in the efficacy of the use of force as a foreign policy instrument, 
both as the ‘right’ thing to do for humanitarian reasons as well as being a valuable component 
of foreign policy in the longer-term pursuit of peace and international security.’’121 
Furthermore, liberal interventionism not only disregards scepticism toward the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes, it also sees military action as a powerful instrument for effecting more 
substantive liberal goals such as democracy promotion. As Freedman explains in his 
examination of ‘‘liberal warfare,’’ the goal is not simply to prevent mass atrocities but to create 
democratic political structures in the target states.122 This support for ‘‘regime change’’ was a 
key feature of the New Labour period but it often provoked criticism that British objectives 
were poorly defined as openly championing such goals was politically controversial.123 Liberal 
intervention therefore entails more than humanitarian intervention, even where it encompasses 
the latter.  
 
The decision-maker’s private moral calculus is often what takes precedence in shaping liberal 
interventionist foreign policy action. Blair was clear, particularly in regard to the Kosovo 
conflict, that he saw it primarily as a ‘‘moral’’ dilemma and that whatever his conception of 
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British interests, they were not the key determinant of his decision-making.124 In his memoirs, 
he goes on to acknowledge that, ‘‘posing and answering a moral question doesn’t inexorably 
lead to a military solution, but it establishes a framework that can do so. And it is a structure 
with a plainly different starting point from that of traditional foreign policy, which is: is this in 
our country’s interests?’’125 Despite some inconsistency, Blair was quite willing to knowingly 
allow his moral judgements to shape policy, even in situations where there were significant 
domestic political costs, as he showed again in his uncompromising support for Israel during 
the Lebanon War in 2006.126 However, the Labour leader was not alone in his preoccupation 
with morality and this attitude can be seen as part of a trend toward more ‘‘ethical’’ foreign 
policies. In 1997 New Labour’s Foreign Secretary Robin Cook announced that British foreign 
policy must have an ‘‘ethical dimension,’’ a controversial pledge that provoked a sustained 
academic commentary on the ethics of British foreign policy.127 While there are many aspects 
of continuity between New Labour’s foreign policy and that of its predecessors, some have seen 
this as the inauguration of a genuine change, at least in the language of British foreign policy, 
the benchmarks against which it is assessed and perhaps even its ideological foundations.128 The 
ethical turn in British foreign policy can therefore be read as part and parcel of the liberal 
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interventionist philosophy or at the very least, a substantial aspect of the ideological backdrop 
against which its core tenets were rehearsed in the years ahead. Additionally, while noting the 
centrality of ethical or moral considerations in the liberal interventionist approach, it is worth 
highlighting that such advocacy has generally taken for granted a particular type of ethical 
reasoning. The moral arguments made by Blair and others typically appealed to an intuitive 
sense of right and wrong, less so a careful deliberation of the likely consequences of any given 
proposal. This was reflected in Blair’s axiomatic loyalty to the ‘‘right thing to do’’ as if this 
label captured something that was self-evident.129  
 
There is arguably a wider context to this also. Liberal interventionism often involves the 
promotion of what are, ostensibly at least, humanitarian objectives. Yet the kind of 
humanitarianism taken for granted in liberal interventionist discourse is part of the 
abandonment of classical humanitarianism and changing approaches to the conception of 
international justice that took place within the NGO community from the 1970s onwards, 
reaching its apotheosis in the post-Cold War period.130  While classical humanitarianism, 
exemplified by the International Committee of the Red Cross, was premised on principles such 
as neutrality, the servicing of basic human needs and a willingness to embrace compromise 
solutions in the interests of peace, such thinking was increasingly challenged by NGOs who 
advocated an alternative ‘‘rights-based approach’’ (RBA).131 The RBA discourse promoted 
human rights alongside and sometimes ahead of basic human needs, was more willing to 
abandon neutrality to align with one side in a conflict (or with Western governments 
intervening) and called for purer solutions that represented justice even at the cost of peace.132  
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The liberal interventionist philosophy presented a twofold challenge to the role of national 
interest in British foreign policy. Firstly, a natural concomitant of the privileging of moral 
considerations was that national interest, while not completely marginalised, was certainly 
relegated in the pecking order of governmental priorities. Secondly, liberal interventionism in 
any case promoted a revised and expansive conception of national interest. Traditionally, the 
vision of national interest taken for granted by British elites was quite narrowly restricted and 
consistent with realist themes, but the debates over Bosnia in the mid-1990s opened up the 
grounds for a conceptual shift. Politicians on left and right began challenging the assumption 
that Britain had no major interests at stake in the conflict by pointing to the threat to regional 
stability and the damage to the credibility of key multilateral institutions like NATO.133  Blair’s 
Kosovo speech provided a justification of intervention by situating it within the perceived 
structural imperatives of globalization, captured in the punchy maxim that ‘‘we are all 
internationalists now.’’134 While arguments about the strategic implications of interdependence 
were hardly novel, this was being delivered in a climate where ‘‘globalization’’ was seen as a 
new form of interdependence that was both quantitatively and qualitatively different from its 
predecessors.135 Liberal interventionism claimed to be driven first and foremost by a basic sense 
of right and wrong, but the notion of a ‘‘globalized’’ world enabled its proponents to present 
their prescriptions as making sound strategic sense also. The ending of the Cold War also 
facilitated this shift. As Daddow and Gaskarth argue, the removal of a decades-long foe created 
a radical dilemma for British foreign policy in the 1990s. The solution, they argue, was no 
longer the mere protection of values through the guarding of territory, but the promotion of 
values abroad through a more interventionist agenda.136 Liberal intervention therefore provided 
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an updated vehicle for the survival of historic notions of Britain’s moral leadership in a 
changing global environment. 
 
Another key aspect of the liberal interventionist approach is its ambiguous attitude toward 
international law and contingent support for multilateral processes. The question of when to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of another state has long divided liberal thinking. As Ralph has 
shown, this faultline has played itself out in the context of British foreign policy, as the 
traditional liberal preference for multilateralism and international law often furnishes a liberal 
argument against intervention.137 Those who might identify with a classical liberal tradition are 
also more cautious about the long-term implications of bypassing international law and 
multilateral decision-making processes, and worry a resort to such actions might provoke a 
conservative ‘‘counter-offensive.’’138 In comparison to those liberals who prioritise such 
considerations, liberal interventionists are more willing to embrace controversial legal 
arguments or operate with smaller coalitions of the willing. This is in part a consequence of the 
extent to which liberal interventionism prioritises the ethical considerations of the individual 
decision-maker and possesses a greater ideological self-confidence than classical liberal 
internationalism. Yet it is also reflective of the fact that for liberal interventionism, support for 
international law and multilateralism is contingent and tactical, rather than based on principle. 
The liberal interventionist is more comfortable with bypassing what traditional liberal 
internationalism would regard as the sacrosanct pillars of the international order, even if their 
first preference is still for seeking solutions that are legal and retain multilateral support. 
A final core component of the liberal interventionist philosophy is its reliance on a negative 
argument. Specifically, liberal interventionism emphasises the costs and consequences of not 
intervening above and beyond the perceived benefits of military action. Such reasoning is often 
reflected in abstract declarations such as ‘‘inaction is also a choice with consequences,’’139 but 
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it is also a product of the fact that liberal interventionism situates itself within a narrative that 
begins with a politicised interpretation of the failures of British policy in Rwanda and Bosnia.140  
For a generation of British politicians, these episodes became key reference points in a story 
about the use and non-use of force in British foreign policy, providing cognitive shortcuts to a 
more hawkish and interventionist approach via the historical ‘‘lessons’’ that such atrocities 
must never be permitted to take place again. Liberal internationalism is a much broader 
tradition of thinking that was primarily concerned with building and maintaining an 
international order which would prevent conflict between major states. It entailed nothing 
specific regarding how to respond to conflicts and large scale human rights abuses inside the 
boundaries of existing states. As Blair argued in his Chicago speech, ‘‘the most pressing foreign 
policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively 
involved in other people's conflicts.’’141 Liberal interventionism thus emerged within a 
particular context and for the purpose of responding to a specific problem that its ideological 
antecedents had not directly addressed.  
‘‘Liberal Conservatism’’: A Middle Ground? 
 
Most of the literature on the foreign policy approach of the Coalition government has focused 
on the notion of ‘‘liberal conservatism.’’142 This was the name given by David Cameron to 
describe his approach, the core tenets of which were first set out during a speech in 2006. 
Speaking before an American audience, Cameron argued that he was liberal, ‘‘because I 
support the aim of spreading freedom and democracy, and support humanitarian intervention’’ 
but conservative ‘‘because I recognise the complexities of human nature, and am sceptical of 
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grand schemes to remake the world.’’143  He called for more ‘‘patience’’ and ‘‘humility,’’ 
arguing that democratic change could not be quickly imposed from outside and that military 
force was not always the most effective instrument in advancing this goal. Cameron enjoyed a 
close and effective relationship with his Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague,144 and while 
the latter was given plenty of freedom to develop his own ideas, he positioned himself in similar 
terms. In a speech in 2009 on ‘‘the future of British foreign policy’’ for example, Hague 
identified himself as a ‘‘Liberal Conservative,’’ speaking of the primacy of national interest and 
the need to be ‘‘realistic’’ in assessing the prospects for democratization on the one hand, while 
on the other making clear his support for the many interventions that had taken place during the 
Blair years and arguing that ‘‘to be idle or uninterested while others starve or murder each other 
in their millions is not for us.’’145  
 
There was no sign of any significant change to this rhetorical positioning following the 
formation of the Coalition government in May 2010. In a series of speeches outlining the 
foreign policy approach of the new government, Hague mixed themes and ideas that can be 
identified with both the pragmatic conservative tradition and the liberal interventionist 
approach: 
 
 We understand that idealism in foreign policy always needs to be tempered with realism. We 
have a liberal-conservative outlook that says that change, however desirable, can rarely be 
imposed on other countries, and that our ability to do so is likely to diminish with time. We 
know that we have to promote our values with conviction and determination but in ways that 
are suited to the grain of the other societies we are dealing with, particularly in fragile or post-
conflict states. As the Prime Minister has put it, we must be “hard-headed and practical” in the 
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pursuit of our goals, working to strengthen the international frameworks which can turn rhetoric 
on human rights into accountability and lasting change.146 
 
The effort to outline a liberal conservative foreign policy represented the first attempt by a new 
generation of Conservative leaders to grapple with a key aspect of the Blairite legacy. Prior to 
the Arab Spring, it is arguable that the presentation of liberal conservatism mattered more than 
its actual substance. As the above quotations suggest, it was clearly presented as a means of 
occupying a middle ground between realism and idealism or, alternatively, between the amoral 
pragmatism of the Major years and the perceived excesses of Blair’s hawkish idealism. To the 
extent that it was clearly equivocal and open to more than one interpretation, it seems quite 
plausible that this was not coincidental. The middle ground was a politically expedient territory 
to occupy given the lack of public support for continued military interventionism among the 
British public.147 
 
It is debateable whether this middle ground was equidistant between the two traditions outlined 
previously. Certainly, on the issue of military intervention in particular, the early indications 
were that Cameron and his fellow Conservatives did not share Blair’s appetite for warfighting. 
Cameron was not simply presenting himself as a less Blairite version of Blair. Instead, he was 
trying to stake out a distinct ideological territory. For example, in a more intimate discussion of 
his views in 2009, Cameron sought to illustrate liberal conservatism by contrasting it with the 
‘‘interventionist’’ approach of Blair, of which he was critical:  
 
I’ve always described myself as a liberal Conservative: liberal, because we do support the 
spread of human rights and democracy around the world, but Conservative because I think 
before intervening I think you have to demonstrate a practicality and scepticism and ask all the 
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difficult questions about the consequences of your involvement. And I think the problem with 
Blair was that he was a humanitarian interventionist [sic] without putting any kind of practical 
brake on these impulses… Blair was just too eager to jump in anywhere.148 
 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), 
which set out the Coalition government’s overall strategy for foreign and defence policy, 
provided a more formal nod in this direction in late 2010. In the former document, there was 
little mention of the issue, and the strategy suggested Britain would participate only on those 
occasions ‘‘where it is in our interests.’’149 The SDSR introduced a real terms defence cut of 
eight percent, as part of the government’s wider program of fiscal retrenchment.150 This could 
be read as a further indication that the type of military interventions that were commonly 
promoted during the New Labour years would be a thing of the past. If the Coalition 
government can be shown to have pursued a liberal interventionist approach to the crises in 
Libya and Syria, then this was largely at odds with the promises made by Cameron and Hague. 
It is also at odds with how Cameron himself sought to characterise Britain’s role in the Libyan 
war. As Chapter Three of this thesis shows in more detail, the Conservative leader resisted the 
attempts made by others to distil an overarching ideology in his approach, which he identified 
as that of a ‘‘practical, liberal conservative.’’151 
Conclusions 
 
The government’s response to the Arab Spring did not take place in an ideological and 
intellectual vacuum. The themes and ideas discussed here help to illustrate the context in which 
the Coalition operated and to historicise some of the assumptions and principles that shaped its 
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approach. The Coalition was not simply dealing with events as they arose, but was also 
grappling with the dual legacy of contrasting approaches to British foreign policy and the use of 
force. This chapter has sought to offer a more robust understanding of ‘‘liberal 
interventionism’’ than is available in the existing literature, in preparation for the wider themes 
that are developed in subsequent chapters.  
 
In summary, liberal interventionism is understood not simply as a doctrine, but as an approach 
to the use of force that is located within a broader world-view or philosophy. While drawing 
upon a liberal or idealist tradition of foreign policy thinking, this philosophy departs from more 
traditional liberal approaches in certain respects and emerged in a given historical context. It 
combines idealism with hawkishness, demonstrating both an ideological optimism and a 
confidence in the utility of military force to promote its goals. It often prioritises moral or 
ethical considerations in guiding decisions about the use of force and it adopts a broader and 
more malleable definition of national interest that is shaped by contemporary understandings of 
globalization. It enjoys a more ambiguous relationship with international legality and 
multilateral institutions, which are regarded as central pillars of traditional liberal foreign policy 
thinking. Finally, it rests on a negative argument about the perceived costs of non-intervention, 
an argument that is powerfully shaped by a politicised memory of the failures of the 
international community to respond adequately to slaughter in the Balkans in the 1990s.  
 
Finally, if the principles of historicism are to be adhered to consistently, then this chapter 
should also provide a warning against straight forward comparisons between the Labour period 
and the Coalition period. The interpretation of liberal interventionism advanced here recognises 
the interrelationship between ideas and context. The same must be applied in any attempt to 
examine the Coalition period and the events described in subsequent chapters. In the aftermath 
of the War in Iraq, with extant commitments in Afghanistan, and a climate of fiscal 
retrenchment following the world’s worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, Cameron, 
Hague and Clegg were operating in a context that was far less conducive to liberal 
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interventionism. The reputational damage caused by Iraq, the legacy of a war weary public 
opinion and the precedents established by allowing Parliament to vote on military deployments 
also meant that Blair had bequeathed to his successors a set of constraints that would make it 





Chapter Three: Libya: The Decision to Intervene 
 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, academic literature has so far largely bypassed the 
details surrounding Britain’s decision to intervene in the Libyan conflict, preferring instead to 
use this episode as a vehicle for arguments about the beliefs of policy actors or in the service of 
advancing a particular conceptual framework.152  While addressing some of these issues, the 
primary purpose of this chapter is to fill this empirical gap in the existing literature by 
explaining how and why Britain came to intervene militarily in the Libyan civil war in March 
2011. Without much serious scholarly scrutiny of this episode of British foreign policy, the 
most detailed explanations have so far been provided by various journalistic ‘‘insider’’ 
stories.153 These accounts emphasise the impetus that came from a hawkish prime minister, who 
is presented as determined to prevent an Arab ‘‘Srebrenica’’ and who had to overcome 
significant scepticism within his own government to prevent the fall of Benghazi.  
The analysis in this chapter retains the two core features of these narratives, emphasising the 
importance of the momentum provided by Cameron and the analogies with Bosnia in 
explaining British policy. However, it places such claims on a stronger evidential footing, by 
drawing upon a systematic survey of the contemporary documentary record and evidence later 
submitted by key decision-makers within the government to the FAC’s Libya inquiry in 2015. 
This chapter also challenges the suggestion that Cameron’s approach shows evidence of 
pragmatism and a scepticism of ideology, arguing instead that his forceful advocacy of force is 
symptomatic of a set of beliefs and assumptions that are consistent with liberal interventionism. 
Furthermore, the analysis in this chapter offers a more nuanced understanding of the role of 
analogical reasoning and the nature and extent of scepticism Cameron had to overcome in 
pushing for intervention, suggesting that the latter is sometimes over-exaggerated in existing 
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accounts. Finally, while these insider stories tend to conflate a month-long process into a single 
monolithic debate, this chapter shows how policy evolved via a series of stages, with the 
decisions made at one stage shaping the options available at subsequent points in the crisis. This 
latter point is reflected in the structure of this chapter, which corresponds to four distinct stages 
in the response.  
The first section briefly describes Britain’s initial response to the ‘‘Arab Spring.’’ It locates the 
Libyan crisis and British policy toward it within this wider context.  It argues that the impact of 
the regional unrest on British policy was profound, predisposing policymakers to view events in 
Libya through an idealistic lens and rendering that country a suitable vehicle for restoring 
British credibility in a context where it was being challenged. This section briefly describes the 
first few days of the Libyan unrest, which coincided with the highpoint of the Arab Spring. 
British policy during this period struggled to keep pace with events and decision makers had to 
react to developments with little understanding of what was happening on the ground in Libya.  
The second section analyses the turning point in British policy between 21 and 22 February, 
during which Britain severed its links with the Gaddafi regime and occupied a position of 
diplomatic leadership at the UN. This diplomatic lead culminated in the passage of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1970 on 26 February, which imposed financial restrictions and an arms 
embargo on the Gaddafi regime and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The importance of these developments, and the central role played by Britain in this 
international response, is often neglected in the existing accounts of British policy. This section 
argues that this period in Britain’s response to the crisis was important in narrowing the options 
available in the future and began the process of conflating the goals of humanitarian protection, 
regime change and democratization. It shows how Britain’s diplomatic strategy was premised 
on a mistaken assumption about the durability of the Gaddafi regime. Contrary to this optimistic 
expectation of the regime’s collapse, Gaddafi promised to retain power at almost any cost, 
plunging Libya into civil war.  
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The third section analyses David Cameron’s decision to advocate military action in his 
statement to the House of Commons on 28 February, and the political and diplomatic backlash 
that resulted from this more forward posture. It shows how Cameron’s position was radical, 
idealistic and demonstrative of a cavalier attitude toward international law, multilateral 
diplomacy and the practicability of military action. In this regard, it points to the parallels 
between Cameron’s thinking and the liberal interventionism outlined in Chapter 2. This section 
also shows how the Prime Minister’s position further encouraged the conflation of regime 
change and civilian protection.  
The fourth section analyses the strategy Britain adopted in pursuit of a military response, which 
centred around three key criteria: demonstrable need, regional support and clear legal basis. 
This section suggests that these criteria, introduced by Foreign Secretary William Hague on 7 
March, provided the parameters within which an official consensus could exist. The rapid 
advance of Gaddafi’s forces on the ground, the request from the Arab League for a no-fly zone 
and the successful acquisition of a legal mandate from the UN on 17 March changed the 
calculus within the National Security Council. So too did the dramatic change of position from 
the White House, which helped secure a broader mandate than Britain had originally envisaged 
and provided US military capabilities without which the action taken may not have been 
possible. This section therefore argues that the scepticism that Cameron had to overcome must 
not be overstated, as the changing situation removed many of the grounds for its existence. 
Furthermore, this section documents the importance of analogical reasoning in British policy, 
showing how the desire to prevent ‘‘another Srebrenica’’ was not simply a powerful motive for 
those who, like Cameron, strongly favoured military action. The pervasiveness and moral 
power of this argument was equally important in persuading those who were initially sceptical 
about the prospects of intervention. 
The concluding section of this chapter summarises two wider points that can be drawn from this 
analysis. Firstly, it highlights how the ‘‘historical lessons’’ of Iraq lost out to the lessons of 
Bosnia when combined with the impact of the Arab revolutions. Secondly, it argues that the 
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beliefs and assumptions that motivated the Prime Minister, while to some extent reflective of 
the greater constraints observed on the use of force following the experience of Iraq, are in fact 
much closer to the ‘‘liberal interventionism’’ of the New Labour period than has been 
recognised until now. Cameron was happy to contemplate military action without UN approval 
and possibly also without US support. He did so not simply because of a need to protect 
civilians, but also because of his personal animosity toward Gaddafi and his belief that military 
force would help spread the seeds of democracy in Libya.  
Libya and the Arab Spring 
 
Foreign Secretary William Hague would later herald the Arab revolutions as surpassing 9-11 
and the 2008 financial crisis in terms of their long-term implications and as presenting the 
greatest opportunity for the advancement of human rights and democracy since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.154 Yet the self-immolation of Tunisia street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi on 17 
December 2010, conventionally regarded as the spark that ignited this historical drama, has 
only taken on its symbolic importance with the benefit of hindsight. It is widely acknowledged 
that the Arab Spring caught Western governments and their intelligence agencies completely by 
surprise.155 As the Chief of Defence staff later recalled of the immediate reaction, ‘‘we all went 
home for Christmas none the wiser.’’156  While the protest movement in Tunisia would force 
the removal of that country’s pro-Western dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, on 14 January, the 
uprising in Tunisia was viewed as a localised disturbance in a country where few British 
interests were at stake.157 The government’s public statements in response to events in Tunisia – 
or the absence of them -  are indicative of the lack of importance Britain attached to events 
there. There was no discussion of events in Tunisia in Parliament until after Ben Ali had fled to 
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Saudi Arabia and it was not until February that the Foreign Secretary himself updated 
Parliament on developments in that country, more than two weeks after the government had 
fallen. Those statements made by the Foreign Office were generally devoid of the optimism and 
idealism in which the government later presented its response to the Arab revolutions.158 In fact, 
the National Security Council  (NSC), the newly created nexus of strategic decision-making, 
did not even discuss the implications of this regional instability until 1 February.159 
 
Protests in Egypt, a key regional ally and a country with which Britain had much stronger and 
more valuable links, began to alert the government to the significance of what was soon to 
become a regional awakening.160 Hundreds of thousands of unarmed demonstrators, whose 
initial calls for reform had hardened into demands for Mubarak’s resignation following the 
regime’s violence toward demonstrators at the end of January, necessitated the British 
government defining where it stood.  The United States would play the lead role in shaping the 
Western response to events in Egypt, given the close military relationship between the two 
countries. We have access to several detailed accounts of decision-making within the US during 
this crucial period, and all of them suggest the US response was determined almost solely in 
reference to internal debates and deliberations, with allies such as Britain having no input into 
this process.161 Within the Obama administration there was a clear ideological divide between 
realists and idealists, with the latter encouraging a show of solidarity with the forces of 
democratic change and the former warning against abandoning long-term allies and 
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encouraging a transformation whose final destination was far from certain. President Obama 
finally decided to call for Mubarak’s departure on 1 February, despite scepticism from members 
of his own administration, including Secretary of Defence Robert Gates and Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton.  
Seldon and Snowdon claim that Cameron was instinctively supportive of the protesters from the 
outset, but there appears to have been at this stage still some division within the British 
government as to how to respond.162 Education Secretary Michael Gove, a known 
neoconservative, was reportedly in favour of strong shows of support for the protesters.163 Other 
key members of the cabinet, reportedly including Defence Secretary Liam Fox, were more 
suspicious of the potential dangers inherent in the protest movements. While the divisions do 
not appear as stark as in the US case, a similar split between realist and idealist perspectives 
was present. The repeated calls for ‘‘orderly transition’’ betrayed an apparent lack of 
enthusiasm for events that just a few weeks later would be celebrated as evidence of the march 
of freedom.164 The Prime Minister’s first serious comments certainly showed greater idealism 
and ideological fervour than those of his Foreign Secretary. During Prime Minister’s Questions 
Cameron described how, ‘‘we cannot watch the scenes in Cairo without finding it incredibly 
moving – people want to have those aspirations in Egypt, as we have them in our own 
country.’’165 These remarks, however, were only made after Obama had publicly called for 
Mubarak’s departure. The British government’s initial response appeared equivocal and non-
committal. Rather than publicly insist on Mubarak’s quitting power, Downing Street stuck to 
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the line that it was ‘‘not for us to dictate.’’166 The more enthusiastic embrace of democratization 
did not come until after Mubarak’s belated departure on 11 February presented the British 
government with a fait accompli.  
By this stage ministers and officials were grappling with what one Foreign Office official 
appropriately described as a ‘‘lack of bandwidth.’’167 Events in Egypt were quickly followed by 
the eruption of multiple crises, as an entire regional order appeared to teeter under the weight of 
popular protests. The contagion effect reached Yemen at the end of January, threatening to 
further destabilise the region’s most conflict-prone state.168 The country had long been a major 
focus of diplomatic attention owing to the growing presence of Al Qaeda on its territory. Mass 
protests in Bahrain, a country where British interests were clearly implicated, began on 14 
February and were followed, just three days later, by unrest in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern 
Province.169 It was in the midst of these developments that the uprising in the eastern half of 
Libya suddenly erupted. A government which had been in power for less than a year, whose 
leader had little to no experience of handling major international crises and whose foreign 
ministry had seen its regional expertise steadily eroded in recent years was ill-equipped to face 
what was later said to be the busiest time for the Foreign Office since the end of the Cold 
War.170 In any case, the safe evacuation of British nationals took priority over developing a 
coherent political response. In the case of Libya, the difficulties with the evacuation were 
significant enough to provoke a consular review.171  
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Hague and Cameron were both criticised for their handling of these events. The Foreign Office 
was depicted as slow and incompetent, while the Prime Minister was accused of failing to 
provide effective leadership.172 Criticisms of Cameron as a foreign policy bystander were 
compounded by his decision to embark on a regional trade tour in the Gulf region, selling arms 
to dictators at the very same time as Arab populations were mobilising to fight for their 
freedom.173 An awareness of this context should caution against making like-for-like 
comparisons between Britain’s response to events in each country impacted by the unrest. The 
sequencing of events matters. As the Libyan crisis arrived after events in Tunisia and Egypt it 
provided an opportunity to salvage the credibility of a Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 
under attack on the domestic front and align British policy with the region’s prevailing political 
winds. The lessons drawn from events in Tunisia and Egypt would also determine expectations 
of what was to come elsewhere. 
Above all though, the wider context of the Arab Spring profoundly shaped the ideational 
context within which the British government debated how to respond to the Libyan crisis. The 
Prime Minister used his regional tour as an opportunity to belatedly set out his approach, 
mixing apologies for previous mistakes with bold promises of support for reform and 
democratization. On 22 February, in a speech before the National Assembly in Kuwait, 
Cameron set out the key principles underlying the revised regional policy: 
For decades, some have argued that stability required highly controlling regimes, and that 
reform and openness would put that stability at risk.  So, the argument went, countries like 
Britain faced a choice between our interests and our values.  And to be honest, we should 
acknowledge that sometimes we have made such calculations in the past. But I say that is a 
false choice.  
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As recent events have confirmed, denying people their basic rights does not preserve stability, 
rather the reverse. Our interests lie in upholding our values - in insisting on the right to peaceful 
protest, in freedom of speech and the internet, in freedom of assembly and the rule of law.174  
The Libyan crisis thus coincided with an ideological shift, away from the middle ground 
claimed by liberal conservatism and in favour of a more liberal and idealist view of the world. 
This was part of the government’s effort to develop what the FCO described as a ‘‘coherent 
narrative’’ to explain its political response, a process that struggled to keep pace with events. 175 
This new approach centred around a revised understanding of ‘‘stability,’’ which would 
henceforward be viewed as contingent upon the development of rule of law, civil society 
institutions and concrete steps toward democratic governance, in contrast to the cosmetic 
reforms embarked upon in the 2000s. This formula was at the heart of the government’s 
‘‘Building Stability Overseas Strategy,’’ published in June of that year and based on the 
argument that the Arab Spring had ‘‘challenged long standing notions of stability.’’176 It 
replaced the orthodox, realist understanding of stability with a new definition, presenting 
democratic institutions not simply as the route to this objective, but as synonymous with 
stability itself:  
 
The stability we are seeking to support can be defined in terms of political systems which are 
representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies 
in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established 
and opportunities for social and economic development open to all.177 
 
Many of the ideas outlined in Cameron’s speech were far from being entirely new. The notion 
that there was no conflict between Britain’s pursuit of its interests and the promotion of its 
                                                          
174 David Cameron, ‘‘Speech to the Kuwaiti National Assembly,’’ 22 February 2011, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-minister-urges-reform-in-the-middle-east 
175 FAC, Arab Spring, Ev 69.  




values was an idea already at the heart of ‘’liberal conservatism,’’ which claimed to be based on 
the pursuit of an ‘‘enlightened national interest.’’178 The vision Cameron was setting out also 
incorporated an explicit recognition that these events were driven by endogenous factors and 
that it was not for outsiders, least of all Western governments, to impose their values or 
solutions on Arab peoples. Aware of the sensitivities of powerful allies, Cameron insisted that 
‘‘we in the West have no business trying to impose our particular local model. The evolution of 
political and economic progress will be different in each country.’’179 This apparent humility 
was consistent with Cameron’s previous attempt to position himself as a critic of 
neoconservative ideology and the disaster of Iraq.  
Yet if Iraq had dented the appetite for democracy promotion across the Middle East, the overall 
thrust of Britain’s response was clear evidence that the ‘‘Arab Spring’’ was pulling the 
pendulum back in the opposite direction. As the above extract from the speech makes clear, 
Cameron was calling for a fundamental departure in Britain’s policy toward a region of crucial 
strategic importance and the government continued to characterise its policy as a ‘‘values-based 
approach.’’180 The assumption that the existing rulers were the most dependable bulwark 
against the prospect of Islamist extremism establishing itself, an argument sometimes known as 
‘‘Arab exceptionalism’’ because of its implication that the region was unfit for democracy, was 
discarded by Cameron as a ‘‘prejudice that borders on racism.’’181 It is not surprising that 
contemporary observers would treat these claims with suspicion given the slow response and 
the impression created by Cameron’s effort to sell arms. In the press conference following the 
speech referred to above, a journalist captured the prevailing political mood by accusing the 
Prime Minister of ‘‘playing catch up with events.’’182 
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If these suspicions might have been justified at the time, the evidence suggests that after some 
equivocation in response to the turmoil in Egypt, many inside the British government genuinely 
came to embrace an idealistic and optimistic narrative surrounding the Arab Spring. The 
government’s rhetoric emphasised the role of values, both in driving the protest movement and 
shaping the British response.183 The defeat of the countervailing forces presented by the existing 
regimes was seen as inevitable given the ‘‘historic’’ nature of the events taking place. The 
protesters were perceived as a pan-Arab yearning for universal freedoms driven by a youthful, 
middle class and secular movement. It became axiomatic to claim that the Western world, with 
Britain playing a leadership role, should stand in support of such values. This was not a moment 
to be fearful or cautious, but instead a ‘‘moment when history turns the page’’ as Cameron 
would subsequently claim.184 As Ralph, Holland and Zhekova rightly note in their detailed 
analysis of this narrative, it tended toward the teleological.185 This view had not fully settled at 
this early stage and it is analysed in more detailed in Chapter Five. However, its key elements 
were already coming into focus by the time Gaddafi faced popular protests against his rule a 
week after the fall of the Mubarak regime, during the zenith of the Arab Spring. It would 
provide a ready-made story about events in Libya, one that resonated with those whose 
ideological predisposition leaned more towards a liberal or idealist worldview and was 
especially comforting in a situation where there was little reliable information about actual 
events on the ground.  
Britain’s bilateral relationship with Libya was a curious affair.186 Following Blair’s efforts to 
resuscitate Gaddafi’s international reputation in return for his abandonment of his WMD 
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programme in 2004, British policy toward Libya had been broadly supportive of the Gaddafi 
regime. In particular, the Foreign Office had sought to build close links with Gaddafi’s son and 
heir apparent Saif al-Islam, identifying him as a Westernised reformer who might steer the 
country in a more liberal direction.187 This policy was continued after the Coalition government 
was formed in 2010.188 Privately, however, Cameron was clearly uncomfortable with this 
strategy of engagement. According to Seldon and Snowdon, he had a ‘‘visceral’’ dislike of 
Gaddafi and was ‘‘repulsed’’ by Blair’s efforts to rehabilitate him.189 In 2010, the Prime 
Minister turned down the opportunity to attend a summit hosted by Gaddafi, ‘‘because he said 
he would go nowhere near him.’’190 This personal dimension undoubtedly partly accounts for 
how Cameron could so suddenly emerge as a champion of democratic regime change in Libya, 
despite Britain’s previous policy of engagement and despite his previous warnings that ‘‘you 
cannot drop a fully formed democracy out of an aeroplane at 40,000 feet.’’191 At the height of 
the Libyan crisis, Cameron would publicly declare how, ‘‘I have never supported Colonel 
Gaddafi or his regime, and I think that his regime is illegitimate.’’192 
Libya’s descent into chaos began on the night of 15 February, with protests in the eastern city of 
Benghazi in response to the arrest of two human rights lawyers.193 Alongside the contagion 
effect of wider regional unrest, these protests provided the spark that ignited longstanding 
grievances. Within a mere five days, much of the eastern half of the country had fallen to what 
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quickly became an armed insurrection, aided by significant defections from the military. The 
conventional wisdom is that this was a national, pro-democratic uprising, with largely unarmed 
peaceful protesters initially calling for reform. Attacks on police buildings and military bases 
were attributed to the response of the regime itself, its extreme brutality forcing protesters to 
take up arms and resort to more ‘‘offensive’’ actions. Regardless of whether this overall 
framing does justice to the complexity of the uprising, it is clear that both the scale of violence 
during this initial phase, as well as the speed of escalation, placed Libya in a somewhat separate 
category to events elsewhere in the region.194 By 21 February, Libya was on the brink of what 
would be a complicated and multi-dimensional civil war.  
The British government struggled to keep pace with these developments and lacked reliable 
information about events on the ground. This is hinted toward in the statements released by the 
Foreign Office, which expressed various levels of ‘‘concern’’ with ‘‘reports’’ that were 
emerging from Libya, implying that the government did not have its own independent sources 
of information.195 A clearer indication that the government’s own sources of intelligence were 
limited came on 21 February, when Hague wrongly announced that Gaddafi was likely on his 
way to exile in Venezuela.196 Media reporting and other open source material was also less 
reliable and informative than it might otherwise have been, given the regime’s unwillingness to 
grant access, the frenetic pace of events and the geographical difficulties of reporting in and 
from Libya.197  
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Further evidence of the importance of this factor was clear throughout the various submissions 
of evidence provided to the FAC in 2015. Both Liam Fox, who served as Defence Secretary 
during this period, and General Richards, who was the Chief of Defence Staff and the 
government’s most senior military adviser, repeatedly emphasised the ‘‘fluid’’ picture they 
received, the speed at which events moved and the limitations of the intelligence the 
government possessed.198 Alan Duncan, who was a junior minister in the Department for 
International Development (DFID) during this time, argued that the government’s Libya 
expertise had become ‘‘very thin’’ because of the priority given to relations between elites.199 
Only Hague sought to defend the government from the subsequent accusation that it was 
working with limited intelligence and a flawed understanding of what was happening on the 
ground. Yet he did so less by contesting the substance of the accusation and more by suggesting 
that Britain was not alone in its relative state of ignorance:  
Remember, these revolutions—Egypt, Tunisia, Libya—were not foreseen, even days before, by 
the regimes in those countries, with massive intelligence services. They did not understand the 
militias, the tribes, the movements and what was happening in their own country, so there is not 
much hope that a foreign intelligence service would have a more profound understanding.200 
The very fact that the government lacked reliable information and that key decisions had to be 
made under intense time pressures made it much easier and more natural to filter events in 
Libya through the emerging lens of the ‘‘Arab Spring’’ and to view Libya as a suitable 
candidate for an intervention that would restore Britain’s moral credibility. This was especially 
so for a Prime Minister who long harboured a personal dislike of Colonel Gaddafi.  
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British Policy and UN Resolution 1970 
 
No account of British policy toward Libya would be complete without acknowledging the 
possible role of the media. This factor likely reinforced the tendency to see the protesters as part 
of an ‘‘Arab Spring,’’ a tendency which overlooked some of the local complexities of the 
conflict and exaggerated the brutality on Gaddafi’s side.201 Without reporters on the ground, 
local reports and witness statements were ‘‘hard to verify,’’202 but often accepted when they 
coincided with the preconceived narrative. The dominant framing of events pitted unarmed pro-
democracy protesters, sometimes including women and children, against the full military might 
of an insane dictator and his force of ‘‘foreign mercenaries.’’203 The high point of media 
sensationalism came between 20 and 21 February, coinciding with the most violent phase of the 
uprising when serious unrest was visited on Tripoli for the first time and the next two largest 
cities effectively fell to opposition forces. On 20 February, witness statements had spoken of 
women and children jumping off bridges in Benghazi as they sought to escape from ‘‘African 
mercenaries’’ and there was much talk of ‘‘massacres’’ having taken place.204 On 21 February, 
news of violent repression in the capital was coupled with widespread allegations of the regime 
using its air force against unarmed civilian demonstrators. A witness described ‘‘warplanes and 
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helicopters… indiscriminately bombing one area after another’’ while others spoke of 
‘‘mercenary forces opening fire at random on people in the capital.’’205 The dramatic defection 
of Libya’s deputy ambassador to the UN, and his loose talk of ‘‘genocide’’ added to the 
growing demonization of the regime.206 This bias and sensationalism reinforced the sense of 
urgency in formulating a response.  
The majority of the more extreme claims were in fact untrue, or at least misleading. The 
casualty figures, while certainly higher than regional equivalents, were slightly at odds with 
some of the more sensational headlines, and certainly inconsistent with suggestions of 
‘‘genocide.’’207 Concerning the violence in Tripoli, it is still unclear exactly what happened. It 
has been established that approximately two hundred people were killed in a two-day period 
between 20th and 21st of February. It is also generally accepted that unrest in the capital involved 
the burning and destruction of government buildings. As for which of these occurred first, the 
evidence is inconclusive.208   The US Defense Secretary later confirmed before a Senate 
committee hearing that the Pentagon had been unable to corroborate any of the reports about the 
use of air power against civilians.209 Hugh Roberts, who was at the time director of the ICG’s 
North Africa Project, also found no evidence to support these claims, despite having gone out of 
his way in search of it.210 The first of two lengthy reports by the UN Human Rights Council 
made reference to media allegations of the air force bombing civilians in Tripoli, but provided 
no additional supporting evidence.211 The second, updated report, published in March 2012 
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simply ignored the allegations entirely and made no reference to any use of air power at all.212  
The same report found no evidence to support the previously ubiquitous claims about the use of 
‘‘African mercenaries.’’213 Although evidence was uncovered of Gaddafi having imported an 
organized force of Sudanese fighters, that was not until June and even these fighters were not 
considered ‘‘mercenaries’’ under international law.214 Talk of genocide was also a gross 
distortion given both the scale of the killings and, more importantly, the absence of any racial 
motivation behind the regime’s attacks.  
 
It is not possible to quantify precisely the extent to which all of this influenced British policy, 
but the media undoubtedly played a part in shaping official perceptions of the crisis, 
encouraging miscalculation and creating political pressure in favour of a strong response. Much 
of the government’s rhetoric mirrored the framing provided by the media and Cameron’s 
subsequent advocacy of a no-fly zone was surely encouraged by what were sometimes false 
reports about the possible use of air power against civilians. According to Jeremy Bowen, the 
officials he interviewed suggested the media did have an important impact on the development 
of policy. The veteran BBC reporter writes that, ‘‘they were setting the agenda of politicians 
and officials, putting them under pressure to move fast and keep up.’’215 The FAC’s Libya 
inquiry provides clearer evidence of the direct impact of media reporting on the perceptions of 
policy-makers and the extent to which the government relied on this as a form of ‘‘open 
source’’ intelligence. Fox recalled ‘‘contemporary reports of people throwing themselves off 
bridges to escape from the forces’’216 while Duncan described an extract from his diary which 
read, ‘‘tales of mass rape and Gaddafi giving mercenaries Viagra.’’217 Neither minister was 
attempting to suggest or imply that such accounts were mistaken or exaggerated. Instead, they 
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offered these recollections to justify the subsequent resort to force and explain how and why the 
government ultimately took the view it did.  
 
By 22 February, it was difficult to conceive of how a return to the status quo ante would have 
been possible, either for Libya itself or for bilateral relations between Britain and the Gaddafi 
regime. Regardless of faulty intelligence or media misreporting, this much would have been 
fairly clear. After less than a week of unrest, Gaddafi now faced an armed insurrection in 
Cyrenaica, with the next three largest cities outside of Tripoli under rebel control, in addition to 
violent unrest in the capital itself. In order for Gaddafi to maintain himself in power, he would 
have to fight a civil war. In this context, Britain stepped up the level of diplomatic 
condemnation and sought to forge a consensus in favour of strong action against the regime, 
culminating in the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1970 on 26 February imposing 
sanctions and the threat of judicial action against senior regime personnel.218 The sudden 
adoption of a much stronger position and the decision to take diplomatic leadership in pushing 
for action was premised on the growing assumption that the demise of the regime was now 
desirable, necessary and inevitable. These diplomatic manoeuvres helped pave the way for the 
subsequent military response and it was during this period, approximately between 24 and 28 
February, that the Prime Minister and key advisers around him first began privately 
contemplating the possibility of military action. 
21 February saw a qualitative change in Britain’s diplomatic condemnation of the violence. 
Speaking before a meeting of EU foreign ministers, Hague warned the Libyan regime that ‘‘the 
world was watching’’ and declared the situation there ‘‘deplorable and unacceptable.’’219 More 
important were calls for ‘‘accountability’’ for the deaths and abuses that were taking place. 
Gaddafi made his first public appearance following the beginning of the uprising the next day, 
defying Hague’s claims about his pending departure to Venezuela and declaring his intention to 
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fight to the end in defiant fashion.220 On 23 February his forces began efforts to retake Zawiyah, 
arguably marking the point at which the civil war began in earnest.221 Existing accounts have 
spoken of the impact of Gaddafi’s speech on both Cameron and Ed Llewellyn, his Chief of 
Staff and a leading adviser on foreign policy.222 According to D’Ancona, Llewellyn, ‘‘regarded 
this speech as a turning point and told his boss so.’’223 The FAC’s Libya inquiry provides 
further evidence of the importance of this speech. According to Fox, it was following this 
speech that the government began assessing various options and planning ahead and the former 
Defence Secretary quoted Gaddafi’s threatening rhetoric in an effort to recreate the dilemma 
that confronted policy-makers at the time.224 
The extent of Britain’s diplomatic activity and the hardening of the government’s position was 
not fully clear at the time, most likely because of the need to avoid increasing the risk to British 
nationals still stranded in Libya, whose safety was a growing concern. Sources in the Foreign 
Office indicated that the government was ready to ‘‘push all the buttons’’ as soon as they were 
safe.225 The existing accounts of British policy tend to neglect this crucial phase, glossing over 
the importance of Resolution 1970 and failing to discuss the role of Hague and the Foreign 
Office in the British response. Seldon and Snowdon merely note in passing that a resolution was 
secured, without discussion of its implications or Britain’s role in it.226 D’Ancona does not 
mention this resolution at all.227 Such neglect is a mistake. This diplomatic development was a 
tangible escalation in the response of the international community, an important stepping-stone 
on the way to the second resolution which authorised military action and a development in 
which Britain, alongside France, played the dominant role. The decisions made in this period 
also altered the strategic calculus, by isolating Gaddafi to the greatest extent and pushing for the 
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strongest possible resolution, Britain narrowed the future options. While there is not a wealth of 
primary source material for assessing this week-long period, this gap can be partially filled by 
secondary sources.228 Research by Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, which involved interviews with 
diplomats and officials, helps reconstruct events behind the scenes at New York during the 
build up to the first resolution.229 
On the 22 February the UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement in response to the 
situation. While the statement called for ‘‘national dialogue,’’ it also invoked Libya’s 
‘‘responsibility to protect its population’’ and ‘‘underscored the need to hold to account those 
responsible for attack.’’230 The British delegation had played a leading part in crafting the 
statement and following its release immediately went to work to push for a Security Council 
resolution. British and French diplomats worked closely together during this period, 
encouraging other members of the international community in a more hawkish direction. French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy saw Libya as an opportunity to demonstrate his support for 
democracy and the Arab Spring, an opportunity even more pressing given his government’s 
closeness to the Tunisian regime of Ben Ali.231 Sarkozy therefore became the first international 
leader to call for Gaddafi to leave power on 25 February, a step both Obama and Cameron 
reserved until after the passage of the first UN Resolution.232 Britain and France occupied the 
leadership position in New York, with Britain imposing itself as ‘‘penholder,’’ the country 
responsible for drafting resolutions and suggesting courses of action.233 The British government 
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also seized the initiative at the UN Human Rights Council, helping establish a commission of 
inquiry and putting in motion the necessary measures to secure Libya’s removal.234 
The outcome of this Anglo-Franco concert was UNSC Resolution 1970, which passed by 
unanimous vote on 26 February.235 Acting under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the Charter, the 
Security Council called for an immediate end to the violence and imposed a series of measures 
against the Libyan government. These measures included an arms embargo, travel bans and 
assets freezes for members of the Gaddafi family and senior regime figures, and referred the 
situation to the ICC. This latter measure was significant, representing the first time the Council 
had unanimously referred a sitting ruler to the court, a fact widely celebrated by advocates of 
R2P.236 The text was largely a British draft, with other members having made only minor 
revisions. Britain and France had secured the inclusion of the ICC referral despite scepticism 
from the majority of Council members, including the United States. As an unnamed British 
diplomat involved in the process revealed to Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, the strategy was to 
‘‘throw everything into 1970,’’ pushing for the toughest possible response.237 Given the speed 
with which the Council was forced to react to the Libyan crisis, and given the unanimous 
backing of its members, this was an unusually strong reaction.  
The determination to ‘‘throw everything into 1970’’ amounted to a policy of regime change.  
From 22 February onwards, and possibly as early as 21 February, British policy was based on 
the de facto assumption that Gaddafi’s removal from power was desirable, necessary and 
inevitable. Whether any formal or explicit decisions were made, senior figures in the British 
government simply took it for granted either that the regime must fall, that such an outcome 
was highly desirable, or both. The assumption reflected both what the majority within 
government believed was likely to happen and what they believed ought to happen. British 
                                                          
234 FCO, ‘‘UK at the UN Human Rights Council on Libya: ‘We Are And Will Continue to Take 
Action,’’’ 25 February 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-at-the-un-human-rights-council-
on-libya-we-are-and-will-continue-to-take-action 
235 UNSC Resolution 1970. 
236 Bellamy and Williams, ‘‘New Politics of Protection?’’; Dunne and Gifkins, ‘‘State of Intervention.’’  
237 Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, ‘‘Power in Practice,’’ 898. 
72 
 
policy would contribute to this outcome by taking diplomatic measures to speed up the process. 
This rationale was made clear from Cameron’s statement to Parliament on 28 February, when 
the Prime Minister argued ‘‘we must do everything we can to isolate it. We must cut off money, 
cut off supply and cut off oxygen from the regime, so that it falls as fast as it possibly can.’’238  
 
The measures included in 1970 were part of this approach. The Guardian’s report on Britain’s 
Libya intervention, which is based on interviews with senior ministers involved in the 
decisions, claims that Britain’s diplomatic activity was initially based on the Foreign Office’s 
belief that a ‘‘classic sanctions resolution’’ would be ‘‘sufficient.’’239 While not explicit, the 
context strongly suggests this meant ‘‘sufficient’’ for the purpose of bringing down the regime. 
Bowen’s account, which is also based on sources inside the British government, reveals that 
Arminka Helic, a foreign policy adviser to Hague, was a key advocate of the ICC referral. Helic 
apparently believed that Gaddafi was already finished but that this measure would help ‘‘peel 
off those around him.’’240 Furthermore, unless we hypothesise that British policy was already in 
the business of regime change before the passage of Resolution 1970, then the measures 
included in that resolution make little sense. As one diplomat involved in the negotiations in 
New York explained, raising the bar so high with the first resolution ‘‘limited the options 
available in future’’ because any subsequent resolution would need to ‘‘up the ante.’’241 The 
only danger in pushing this interpretation too far is that it gives the appearance of a conscious, 
calculated strategy when the reality was likely more complicated. As one official recalled of 
this period, ‘‘we were responding, not strategizing.’’242 
 
It is not clear whether 1970 was treated as a precursor to a possible intervention, but it was 
during this period that the Prime Minister shifted toward considering a military response. 
D’Ancona writes that, ‘‘behind the scenes, Cameron was increasingly convinced that at least 
                                                          
238 HC Deb, 28/02/2011, c. 36. 
239 Wintour and Watt, ‘‘Cameron’s Libyan War.’’ 
240 Bowen, Arab Uprisings, 139. 
241 Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, ‘‘Power in Practice,’’ 900. 
242 Bowen, Arab Uprisings, 140. 
73 
 
the threat of a no-fly zone would be needed and probably its imposition.’’243 It is not explicit 
exactly when this shift in Cameron’s thinking occurred, but the narrative suggests it was around 
the time of Gaddafi’s speech on the 22 February and his security forces’ brutal effort to retake 
Zawiyah the following day. However, at this stage, Cameron was still preoccupied by his 
regional trip and the safety of British nationals.244 While most accounts of Britain’s decision to 
intervene are right to stress that the impetus came directly from Number 10, it is unclear 
whether the prior impetus in favour of a stronger diplomatic position, which logically preceded 
the consideration of military measures, originated with the Foreign Office or Cameron himself.  
The processes by which any formal decisions were made during this period also remains 
unclear.245 The NSC did not meet until Cameron’s return from the Gulf on 25 February.246 It 
met again on 28 February, the morning before Cameron effectively advocated military action in 
the Commons. D’Ancona writes that ‘‘in the National Security Council, Cameron put to the 
meeting the pivotal question: ‘‘Is it in our national interest or not to get involved?’ As far as the 
PM was concerned, the question answered itself.’’’247 It is unclear whether he is referring to the 
meeting on the 25th before even the passage of the first resolution, or the 28th, following 
Obama’s public call for Gaddafi’s departure.  Either way, if D’Ancona’s account is accurate, 
the Prime Minister had effectively made up his mind at this early stage. Cabinet did not even 
discuss the possibility of military action until 1 March.248  
 
While existing accounts of British policy almost certainly overstate the level of internal 
opposition and scepticism faced by the Prime Minister, it is true that at this point in the debate, 
many were sceptical. According to the Guardian’s investigation, MI6 chief John Sawers 
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believed it was ‘‘better the devil you know,’’ indicating his fear of what might happen if the 
Gaddafi regime were to collapse.249 General David Richards served as the Chief of Defence 
Staff during the period examined in this research. As the government’s most senior military 
adviser, he was also a regular participant in NSC meetings. He is significant for being the only 
participant to have so far published his memoirs.250 In both Libya and Syria, his thinking often 
provided a juxtaposition with the Prime Minister, who described the general as a ‘‘big state 
man.’’251 This was a shorthand way of describing Richards as more traditional and realist in his 
approach and these instincts would often place him at odds with the politicians. Richards was 
primarily focused on the evacuation effort at this time, but it is clear from his later testimony to 
the FAC and his memoirs that he was sceptical about the politicians’ enthusiasm for military 
action.252 Fox also describes a ‘‘careful reticence’’ about potential involvement, recalling that 
‘‘it would be fair to say that the military, as is very often the case, did not want to be drawn into 
a conflict unnecessarily. Certainly for my own part, I was keen that we would not see military 
operations unless required.’’253 Contemporary reports also suggest both Hague and Clegg were 
somewhat sceptical, at least at this early stage.254 If Cameron had already decided that some 
form of military intervention were all but inevitable unless Gaddafi backed down, then he was 
clearly further along in his thinking than the majority of the NSC. It is more likely, given the 
divisions described above, that other members of the government were consenting to what they 
regarded as contingency planning. 
Cameron Advocates Intervention  
 
The passage of Resolution 1970 was quickly followed by widespread calls for Gaddafi to quit 
power. Obama made the first such call on the day the resolution passed and Cameron quickly 
followed, claiming the measures contained in the resolution were sending a ‘‘very clear 
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message to this regime. It’s time for Colonel Gaddafi to go and to go now.’’255 The following 
day Cameron set out his position in greater detail before Parliament, with the majority of British 
nationals safely evacuated.  This statement marked a clear escalation in Britain’s response. The 
Prime Minister reiterated the position on Gaddafi, telling Parliament that ‘‘we should be clear 
that for the future of Libya and its people, Colonel Gaddafi’s regime must end and he must 
leave.’’256 The various measures that had been enacted were justified in accordance with this 
objective and Cameron proudly claimed that ‘‘with respect to all of those actions, Britain is 
taking a lead.’’257  
Unlike his American counterpart, Cameron went further than open advocacy of regime change 
by announcing plans for possible military action and lending his approval to the prospect of 
arming the opposition.258 Declaring that ‘‘we do not in any way rule out the use of military 
assets,’’ Cameron announced he had asked military chiefs to begin drawing up plans for a no-
fly zone, appealing to the growing sentiment that it would be unconscionable to stand aside in 
the event of Gaddafi using force against his own people.259 In the days ahead, the government 
would later claim that this was simply a call for contingency planning. In an exchange with the 
interventionist Labour MP Mike Gapes, Cameron did suggest that, ‘‘we need to do the 
preparation and planning now, because no one can be sure what Colonel Gaddafi will do to his 
own people.’’260 The Defence Secretary reinforced this point when speaking on the Andrew 
Marr Show the following week, arguing that ‘‘the important thing is that we get the work done 
before we have to get to that point, and had it not been for the Prime Minister pushing the issue 
I rather fear that we would be behind the curve.’’261 As noted in the preceding section, given the 
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differing views within the NSC, the instruction to draw up plans would not have been 
understood as an automatic endorsement of intervention.  
However, to characterise all of this as nothing more than a prudent call for contingency 
planning would be at odds with both the tone and the substance of the remarks the Prime 
Minister had made in Parliament. When Cameron first announced he had asked military chiefs 
to draw up plans for a no-fly zone, he argued that ‘‘we must not tolerate this regime using force 
against its own people.’’262 When asked by one MP if the world would be able to stand by in the 
event of Gaddafi fighting back, the reply was unequivocal: ‘‘I agree that we should not just 
stand by – if Colonel Gaddafi uses military force against his own people, the world cannot stand 
by.’’263 Such comments suggested more than contingency planning. They suggested that, as far 
as Cameron was concerned, military force would be inevitable if Gaddafi did not back down. 
Certainly, this was the interpretation that was adopted by British politicians, the media and key 
allies.264 Cameron was not just exploring the possibility of the military option, he was 
advocating it.  
While the above quotations suggest the need to protect civilians was the primary motivation 
behind the consideration of military action, Cameron’s statement continued the tendency to 
conflate this goal with the strong desire to replace the Gaddafi regime. In fact, his comments 
placed more emphasis on the regime change objective than on the need for civilian protection. It 
was on the basis of bringing down the regime that Cameron responded positively to the idea 
that Britain might provide arms to Gaddafi’s opponents, replying to the suggestion by saying 
that given the importance of ensuring the dictator’s removal from power, ‘‘if helping the 
opposition in Libya would help bring that about, it is certainly something we should 
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consider.’’265 This was profoundly at odds with Cameron’s later efforts to characterise himself 
as ‘‘practical’’ in his approach. Not only did Britain know relatively little about who the 
opposition were but providing arms to them would violate the very UN resolution British 
diplomacy had just brought about.266  
Many of the existing explanations of Cameron’s motivation have emphasised the need to 
prevent a major civilian massacre in Benghazi, akin to the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, as the 
central driver of government decision-making.267 The role of this historical analogy in the 
government’s decision was indeed powerful and is analysed in more detail in the following 
section. However, as Davidson has already pointed out, Cameron’s call for military action 
predated the emergence of the threat to Benghazi.268 While Gaddafi’s forces were continuing 
their onslaught on Zawiyah in the west, they did not begin their counter-offensive to retake the 
cities in the eastern region until the following week and the rapid success they achieved on the 
ground was not widely anticipated at the time. Even when the regime’s forces did begin 
retaking towns and cities that had fallen to the opposition, this recapturing of territory was not 
accompanied by any large-scale massacres, even if disproportionate force and brutal repression 
was the norm.269 To say that Cameron anticipated widespread threat to civilian life and the 
potential for a massacre is one thing, to say that his advocacy of force was a straightforward 
reaction to the threat to Benghazi or the vague possibility of an ‘‘Arab Srebrenica’’ is too 
simplistic. A supplementary explanation might highlight the political pressure Cameron had 
been facing. Cameron’s statement before Parliament was being billed as a ‘‘defining moment of 
his premiership.’’270 It was delivered at a time where both Cameron and his government were 
being roundly criticised for their response to the Arab Spring, as describing previously. A 
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strong and decisive stand against Gaddafi could counter suggestions that Cameron was a weak 
leader or that Britain’s foreign policy was moral suspect.  
Cameron’s wider views about Britain’s identity as an international actor are also a potentially 
relevant part of the equation in any attempt to understand his psychology and motivation. His 
public speeches and statements on foreign policy, assuming they are in any way representative 
of his private thinking, reveal a man who is deeply patriotic and painfully wedded to 
anachronistic visions of British leadership. Cameron believed that Britain should ‘‘punch above 
our weight in the world,’’ notwithstanding his government’s decision to reduce defence 
expenditure, because ‘‘it is part of who we are.’’271 He was was fond of quoting Gladstone’s 
maxim that ‘‘the foreign policy of England should be inspired by the love of freedom’’272 and 
he liked to speak of values and instincts that ‘‘are part of our DNA.’’273 This was reinforced by 
a narrative which celebrated Britain’s role in world history and relived key episodes as evidence 
of British leadership and moral purpose. Such episodes were not seen as belonging to a distant 
past, but instead presented as revealing traits that are assumed to be intrinsic and can be 
summoned in the face of present challenges. In his first speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 
Cameron concluded his vision by pointing out that ‘‘we have the values - national values that 
swept slavery from the seas, that stood up to both fascism and communism and that helped to 
spread democracy and human rights around the planet - that will drive us to do good around the 
world.’’274 The threat to this identity and the psychological comfort it provides is the notion of 
decline and the Prime Minister clearly saw it as his duty to ‘‘confront the pessimism that says 
we can’t make a difference.’’275 These beliefs do not automatically translate into a reflexive 
appetite to intervene militarily when faced with dilemmas of the kind that Libya presented. Yet 
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when we combine this specific conception of Britain’s identity as an international actor with the 
context of the Arab Spring we can see how a desire to confront Gaddafi decisively would have 
had an intuitive appeal. In this context, Cameron’s statement in the House on 28 February can 
be understood, in part, as a bid for international leadership and an exercise in identity 
reinforcement.  
Above all though, Cameron’s greater willingness to consider using force in these circumstances, 
and his open advocacy of this possibility at a stage when there was less appetite for it both 
domestically and internationally, places him much closer to the liberal interventionist camp than 
he would be willing to openly concede. Instinctively, Cameron felt the dangers of allowing 
Gaddafi to prevail outweighed the many risks of intervening. As D’Ancona rightly observes, 
the Libyan intervention showed Cameron was not a risk-averse pragmatist. As someone close to 
him during the conflict observed, ‘‘he is actually a gambler, it goes back to the side of him that 
loves playing bridge and all that.’’276 The tone of Cameron’s marks was often fiery and zealous. 
He proudly announced that, ‘‘I have never supported Colonel Gaddafi or his regime, and I think 
that his regime is illegitimate’’ before adding ‘‘we must do everything that we can to isolate it. 
We must cut off money, cut off supply and cut off oxygen from the regime, so that it falls as 
fast as it possibly can.’’277 
As is typical of liberal interventionist thinking, Cameron’s position was also premised on an 
over-estimation of the utility and efficacy of the military option, despite paying lip service to 
the fact that a no-fly zone would not necessarily solve the problem. In one exchange, Cameron 
recognised that a no-fly zone was ‘‘not without its difficulties and problems’’ and that ‘‘it 
would not necessarily stop all oppression of the Libyan people…’’278  Despite this, Richards 
writes in his memoirs how he was worried a no-fly zone would make little practical difference, 
but ‘‘had a hell of a time’’ trying to convince his political master of this fact.279 Similarly, a 
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Whitehall official later recalled remarking at the time, ‘‘what is this going to do? The critical 
things would happen on the ground. There would be slaughter on the ground.’’280 Furthermore, 
it is worth observing that there was at this stage no support within the UN for a no-fly zone, nor 
from within the MENA region. It appears that for Cameron, considerations of practicability, 
legality and multilateral support, while not dismissed completely, fell behind the symbolic 
appeal of a strong and confrontational position.   
The tendency to conflate regime change and civilian protection has already been noted. It is also 
worth observing that Cameron was not simply positioning himself as the protector of civilian 
life, but as the champion of democratization and universal values. The first section of this 
chapter emphasised the importance of the government’s framing of the Arab Spring and 
Cameron was clearly swept up in the idealism surrounding these events, telling 
parliamentarians that, ‘‘what is exciting is that everybody thought that this murderous dictator 
was fully in control of his country, but part of his country has been knocked over so 
quickly.’’281 These were not simply Libyan civilians, but civilians who were standing against a 
typical pantomime villain in the form of Colonel Gaddafi and who were fighting, Cameron 
believed, ‘‘for greater democracy and greater freedom, such as we take for granted in this 
country.’’282 They thus became worthy of protection in a way other victims of repression are 
not. Cameron was driven by the Srebrenica argument, but he was also moved by a desire to use 
this opportunity to rid the world of a dictator and help spread democracy in the Middle East. 
The Prime Minister had previously spoken on many occasions about the mistakes of Iraq, but he 
made clear, in the context of the contemporary changes sweeping the Arab world, that the 
promotion of democracy ‘‘is almost always and everywhere a good thing to do.’’283 Despite his 
previous rhetoric about the need for patience and humility, British military force was beginning 
to be seen as a means by which Britain could decisively contribute to this goal.  
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The Three Criteria and UN Resolution 1973 
 
If Cameron was retrospectively praised for adopting a strong stance early on, he initially 
appeared to face diplomatic isolation. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates immediately played 
down the prospects of military action, warning Congress about the difficulties and dangers of a 
no-fly zone.284 Although it subsequently became clear that Gates was speaking for himself, the 
US position remained ambiguous and non-committal despite Obama having called for 
Gaddafi’s departure. Officials in the US Embassy in London were apparently ‘‘baffled’’ by 
Cameron’s remarks and resorted to telephoning backbench MPs for guidance on how best to 
interpret the speech.285 As noted, there was at this stage no regional call for intervention, nor 
much prospect of approval in either the EU or the UN. When cabinet discussed the possibility 
of military action for the first time on 1 March, there was a leaked report of a split between 
‘‘idealists and pragmatists.’’286 These difficulties were compounded when a covert mission to 
make contact with opposition forces ended in fiasco.287 Rebel fighters detained the British team 
near Benghazi, and a phone call from the former British ambassador, during which he pleaded 
for his compatriots’ release, was leaked by the Gaddafi regime.288 The government therefore 
faced a fresh round of criticism in both the press and Parliament.289  
Yet this fiasco was quickly followed by the introduction of a much clearer approach. In place of 
the Prime Minister’s inconsistent hawkishness and the reports of internal divisions, Hague 
introduced three criteria that would shape Britain’s response to the crisis and any decisions 
surrounding the possible use of force. These were outlined in Parliament for the first time on 7 
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March.290  The first criterion was ‘‘regional support.’’291 This necessitated both the diplomatic 
support of key regional actors and an explicit request from rebel forces themselves. Secondly, 
any military action would require a ‘‘clear trigger’’ or ‘‘demonstrable need.’’292 This was taken 
to refer to circumstances in which widespread loss of life was widely anticipated and the case 
for action of some kind was therefore less open to question. Thirdly, any military action would 
require an ‘‘appropriate’’ or ‘‘clear legal basis.’’293 A UN Security Council resolution was 
naturally seen as the preferred route, but ministers were sufficiently non-committal so as to 
leave open the opportunity for alternative, more controversial, legal bases.  
The introduction of these criteria was significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, they provided 
the basis for British diplomatic leadership, shaping discussions and deliberations within NATO 
in the build up to intervention.294 Secondly, they provided an effective rhetorical strategy, 
allowing ministers to coalesce around a pre-formulated set of answers to difficult questions in 
the days ahead.295 Thirdly, they suggest that while existing accounts are correct to highlight the 
impetus that came from Number 10, they have neglected the role of Hague and the Foreign 
Office in the development of British policy. It was Hague who first introduced these criteria 
publicly, and while NATO representatives referred to them as the ‘‘Leslie criteria’’ after their 
introduction by Britain’s Permanent Representative Mariot Leslie on 8 March, Leslie herself 
later suggested that Hague was the originator of this approach.296 Fourthly, it might be argued 
that these criteria permitted boundaries within which an official consensus could exist. The 
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notion that Cameron ‘‘swept aside sceptics’’ is too simplistic.297 The three criteria represented 
the incorporation of scepticism into the government’s strategy. 
Securing regional support was the priority objective of the British government during the first 
week of March. The greater emphasis on regional support was a necessary tactic in the 
aftermath of Iraq. Cameron expressed the government’s calculation in the following terms, 
suggesting that, ‘‘it seems to me that we have to learn both the lessons of Iraq, by proceeding 
with the maximum Arab support and being very clear that there will be no army of occupation, 
and the lessons of Bosnia and not stand aside and witness a slaughter.’’298 Despite the botched 
covert intervention, the Foreign Office had already established tentative contacts with the 
opposition by 2 March.299 By the time Hague outlined the three criteria on 7 March, the rebel 
leadership had already explicitly requested a no-fly zone.300 Gaddafi’s forces began a concerted 
counter-attack beginning on 6 March and rebel groups struggled to hold the territories they had 
previously occupied. Initially sceptical of any outside involvement, they were now realising that 
the survival of their revolution could depend on powerful outside backers.301  
Unlikely circumstances prompted Arab states to abandon their traditional hostility to the notion 
of humanitarian intervention. Key to explaining such an outcome is the fact that Gaddafi held 
the unique status of having almost no friends he could rely on. While he could count on some 
support from African states, his arrogance and eccentricity had ensured he was almost 
universally detested across the Arab world, with Saudi Arabia, a strong voice within the Arab 
League, especially hostile.302 His removal from power would be entirely welcome to most of 
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the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which first called for a no-fly zone on 8 March. Although 
North African countries were more fearful of the risks of a power vacuum being created by his 
removal, Gaddafi had made enemies on that continent too and many leaders were in any case 
accepting of the argument that the current crisis made his continuity in power all but 
impossible.303 
The Arab Spring was also responsible for a shift in the foreign policy of Qatar which, unlike 
most of its neighbours, saw the unrest not as a threat but an opportunity.304 The Qatari PM, 
colloquially referred to in diplomatic circles as ‘‘HBJ’’ was the regional leader that Cameron 
spoke to the most often and the two had shared their hostility toward Gaddafi and their desire 
for strong condemnation during the Prime Minister’s trip to the Gulf.305 The prominent role of 
Al Jazeera in covering events in Tahrir Square had strengthened the soft power credentials of 
the small Gulf state and despite its own autocratic political system, Qatar saw itself as the 
potential beneficiary of democratization beyond its own borders.306 Unlike Saudi Arabia and 
UAE, who both feared the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar had cultivated links with regional 
Islamist leaders in the preceding years and was well-placed to capitalise on these connections in 
the event of their achieving power.307 Doha was therefore a key voice within the Arab League 
pushing for intervention.  
In addition to these particular circumstances, British diplomatic lobbying almost certainly 
played a role in securing support from the Arab League. The Guardian’s investigation credits 
Hague with helping persuade the League’s Secretary General Amr Moussa, an outcome partly 
attributed to the Foreign Secretary’s previous policy of cultivating bilateral links.308 The FAC’s 
Libya inquiry also received evidence from Dominic Asquith, who while serving at this time as 
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Britain’s Ambassador to Egypt, was clearly involved in this kind of lobbying.309 It was not then, 
as the government later sought to imply, that Britain and France were asked to introduce a no-
fly zone by concerned Arab states. Instead, Britain asked the Arab states to ask them to take 
these measures, seemingly for presentational reasons. As Hague later explained, ‘‘any action 
that appeared to be the west trying to impose itself on these countries would be counter-
productive, as has been suggested.’’310 
With Gaddafi’s forces rapidly regaining territories on the ground, the Arab League, under 
pressure from the Gulf states, passed a resolution calling for the implementation of a no-fly 
zone on 12 March.311 The British government could now unequivocally claim to have the 
‘‘regional support’’ it was seeking, but it was still far from guaranteed that the UN would 
approve military action. In addition to the prospect of either a Russian or Chinese veto, the 
government would need to build a coalition of nine states to vote in favour of any proposed 
action. With all of the BRICS states then present on the Council, such an outcome could not be 
taken for granted given their suspicion of humanitarian intervention.312 Key players in the 
Obama administration were far from convinced of the necessity or wisdom of intervening. 
Remarkably, as late as 15 March, Obama himself remained very firmly the fence. The reticence 
toward intervention was equally felt in Germany, which also sat on the Council during this 
period.313 
According to Seldon and Snowdon, Cameron informed his cabinet on 7 March that he believed 
a no-fly zone was necessary, with or without UN approval.314 The level and extent of any 
internal division at this stage is unclear. Both Seldon and Snowdon and D’Ancona give the 
impression that many were still sceptical, but it is unclear whether such scepticism was 
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expressed toward the idea of intervention in principle, or merely the idea of acting without the 
UN.315 In contrast, Goodman’s account, which also draws on interviews with participants, says 
the cabinet was now ‘‘solidly behind the PM.’’ 316 Yet regardless of whether other members of 
the cabinet would have been supportive of military action without a second resolution, the 
government’s public position was in fact consistent with Cameron’s private stance. During 
PMQs on 9 March, Cameron declined the opportunity to rule out military action without UN 
approval.317 As Hague explained, while a Chapter VII resolution would provide the clearest 
basis, it was ‘‘not a completely open-and-shut argument.’’318 When the FAC met on 16 March, 
at the very time Britain and France were tabling a second resolution, Hague made clear that the 
government felt it was legally permitted to take action regardless of the outcome of the vote. 
The Foreign Secretary concurred with Menzies Campbell’s contrived notion of a ‘‘duty to 
protect’’ and asserted that ‘‘in the case of overwhelming humanitarian need or in self-defence, 
nations are allowed to take action.’’319 
As the government set out in pursuit of regional support and ‘‘clear legal basis,’’ the third 
criteria largely took care of itself. The regime’s counter-offensive saw it retake a number of 
coastal towns in the second week of March, as forces loyal to Gaddafi rapidly advanced 
eastward. As Kuperman has pointed out, such advances did not involve the ‘‘massacres’’ and 
the deliberate targeting of civilians in the manner claimed by Western politicians, but the city of 
Benghazi was surely a different prospect.320 By the time Britain and France tabled their 
resolution on 15 March, the regime’s forces were fast approaching the country’s second city 
and the epicentre of the revolution. Benghazi, a city with a population of approximately 
650,000, would have been the likely venue for a last stand. Given Gaddafi’s ominous threats to 
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those who did not lay down their arms, significant loss of life was anticipated. On 17 March, in 
a radio broadcast ahead of his forces assault on Benghazi, Gaddafi was reported as having 
promised to show ‘‘no mercy and no pity to them’’ adding that ‘‘we will find you in your 
closets.’’321 Although the comment was directed toward rebel groups, rather than civilians, such 
language naturally reinforced the prospect of sustained and indiscriminate bloodshed. 
As the threat to Benghazi’s population became clearer, British politicians began making more 
frequent, often simplistic, parallels with Bosnia and Rwanda. Denis MacShane captured the 
fears of many in Parliament when he said on 15 March that ‘‘there is a whiff of Bosnia of 15, 
16, 17 years ago about all of this. We do not want the Foreign Secretary to talk about 
discussions at the UN, empty EU statements and NATO meetings that result in nothing.’’322 
While these comparisons were especially common among Labour MPs, Liberal Democrats 
invoked similar memories. The most powerful Lib Dem voice on foreign policy, Sir Menzies 
Campbell, encouraged the government to intervene with or without UN approval. Recalling the 
Bosnian conflict he spoke of ‘‘the lessons from that unhappy period’’ as a self-evident 
justification for some form of military action.323  After an EU Council meeting on 11 March, a 
journalist invoked the comparison for the Prime Minister, who replied by acknowledging, ‘‘I 
think you are making a good point, which is many people say we have to learn the lesson of 
Iraq, and yes we do, but we also have to learn the lesson of what happened in former 
Yugoslavia, in Bosnia as well, and I think that is important’.324 This was the first instance of 
what was to become a familiar theme. For Cameron and many of that generation, the lessons of 
Bosnia took precedence over those of Iraq. 
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This was not simply an attempt to appease domestic political pressure. Analogies with Bosnia 
were a driving force of internal deliberations in the build up to the second resolution. The 
evidence that has subsequently emerged strengthens the claim made in the existing accounts 
that this was arguably that the single most important factor in the government’s decision-
making calculus. For Hague, while he might not have displayed the same hawkish instincts as 
Cameron, not intervening was simply not possible. Reflecting on the intervention in 2015, the 
former Foreign Secretary referred to these kind of foreign policy decisions as a ‘‘choice 
between unpalatable alternatives’’ but he strongly resisted the suggestion that he might, with the 
benefit of hindsight, have acted with greater caution.325 For Hague, this was primarily a moral 
dilemma and he made clear that faced with the same situation again, he would pursue the same 
course of action, arguing that ‘‘I would wonder where the standards of morality of the western 
world had come to if we were not going to take decisions such as that.’’326 
From this perspective, the apparent costs of inaction were amplified above and beyond the risks 
of intervention, ensuring a negative argument took precedence over a positive one. Non-military 
responses were seen as entailing equal responsibility for the outcome, in a simple binary 
framing that pitted action against inaction. In both his testimony to the FAC and a later 
interview with Lord Hennessy, Hague invoked the memory of Rwanda as a key justification for 
the action taken and his continued lack of regret: 
I have stood and placed wreaths at the Srebrenica memorial and at the Rwanda memorial, with 
thousands of dead bodies underneath me. When you do that, you have many thousands of 
bodies underneath your feet because in each case the world did nothing when thousands of 
people were being slaughtered – in Rwanda, hundreds of thousands. When you are in office 
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facing this situation, that is what you have to think about. Are you going to let that happen 
again?327 
This sense responsibility extended to those who were both the most sceptical of intervention 
and in the best position to be aware of its potential difficulties and limitations. Fox was both 
sceptical of the initial proposals to intervene and willing to accept criticism of the way in which 
the intervention unfolded, but once the scale of the threat to Benghazi became apparent, he felt 
that ‘‘our hand had been forced.’’328 Having revisited all the documents from this time of crisis, 
he later chose to emphasise the importance of this historical lesson in shaping the context in 
which the decision was made, stressing that ‘‘I think the driver – and I go back to this point – 
was the fear of a civilian slaughter of the sort we had seen in the Balkans.’’329 The key points 
from Fox’s testimony are mirrored by the recollections of Richards, who was equally if not 
more reticent than the Defence Secretary in his attitude toward intervention. Richards recalled 
‘‘a lot of talk about Srebrenica’’ and says the decision was taken to prevent Benghazi from 
falling because ‘‘it would be a stain on our conscience forever if we allowed another 
Srebrenica.’’330 Such fears were therefore significant enough not only to prompt Cameron and 
others to push for intervention but perhaps more importantly, to convince doubters and sceptics 
that they could not in good conscience prevent the rush to war.  
In addition, it needs reiterating that any decision to intervene was not the outcome of months of 
gradual deliberation and contingency planning. When the NSC debated whether it would be 
necessary to intervene so as to prevent ‘‘another Srebrenica,’’ it did so at a pace determined by 
events on the ground and under the watchful eye of the 24-7 media. One official recalled, ‘‘we 
didn’t have the luxury they had in the 1990s of having time to react to events.’’331 This was 
arguably the key point of emphasis in Richards’ account of what happened, as he explained that 
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‘‘what I hoped I have tried to get across is that the imperative of the need for speed to prevent 
Benghazi falling meant that we were committed to conflict in an imperfect world.’’332 Fox 
recalled a similar set of demands, describing how ‘‘what struck me, going back and looking at 
the ministerial papers… was the speed at which events were moving.’’333 As he also recalled, 
the government was not simply thinking of the consequences of intervention, but of the 
consequences of not intervening, a calculation shaped by Gaddafi’s ominous-sounding 
rhetoric.334  
For those who would otherwise be more cautious in their approach, this humanitarian 
imperative was central. For those who, like the Prime Minister, were more naturally inclined to 
favour a hawkish position, this imperative was conjoined with an ideological one. Libyan 
civilians were more worthy of protection precisely because they were on the right side of 
history and their opposition to Gaddafi represented the march of democratic progress. Their 
deaths would not simply be a humanitarian catastrophe but would signal the failure of the 
‘‘Arab Spring.’’ Cameron was firm in his conviction that ‘‘it is a revolt by the people, who 
want to have greater democracy in their country,’’ a conviction that reinforced the necessity of 
their salvation.335 Arming himself against charges of inconsistency, the Prime Minister 
responded with the argument that while ‘‘we cannot do everything, but that does not mean we 
should do nothing.’’336 In this instance, Cameron felt Britain could do something and he 
explained he was ‘‘very clear that a no-fly zone is something we should consider, because it 
may help to stop atrocities being committed against people who want a more democratic 
future.’’337 The last bit is key, as it implicitly combined the idea of humanitarian intervention 
with an emerging right to democracy. The sceptics willingly converted themselves to the cause 
in order to save civilians, others more forcefully pressed the case for action to save civilians and 
ensure the victory of what they took for granted to be democratic forces. 
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National interest played an ambiguous and secondary role in these discussions. When the NSC 
finally took the decision to support intervention in principle, Hague recalls how, ‘‘I remember 
the Prime Minister summing up the meeting and saying, ‘the key question is this: is it in the 
British national interest, if this is about to happen in Benghazi and this conflict is happening in 
this way, for us to intervene? That is the question we have to decide’’’338 However, this 
recollection arguably misrepresents the nature of the debates that were being held. There was a 
wider strategic argument that supporting the Arab Spring was in British interests, given 
Britain’s security, commercial and energy interests in the Middle East and the potential benefits 
of a successful transition across the region. Cameron had made a similar point in his speech 
before the Kuwaiti National Assembly and Clegg offered a more finessed version of this 
particular argument in a speech in Mexico in early March.339 However, the wisdom of this 
reformist and liberal vision of national interest was not self-evident. Those who adhered to a 
more traditional conception of national interest instinctively saw the prospect of unrest across 
the Arab world as a potential threat. In short, national interest was an indeterminate guide to 
policy. 
When it came to Libya specifically, the national interest case for intervention emphasised 
geographical proximity, the threat of a refugee crisis and the potential menace if the regime’s 
forces were allowed to ‘‘run amok.’’340 This latter argument could recall Gaddafi’s 
controversial past. As Cameron informed the media during his Brussels press conference on 11 
March, ‘‘we should never forget this man’s track record.  This is a regime which for years 
supported terrorism around the world and which was implicated in the biggest mass murder 
ever on British soil, the Lockerbie bombing, as well as being associated with the deaths of many 
innocent people around the world.’’341 The government conjured the image of a ‘‘pariah state’’ 
that would ‘‘fester’’ on Europe’s southern border.342 The Prime Minister therefore insisted that, 
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‘‘this is in our interests, it is not some great adventure that is being planned.’’343 However, 
while Cameron and Hague did forcefully make the case that this was in Britain’s national 
interest, they do not present these arguments until a relatively late stage. The timing of these 
arguments and their presentation suggests that their primary purpose was to appease sceptical 
Tory backbenchers. As Holland and Aaronson conclude in their analysis of the government’s 
justifications for intervening, national interest was a ‘‘secondary argument’’ and that it was ‘‘at 
least in part, invoked to silence those sceptical of an intervention designed solely to ‘save 
strangers.’’’344  Hague’s memory of the crucial meeting is also somewhat contradicted by 
Richards’ account, which suggests it was simply not possible to fully assess the national interest 
within the time constraints and that different individuals would in any case reach different 
assessments on this principle.345 Above all though, throughout the evidence reviewed references 
to national interest are significantly outweighed by moral or value-based arguments and 
references to Srebrenica. 
Similar moral arguments and memories of Bosnia and Rwanda, combined with the speed of 
events and reports of Gaddafi’s threats, drove forward decision-making at the UN, where 
international diplomats were pressured into acquiescing to an intervention they might otherwise 
have harboured doubts about. British and French diplomats were especially effective at seizing 
the moral high ground in this arena and framing the crisis in a manner of their choosing.  As a 
diplomat involved in the negotiations explained, ‘‘the power of determining the agenda, saying: 
‘the moral situation is this and the transgressor is this’ – is huge. So it’s difficult to fight against 
this.’’346 Britain and France were able to utilise Libya’s defected ambassador and, following the 
passage of the Arab League resolution, work alongside the Lebanese delegation, promoting the 
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latter as the ‘‘Arab voice’’ on the Council.347 The presence of regional support was likely a 
factor in persuading Russia and China not to exercise their vetoes.348  
The late and dramatic change in the US position was hugely significant, both for the outcome at 
the UN and for any attempt to interpret British policy.349 While Obama had called for 
contingency planning at the end of February, he remained cautiously opposed to intervention 
until as late as 15 March. Secretary of State Clinton was seemingly in the sceptics’ camp until 
as late as 14 March.  Her own account makes clear that it was following the meeting in Paris on 
this day that she turned decisively in favour of intervention.350 In addition to realising the 
strength of Arab support, it was at this particular meeting that she first met Mahmoud Jibril, a 
leading representative of the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC), who she found 
‘‘impressive and polished.’’351 The British Foreign Secretary’s lobbying also made a favourable 
impression on Clinton, who recalled that, ‘‘if Hague thought military action in Libya was 
necessary, that counted for a lot. I knew that he, like me, was wary of making such decisions 
without confidence in the rationale, strategy and end game.’’352 It was following this meeting 
that Clinton communicated her views back to Washington and most accounts of the US decision 
see her as the decisive voice that tilted Obama in favour of intervening. As a thorough 
investigation of her role in US policy for the New York Times later concluded, this was 
‘‘arguably her moment of greatest influence as secretary of state.’’353  
With Clinton having persuasively made the case to the White House, Obama finally and 
reluctantly decided to support intervention on 15 March, in what he described to his frustrated 
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Defence Secretary as a ‘‘51-49 decision.’’354 Additionally, Obama’s method of deliberation, 
described by one official as ‘‘almost a Socratic method’’ led him to conclude that if the US was 
going to intervene, there was little purpose in merely establishing a no-fly zone.355 The 
Pentagon’s contingency planning had made clear this would have little impact on the ground 
and would not prevent the massacre many were anticipating. The President therefore insisted on 
better options.356 The end result of Obama’s u-turn was the insertion of the clause ‘‘all 
necessary measures’’ into the draft resolution tabled by Britain and France, thereby authorising 
a much broader range of military actions. Arab suspicions were alleviated through the phrase 
‘‘excluding an army of foreign occupation.’’357   
This episode sheds important light on the nature of the ‘‘special relationship’’ during this 
period. Firstly, there is some evidence suggesting the British and French leaderships, aware of 
Washington’s lack of appetite for intervention in Libya, were seriously contemplating taking 
action without the US.  According to D’Ancona’s account, while the possibility of an Anglo-
French operation was never discussed at NSC or cabinet level, Cameron and his close advisers 
were considering this possibility.358 In fact, Chivvis suggests that by 11 March US officials 
were concerned that Britain and France would intervene on their own and that their inferior 
capabilities would see them make the situation worse.359 Clinton too, gathered this impression 
from her meeting in Paris on the 14th and informed the White House that Britain and France 
would take action regardless of US support.360 Secondly, Britain appears to have been out of the 
loop regarding the sudden change in the US position. When Susan Rice first proposed 
broadening the mandate in the draft resolution, Britain and France suspected a ‘‘trick.’’361 
During Prime Minister’s Questions on 16 March, the day before the resolution passed, Cameron 
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referred only to conversations taking place, but gave no hint of any broadening of the 
mandate.362 Nor either did Hague, in lengthy discussions with FAC on the same day.363  
On 17 March, the Security Council passed resolution 1973, which authorised ‘‘all necessary 
measures’’ to protect ‘‘civilians and civilian populated areas,’’ with ten countries voting in 
favour.364 This outcome was the product of unique diplomatic circumstances that are unlikely to 
be repeated. The change in the US position, in addition to broadening the mandate, was also key 
to a successful vote. Four of the five BRICS chose to abstain. That South Africa did not do so, 
despite subsequently emerging as a major critic of the Libyan intervention, is perhaps partly 
attributable to US diplomatic pressure.365 The South African decision was important because it 
also likely determined the position taken by Gabon. Absent those two African votes, the 
resolution would not have passed.  
These empirical details are also necessary for any historical judgement of British policy, for 
reasons that have been largely overlooked in the existing accounts. The latter have often tended 
to end in a triumphalist manner, with the outcome in New York and the sparing of Benghazi 
seen as a vindication for a Prime Minister who adopted a hawkish stance early on. For example, 
Wintour and Watt approvingly quote the Minister for International Development, Andrew 
Mitchell, claiming that ‘‘David was brave and proved right in the beginning… All the soi-
disant experts said, you cannot do it from the air, the Americans said it was naïve, but he stuck 
to his guns.’’366 This ignores the extent to which Britain, and Cameron in particular, were 
effectively saved by Obama’s late intervention. While the purpose of this research is not to 
enter into normative judgements about the wisdom or not of intervening, those reflecting back 
on this episode with a full possession of the facts must conclude that without the ‘‘all necessary 
measures’’ clause, and without the US providing the overwhelming share of the capabilities 
during the initial effort to establish the no-fly zone, the experts Mitchell is dismissing would 
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most likely have been proven right. It would have been impossible to have prevented 
Benghazi’s fall with a simple no-fly zone alone and an Anglo-Franco operation would in any 
case have been far riskier, less extensive and have taken longer to establish than that which the 
US put in place during Operation Odyssey Dawn.  
Within the British NSC, a decision had already been made before the vote in New York, that 
Britain would take military action in the event that a resolution could be secured. This fact was 
revealed in Hague’s testimony to the FAC, although it is unclear exactly when this decision was 
made.367 As already noted, Cameron favoured intervening with or without UN approval and 
Hague had made clear that the government’s position was that a second resolution was 
preferable, but not essential. Ultimately though, we cannot know how decision-makers would 
have reacted had the conclusion of Anglo-French diplomatic wrangling not been successful. 
Resolution 1973 meant a decision already made in principle could now be put into effect. The 
cabinet signed off on the intervention on the advice of the NSC and the government followed 
the precedent established by Blair in allowing the Commons to vote on military action. While 
the vote took place after the decision had already been made, this was entirely due to the 
impossibility of scheduling one in time given the speed with which events were moving. In any 
case, the government would have been aware that it had widespread support for military action 
in Parliament, which resulted in 557 MPs voting in favour of intervention and just 13 rebels 
opposed when the motion was debated on 21 March.368  
In a highly critical account of British decision-making processes, Michael Clarke has asserted 
that this was a ‘‘top-down’’ decision driven by a Prime Minister whose style emulated the 
‘‘sofa’’ government of the Blair years.369 Similarly, most of the existing accounts referenced in 
this chapter create the impression that this decision was forced through in the face of some stiff 
opposition. While it is quite likely that there were contrary voices when Cameron first began 
pushing for intervention at the end of February, this interpretation seems to overstate the extent 
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of opposition. Firstly, Cameron was far from alone in his enthusiasm. Osborne and Gove are 
both described as ‘‘neocons’’ and while the latter was not present on the NSC, he was generally 
regarded as being a powerful voice in cabinet.370 Cameron was also clearly egged on by his 
chief of staff, Ed Llewellyn.371 Had Cameron really had to confront such scepticism, he would 
have done so with powerful allies.  
Secondly, the debate took place over a three week period, during which time developments on 
the ground in Libya and in the arenas of international diplomacy moved rapidly. It is entirely 
likely that Cameron faced widespread scepticism when he first began making the case for 
intervention at the end of February, but it does not follow that this was necessarily the case two 
or three weeks later. Most reports indicate that Hague was initially cautious, but the strength of 
his conviction in favour of intervention remained undiminished even given the subsequent 
fallout in Libya. Hillary Clinton’s memoirs, and her description of her meeting with Hague at 
the G8 foreign ministers’ meeting on 14 March, would indicate that by this point at the latest, 
the Foreign Secretary had firmly turned to support intervention.372 As shown by the evidence 
reviewed in this chapter, he was adamant that intervention was the right thing to do for moral 
reasons and later had no regrets about his decision. The same argument would apply to the 
Deputy Prime Minister. Perhaps Clegg expressed some doubts initially, but he soon became a 
keen supporter of intervention. Officials would described him as a ‘‘liberal interventionist’’ and 
Clegg made a speech describing himself in these terms.373 
Thirdly, the development of the three criteria, and the fact that this approach originated with 
Hague, contradicts the notion that Cameron was simply ignoring or bypassing those who were 
initially less inclined to agree with him. The relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary within the Coalition government was radically different to that which existed in the 
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Blair years. Hague was not subordinate to Cameron and he recalls that while Cameron came to 
power with detailed ideas for Afghanistan, ‘‘I felt as Foreign Secretary in his administration I 
had a great deal of freedom to propose what I wanted about much of the rest of foreign 
policy.’’374 Cameron asserted himself over Libya, but the Foreign Office played a key role in 
the crafting of the first resolution and it was Hague who introduced the three criteria shaping the 
pursuit of the second resolution. Addressing these criteria helped alleviate many of the concerns 
that would have initially arisen over issues such as legality and international support. Fourthly, 
scepticism about the feasibility and utility of military action would have significantly 
diminished following US support for intervention. It is true that Cameron brushed aside 
concerns about the practical value of a no-fly zone and overlooked the possibility that British 
intervention alone would not decisively impact the outcome in Libya. In the end though the US 
change of position would have entirely removed these doubts and concerns, both by broadening 
the UN mandate and bringing America’s superior capabilities to the table.  
Fifthly, attention on splits and divisions detracts from a consensus that existed in government 
from the outset. Almost everyone shared the view that Gaddafi must be removed from his 
position.375 As already shown, British policy was committed to this outcome before Cameron 
began pushing for military options. Within government, Sawers, Richards and Fox were in the 
relative minority in questioning the wisdom of such a policy, but there appears to have been a 
political consensus, both within and without the government and borne of the spirit of the Arab 
Spring, that Gaddafi simply had to go. Added to this fact, as the analysis in this section has 
shown, there was also a universal consensus that whatever private doubts key individuals might 
have had about intervening, such doubts were in the last resort insufficient to counteract the 
collective feeling that Britain could not allow Benghazi to fall. By the time force was finally 
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committed, Cameron did not need to brush anyone aside, the sceptics themselves had accepted 
the necessity of intervention. 
Conclusions 
 
When first announcing this triumph in Parliament, Cameron was able to insist that the three 
criteria which had framed his pursuit of a no fly zone were ‘‘satisfied in full.’’376 Such claims 
were ostensibly true. There had been an explicit request from the opposition forces themselves, 
an explicit request from the Arab League, and while the African Union had been more sceptical 
about military action, the African members of the Security Council had all voted in favour. 
Resolution 1973 resolved any questions about what constituted ‘‘clear legal basis’’ while 
President Obama’s late change of heart meant any doubts about the efficacy or feasibility of 
what was being proposed were now no longer at issue. As for demonstrable need, few could 
doubt that the situation on the ground required a rapid response in order to prevent significant 
loss of life. A decision that had already been made in principle could now be put into effect. 
The impetus to intervene came directly from Number 10 and David Cameron personally. 
Without the Prime Minister’s willingness to take risks and push for a strong response it is 
unlikely Britain would have become involved, not because others were fundamentally opposed 
to intervention, but because the speed with which the threat was developing required a rapid 
political and diplomatic mobilization. Cameron’s hawkishness made this possible. The final 
decision itself was then a formality, the culmination of a series of prior moves that had removed 
the obstacles in the way of a course of action that many were already committed to in principle. 
While it is natural to think in terms of ‘‘decisions’’ it is perhaps more appropriate to think of 
Britain’s response in evolutionary terms. For example, those who supported stronger diplomatic 
action against the regime during the early stages of the crisis may not have envisioned a military 
response would be necessary or desirable, yet the very diplomatic action they took helped 
increased the likelihood of this eventuality.  
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None the less, a decision was made in the NSC, approximately between 12 and 16 March, that 
Britain would intervene to prevent the fall of Benghazi if a Chapter VII resolution could be 
passed. The analysis in this chapter has suggested that Britain would have intervened without 
UN approval, although a controversial decision such as this was not necessary. This chapter has 
provided further evidence to support the claim that fears of a massacre on the scale seen in the 
Balkans in the 1990s was a primary driver of this decision. Importantly though, while a 
determination to prevent such a possibility was a key motivator for those like the Prime 
Minister who aggressively pressed the case for action it was just as important, if not more 
important, in persuading others to acquiesce to an intervention about which they shared some 
reservations.  
Notwithstanding this argument, an exclusive focus on memories of Srebrenica would lead to an 
incomplete understanding of the moral case for intervention and a simplistic assessment of the 
Prime Minister’s psychology. The wider context of the Arab Spring, longstanding beliefs about 
Britain’s role on the world stage and Cameron’s personal dislike of Gaddafi were also relevant. 
So too was the context in which the decisions took place. This context was shaped by extremely 
fast-moving events, a poor intelligence picture and significant media pressure. These additional 
arguments are not mutually exclusive with an explanation that highlights the importance of 
memories of Bosnia in the 1990s. They do, however, suggest a more nuanced account of 
Britain’s decision to intervene and one that gives full weight to both analogies with Srebrenica 
and the importance of the Arab Spring.  
Additionally, acknowledging the Prime Minister’s centrality does not mean ignoring the role 
played by other actors, or misrepresenting the nature and extent of scepticism Cameron had to 
overcome in pushing his case. Hague can be credited with outlining the approach that guided 
the government’s final decision to intervene and its pursuit of a second resolution. Existing 
explanations have tended to downplay or ignore the significance of both the first UN resolution 
and the ‘‘three criteria’’ in the development of Britain’s response. The importance of the three 
criteria also suggests a more subtle understanding of the divisions within the British 
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government. Although Cameron’s strength of conviction drove him forward, the importance 
attached to issues such as regional support and the effort taken to build a case at the UN show 
that if there were concerns about the diplomatic fallout from any intervention then these were 
not ignored or brushed aside. More importantly, this analysis shows that the changing situation 
on the ground led many to conclude that they had no choice but to sanction intervention, even 
with the risks this might entail.  
If there is one instance where it is more accurate to suggest that the Prime Minister simply 
ignored or overruled sceptics, it is in relation to the presence of concerns about the limitations 
of a no-fly zone and the potential shortcomings of British military capabilities. This argument 
must also acknowledge, however, that it was the US change of position that removed these 
issues. On this basis, it is wrong to portray subsequent events as a vindication of Cameron’s 
strong response, given that the failure of these concerns to materialise was the result of 
fortuitous circumstances. Libya can be viewed as one of those instances where Cameron’s 
penchant for risk taking initially paid off, but alongside an appreciation of his boldness and 
resolve, the role of chance and contingency deserves its place in our retelling of this episode in 
British foreign policy. 
This willingness to take risks when considering the possible use of military force, alongside the 
extent to which moral considerations took precedence over more traditional understandings of 
national interest, is the potential avenue toward a wider argument. The Libyan intervention can 
be seen as displaying facets of both liberal internationalism and liberal interventionism. Which 
of these facets we choose to emphasise is important in how we characterise the beliefs and 
assumptions that shaped British decision-making. These beliefs are vital to understand precisely 
because Libya was, like the majority of conflicts Britain has pursued in the post-Cold War era, a 
war of choice. It was not for reasons of national security or self-defence, strategic calculation, 
alliance loyalty or even domestic political pressure than Britain decided to intervene. It was 
because Cameron, like Blair before him, believed it was the right thing to do. 
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Fully addressing the question of how we might classify or characterise the beliefs and 
assumptions that shaped Britain’s intervention in Libya cannot be completed without first 
analysing how British policy played out after the immediate goal of establishing a no-fly zone 
and liberating Benghazi had been achieved. That is the task of the following chapter. For now, 
it is worth making two observations to prepare the ground. 
Firstly, the decision to intervene is good evidence that Cameron himself was a liberal 
interventionist, at least in his response to Libya. That Britain’s approach also displayed 
elements of liberal internationalism is partly attributable to the fact that Cameron himself was 
not the sole architect of policy. His willingness to call for intervention, without first having 
tested the diplomatic waters nor fully consulted his cabinet, is an act that shows a lack of the 
cautiousness toward intervention that he claimed to possess while in opposition. It is true, as 
Daddow and Schnapper eloquently put it, that the Prime Minister attempted to chart a course 
‘‘between the Scylla of Major’s moral bankruptcy over Bosnia and the Charybdis of Blair’s 
adventurism in Iraq.’’377 Yet this attempt, even in its earliest stages, clearly veered toward the 
latter. Bound up with Cameron’s desire to prevent another Srebenica, was his ideological 
sympathy for rebel forces about which he knew little, an uncompromising insistence upon 
regime change and a tendency to see Middle Eastern politics through a Manichean prism.  
The two key differences between Libya and the ‘‘adventurism’’ of the Blair years was the 
greater emphasis on ‘‘regional support’’ and the decision to rule out ground forces. The 
determination to avoid the impression of imposing solutions from outside and a desire to 
preserve good relationships with key regional players represent a lesson learned from 2003 and 
perhaps, a more pragmatic approach. The decision to rule out grounds troops was primarily a 
reflection that such considerations would have been operating in a fantasy land given strong 
opposition to such a prospect from Middle Eastern states, Libyans themselves and British public 
opinion. Add to that the impossibility of securing UN approval, cuts to defence spending and 
ongoing commitments in Afghanistan, it is no surprise that such an option was not seriously 
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entertained. The extent to which there has been an attitudinal revision is therefore difficult to 
assess, as even the most ardent of neoconservatives would have been unlikely to have insisted 
on ground forces in such circumstances. 
Elsewhere, what appear at first glance to be fundamental differences with previous conflicts are 
on closer inspection differences of degree. It is true that the government demonstrably attached 
more importance to international legitimacy and international law. The securing of a UN 
Resolution authorising force is not, however, strong evidence of a fundamental change of 
approach, but the happy coincidence that resulted from unique circumstances. The evidence 
reviewed in this chapter shows that the government would likely have intervened without a UN 
resolution, regardless of the claimed necessity of a ‘‘clear legal basis.’’ The suggestion that 
military power would now be used for more limited and carefully defined ends, a claim made in 
the government’s National Security Strategy and seen as a further means of distancing its 
approach from that of New Labour, is also undermined. This was a leap into the unknown, with 
little consideration given to what might happen if Gaddafi were to cling to power indefinitely. 
Ultimately, this argument stands or falls to a significant extent on the basis of what comes next. 
Would the British government stick to the terms of the UN mandate? Would it avoid adopting 
an uncompromising and maximalist position in order to explore the possibility of a diplomatic 
end to the conflict? Would policy-makers genuinely be capable of limiting their use of force to 
the objective of preventing loss of civilian life? If answers to the above questions are 
affirmative, then while the Libyan episode is not absent its dose of liberal interventionism, the 
Coalition had clearly embraced a fundamentally different approach to the use of force in 
comparison to its predecessors. On the other hand, the idealistic framing of the Arab Spring, the 
outraged demands for Gaddafi’s removal, and the blurring of the lines between the desire to 
save civilians and support democratic transition had already planted the seeds for another round 
of adventure in the Middle East. As the following chapter will show, UNSC 1973 provided an 






Chapter Four: Libya: After Benghazi 
 
The swift liberation of Benghazi and the establishment of a no-fly zone fulfilled the immediate 
objectives that had been advocated by Cameron. This quickly brought to the fore questions 
about the continuing use of military force, what was and was not permitted according to the 
terms of the UN resolution, and the ultimate objectives of Britain’s Libya policy beyond this 
point. Accordingly, the first section of this chapter examines why and for what purposes Britain 
continued military action beyond the stage at which Benghazi had been secured and a no-fly 
zone put into effect. Although the immediate priority was the prevention of a massacre in 
Benghazi, the analysis in this chapter supports the argument that democratic regime change 
was, at the very least, a latent objective of British military intervention from the very beginning.   
Following the initial phase of military action and the transition away from a US-led coalition of 
the willing to NATO command and control, the fighting on the ground settled into a stalemate 
that lasted between April and July. The analysis in the second section describes how Britain 
pursued an ‘‘anaconda’’ strategy, based on using a combination of military and non-military 
pressure and premised on the expectation of encouraging widespread defections to bring about 
the internal collapse of the regime. This section further shows that the fulfilment of this agenda 
was obstructed by a range of constraints, foremost among them the limited efficacy of a military 
strategy almost entirely reliant on air power and the compromises necessary to maintain alliance 
unity. In these circumstances, Britain and France adopted a series of measured escalations, 
incrementally tilting the balance on the ground against the regime but without promising to 
yield a decisive outcome within a realistic timeframe.  
The third section examines the possibility of alternative, non-military means for resolving the 
conflict and analyses the British government’s position on the possibility of peace talks. The 
available evidence suggests that Britain not only failed to seriously explore this option, but 
actively undermined the efforts of others to mediate between the two sides. The analysis 
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explores some of the possible explanations and suggests two main reasons for Britain’s 
diplomatic obstructionism. Firstly, as British policy was aimed at encouraging widespread 
defections, any signal of a weakening of resolve was viewed as counterproductive, and the 
possibility of peace talks was interpreted in this light. Secondly, although the British 
government desired an end to the conflict, it was determined to reach such an end on favourable 
terms and in a manner that was symbolically aligned with its understanding of the conflict. This 
led to a winner-takes-all strategy, in which Britain could avoid making tactical concessions to 
Gaddafi and the ‘‘democratic’’ rebels would triumph on the battlefield. 
In July, the tide began to turn in favour of the rebel forces, leading to the liberation of Tripoli in 
August and the capturing and killing of Colonel Gaddafi in October. This breakthrough is 
generally attributed to a shift in strategy on the part of Britain, France and their Gulf allies, who 
switched their focus toward seeking a military breakthrough in the western half of the country, 
in addition to the insertion of special forces to train and assist rebel forces.378 Alongside these 
actions, NATO took on what amounted to a combat support role, aiding rebel offensives in 
Tripoli and beyond. The fourth section analyses this change of strategy and the role of British 
policy during this stage of the conflict. It shows that in pursuing such an approach and 
continuing to prioritize a military solution, the British government, and Cameron in particular, 
showed a willingness to take considerable risks and to exceed the boundaries of the UN 
mandate.  
The fleeting sense of vindication occasioned by the death of Gaddafi has since given way to 
strident criticism, especially of alleged failures in the area of post-conflict planning.379 The fifth 
section of this chapter considers British policy towards winning the peace in Libya, focusing on 
the post-conflict planning carried out during the course of intervention and analysing this aspect 
of policy in the context of perceived parallels with nation-building in Iraq. The analysis lends 
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weight to the assessment that British policy was based on poor intelligence, faulty assumptions 
and a lack of adequate planning, despite a greater recognition of the importance of this area of 
policy following the experience of Iraq. However, the evidence further shows that rather than 
blithely repeating the mistakes of that conflict, the Coalition government often wrongly applied 
the ‘‘lessons’’ taken from Iraq in a way that undermined its efforts to support transition in 
Libya. 
The final, concluding section explores the underlying ideas and philosophies that shaped the 
intervention. It argues that while Cameron and Hague positioned themselves as pragmatists and 
sought to resist efforts to draw wider lessons from this conflict, such rhetoric ultimately 
obscures the extent to which British military action in Libya was driven by assumptions that 
show strong parallels with the liberal interventionism outlined in Chapter Two. The purpose of 
advancing this argument is not simply to engage in label-making for its own sake, but to instead 
identify the beliefs and assumptions that drove British intervention in Libya. While many 
factors were involved in explaining the development of British policy, this was a war of choice 
that was profoundly shaped by the liberal interventionist philosophy and instincts of many in 
the Coalition government, particularly Prime Minister Cameron.   
Democratic Regime Change: British Objectives in Libya 
 
Military action under a US-led coalition quickly succeeded in preventing the fall of Benghazi 
and establishing a no-fly zone.380 At the same time, strikes against the regime’s ground forces 
not only prevented Gaddafi from retaking Benghazi, but helped relieve the besieged city of 
Misrata and facilitated rebel advances against Ajdabiyah and Brega. Poorly organized 
opposition forces were able to advance as far as fifty miles east of Sirte, before a counter-attack 
forced them back to Ajdabiyah. Gaddafi’s forces therefore held the strategically important oil 
town of Brega, establishing a frontline that would remain largely unchanged until the middle of 
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July.381 Immediately following the passage of Resolution 1973, Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy 
released a joint declaration laying out their interpretation of the resolution and additional ‘‘non-
negotiable’’ terms for the Gaddafi regime.382 The statement called for the re-establishment of 
water, electricity and gas to certain areas and access to humanitarian assistance for the Libyan 
people. It also specifically called for Gaddafi to pull his forces back from Benghazi and 
withdraw them from Adjabiya, Misrata and Zawiyah.  
These terms quickly provided the rationale for indefinitely continuing military action and the de 
facto demands for any possible ceasefire. In his statement to the House before the vote on 
military action on 21 March, Cameron reiterated these terms and made clear that ‘‘the 
government’s view is that those non-negotiable terms are entirely consistent with implementing 
the resolution.’’383 This position raised the bar for the ceasefire demanded by the UN, by calling 
for the reversal of territorial changes made before the passage of the resolution.384 When he next 
addressed Parliament a week later, Cameron brushed aside calls for ‘‘exit strategies’’ by 
repeating this position, telling MPs that ‘‘I think that what we should hold true to is the strong 
UN Security Council resolution that is about a no-fly zone, about protecting civilians and about 
getting humanitarian aid in. To comply with that, Gaddafi must comply with all the things in the 
resolution and with what the President of the United States set out in his statement. I see no sign 
of that happening and, as that is not happening, we are right to go on enforcing the 
resolution.’’385 Both the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary dismissed the possibility of a 
ceasefire by pointing to the fact that Gaddafi’s claims to have implemented one were instantly 
disproven by events on the ground. Cameron therefore rebuffed the suggestion of seeking one 
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by arguing that, ‘‘of course everyone would welcome a ceasefire, but let us be frank – two 
ceasefires have been announced by Colonel Gaddafi, both of which have been broken, so I 
think that we should have a heavy degree of scepticism about what this man says.’’386 While 
such scepticism was clearly justified, this position effectively placed all the onus on the side of 
the regime for achieving an end to the fighting.387 The government did not respond to news of 
advances by rebel forces by calling for them to halt, but instead welcomed such developments. 
In an interview on 27 March, the Defence Secretary celebrated the rebels’ seizure of Brega, 
because ‘‘it puts them in control of Libya’s oil output and that is a very substantial change in 
terms of the dynamic internally in that particular situation…’’388 It was already clear that 
military force, whether by design or otherwise, was assisting one side in a civil war.  
While the terms of the P3’s ultimatum were clear,389 interpreting Britain’s objectives is more 
difficult. The evidence reviewed in the preceding chapter illustrated that while the need to 
prevent large-scale loss of life in Benghazi was the key driver of government decision-making 
in the build up to the deployment of force, this perceived imperative co-existed alongside a rigid 
determination to see Gaddafi’s removal from power, especially on the part of the Prime 
Minister. This latter position was reinforced by an unstated but widespread assumption that 
such an outcome was the likely culmination of ongoing events on the ground, so long as the 
regime was denied the ability to fully utilise its military assets against its opponents. Fox 
captured this assumption in the interview referred to above, saying ‘‘there is no doubt that 
we’ve given a fillip to the rebels, that they have increased confidence, and I hope that what will 
ultimately happen is that without further bloodshed the people of Libya will rise up and be able 
to determine what sort of government they want and to control their own destiny and not have it 
inflicted upon them by a very vicious regime indeed.’’390 That such an eventuality did not 
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emerge following the liberation of Benghazi elevated the salience of questions about the 
relationship between regime change and civilian protection and brought to the fore widespread 
concerns about the apparent lack of an ‘‘exit strategy’’ and the possibility of ‘‘mission 
creep.’’391  
There are four key sources of evidence that can be drawn upon to assess and interpret the 
government’s objectives in its continuing use of force in Libya. The first and most abundant 
source of evidence is the public statements made by ministers throughout this period. The 
government sought to emphasise firstly, that it was acting entirely within the remit of the UN 
resolution and secondly, that its use of force was premised on a distinction between military and 
political objectives. The government was therefore clear in acknowledging that while providing 
a broad authorisation for the use of force, the UN resolution also limited what was possible. 
Aside from ruling out an occupation force, 1973 also ruled out using military power to 
orchestrate regime change. Despite his previous insistence on the necessity of Gaddafi’s 
departure, in his first statement to the House at the outset of the campaign, the Prime Minister 
recognised that 1973 ‘‘explicitly does not provide legal authority to bring about Gaddafi’s 
removal by military means.’’392  The government also strongly emphasised the importance of 
acting in accordance with the UN resolution and retaining the legal, diplomatic and moral 
authority that stemmed from that mandate. Hague was especially persistent in reaffirming the 
importance of this, telling Parliament that, ‘‘whatever we do… must be in strict accordance 
with the UN resolution and we must maintain the legal, moral and international authority that 
comes from that. We will not do anything that we think would transgress that resolution.’’393 
The message intended was that the UK’s military objectives were limited to the narrower 
purpose of protecting civilians. 
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This did not mean, however, that the government backtracked from openly championing regime 
change in Libya. Instead, the government claimed that its ‘‘political’’ objectives remained 
unchanged and by drawing a distinction between military and political objectives it could 
continue to insist that its use of force was consistent with the UN resolution. This ambiguous 
dual position was the major recurring theme in the government’s public announcements during 
this period. When the Commons voted to support military action on 21 March, Cameron 
informed MPs that:  
Many people will ask questions—I am sure, today—about regime change, Gaddafi and the rest 
of it. I have been clear: I think Libya needs to get rid of Gaddafi. But, in the end, we are 
responsible for trying to enforce that Security Council resolution; the Libyans must choose their 
own future.394 
A few days later, at a press conference following an EU summit, the Prime Minister again 
spoke of the ‘‘constraints’’ contained in the resolution, before telling the assembled journalists 
that:  
However that does not change my belief – and a belief that has also been expressed by almost 
every leading of every major country in the world – that there is no future for Libya with 
Gaddafi and that he should go. I think we need to be clear about those two things; what is in the 
UN Security Council and what we believe, as leaders, needs to happen.395 
This position was shared with Britain’s key alliance partners. It was set out by Obama, 
Cameron and Sarkozy in a joint letter to the New York Times on 14 April: 
Our duty and our mandate under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, 
and we are doing that. It is not to remove Qaddafi by force. But it is impossible to imagine a 
future for Libya with Qaddafi in power. 
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The article then reiterated the same terms that the three leaders had first outlined a month 
previously, before declaring that: 
However, so long as Qaddafi is in power, NATO must maintain its operations so that civilians 
remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds. Then a genuine transition from 
dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process can really begin, led by a new generation of 
leaders. In order for that transition to succeed, Qaddafi must go and go for good.396 
Regardless of whatever technical distinction might have existed between military and political 
objectives, it was natural and logical to see military force as an instrument that would facilitate 
political change. Cameron let this manner of thinking slip in his testimony before the Liaison 
Committee in May. Responding to a question about how Britain would narrow the gap between 
its ‘‘political’’ and ‘‘military’’ objectives , he argued that what was needed was ‘‘turning up the 
pressure.’’397 The Prime Minister listed a range of actions Britain was taking in this regard, such 
as sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Importantly though, he also referred to military action 
within this context, telling committee members that ‘‘you have seen a ramping up of the 
pressure, within the rule of 1973…’’398  Such an admission made clear that military action was 
seen as making an important contribution to the government’s wider political objectives. 
These wider political objectives were ambitious and idealistic. The contemporary public record 
provides ample evidence that while British policy desired the protection of civilians, policy-
makers also sought what they regarded as a just solution to the conflict. Crucially, this latter 
goal entailed a democratic political system and ‘‘accountability’’ for the crimes of Gaddafi and 
his senior acolytes. This is clear from some of the comments quoted above, and the references 
to allowing Libyans to ‘‘determine their own future.’’ In general it did not need spelling out, as 
it was taken for granted within the government that the protection of civilians was simply one 
component of a much broader agenda. Summing up the government’s approach before the 
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Defence Committee at the end of April, Fox explained that, ‘‘the UK aims, if I may begin with 
those, are for the protection of civilians, for Gaddafi to comply with UN Resolution 1973 and 
for the Libyan people to have the opportunity to choose their own future.’’399 When it was 
observed that this latter goal was not in fact included in the terms of the resolution, Fox replied 
by suggesting that, ‘‘but I would have thought that a very clear aim for all of us is that the free 
decision of people to determine their own future is something that we would want to see. I 
would have hardly thought that required incorporation into the Resolution; I would have 
thought that to an extent it was self-evident.’’400  
The second key source of evidence is the subsequent testimony of senior members of the 
government before the FAC’s inquiry in 2015. In certain respects, this evidence is consistent 
with the contemporary claim that military force was deployed primarily for civilian protection. 
When asked why military action continued following the liberation of Benghazi, both Hague 
and Fox pointed to the continuing actions of the Gaddafi regime in threatening civilians in other 
areas of the country.401 Fox persisted with the distinction between political and military 
objectives, recalling how ‘‘I think the political view was taken that somebody else had to be in 
charge. But there was never a plan for regime change as such.’’402 Hague was able to avoid 
addressing these issues quite so explicitly, but on the question of regime change, he asserted 
that ‘‘… it is highly likely that western democracies will say that, whatever is going on in UN 
resolutions or military action, a leader that is butchering his own people has to go. It would be 
quite surprising if we said anything else.’’403 Both former ministers stuck to the official line, 
and neither was willing to suggest that their contemporary statements, despite their ambiguities, 
were in any way misrepresenting actual UK policy in Libya. 
The testimony of Lord Richards would appear to contradict the claims made by Hague and Fox. 
In his testimony, Richards was very explicit in conceding that removing Gaddafi was the goal 
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of military action, noting that, ‘‘I would say that by April… we were all focused on regime 
change.’’404 What Richards’ testimony suggests, however, is that Britain’s initial goals were 
more limited and that while regime change quickly became the goal, this was only in order to 
continue fulfilling the civilian protection mandate, rather than something that was pursued as an 
end in itself. Summarizing his recollection of this change of approach, he acknowledged that, 
‘‘… at some point regime change, in shorthand, became the accepted means of ensuring that the 
civilian population of Libya would not be threatened into the long term, so it became, as I said, 
an ineluctable change of mission for me.’’405  
However, at other times Richards has suggested that getting rid of Gaddafi was an explicit goal 
from the outset. He suggested that even during the evacuation stage of operations, discussions 
about Gaddafi were being held and that: 
During Benghazi, an increasingly influential set of people started saying, ‘If we’re really going 
to protect civilians, you’ve got to get rid of Gaddafi.’ That is when I said, ‘Well is that really 
sensible? What are we going to do if he goes?’’ … That was rather ignored in the majority 
view, which was, ‘We need to get rid of him, simply to make sure we meet the political aim of 
preventing large-scale loss of life.406 
This evidence would seem to suggest that if there ever was a change of mission, then this 
change took place before April, during the very earliest round of military action over Benghazi. 
The claim that this change occurred only in order to protect civilians is also complicated by 
Richards’ revelations about the British military’s original campaign plan. This plan initially 
entailed a ‘‘pause’’ after the establishment of the no-fly zone and the operation to halt the 
regime’s advance on Benghazi. Richards justified the inclusion of a ‘‘pause’’ because ‘‘I felt 
that my political masters and those in American and Europe should at least have an opportunity 
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to pause, perhaps have a ceasefire and have another go at the political process…’’407 Richards is 
not entirely consistent when explaining how and why such an option was not in fact taken up, 
suggesting a number of reasons, but noting that ‘‘that was not accepted more widely, and it did 
not really, because of the speed of events, get much traction here in London, but we did build it 
in.’’408 In addition to noting that the plan did not get much traction in London, Richards jumps 
between differing explanations for the failure to exploit this possibility, claiming that as the 
momentum was then with the rebel forces, ‘‘they didn’t feel the need to stop anyway,’’409 that 
the British campaign plan was ‘‘not accepted by our allies,’’410 and because ‘‘it was clear that 
Gaddafi was not going to pack up.’’411 It is unclear which of these three explanations he sees as 
most worthy of emphasis, and it is likely the three were impossible to disentangle. Nevertheless, 
it suggests that other, non-military means of ending the conflict were not pursued as seriously as 
they might have been, a point returned to in more detail in the third section of this chapter. 
Richards’ memoir, somewhat at odds with the account he provided before the FAC’s inquiry, 
does not appear to broker a meaningful distinction between military and political goals, nor 
does it suggest that Britain sought regime change if only to best protect civilians. Instead, while 
not addressing these issues explicitly, the entire narrative is written as if answers to such 
questions can be taken for granted. It appears that from the perspective of Britain’s senior 
military representative, the major goal was to win the conflict by assisting one side in a civil 
war. He concludes his assessment of the campaign by describing it as a success because, ‘‘… in 
the end, we got our man.’’412 He also relates how there was ‘‘considerable political pressure’’ to 
target Gaddafi directly, because politicians viewed this as a ‘‘quick route to finishing off his 
regime.’’413 Richards’ objections to this approach, which were reported in the media as early as 
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21 March 2011,414 were based on his desire to ensure the actions of the Armed Forces were 
consistent with international law.415  
The memoirs of key individuals within the Obama administration would also seem to suggest 
that military force was being used for the purpose of regime change. Clinton was already 
thinking in these terms at the G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 14 March. She describes her 
meeting in Paris with head of the Benghazi-based rebel NTC, Mahmoud Jibril, by writing that, 
‘‘we had learned the hard way in Iraq and elsewhere that it’s one thing to remove a dictator and 
another altogether to help a competent and credible government take his place. If the United 
States was going to intervene in Libya, we would be making a big bet on this political scientist 
and his colleagues…’’416 Gates recalls in his memoirs the distinction between political and 
military objectives, yet that is only a recollection of his comments before a Congressional 
Hearing.417 Elsewhere, he has more or less admitted that such distinctions were purely 
cosmetic.418 In June he was succeeded as defence secretary by former CIA chief Leon Panetta, 
who in his account of this period recalls letting slip to a journalist ‘‘what we couldn’t officially 
acknowledge: that our goal in Libya was regime change.’’419 Only General Stavridis, who was 
NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe at this time, offers a subtly different perspective. 
He states explicitly that, ‘‘we were not authorised to do everything necessary to ensure regime 
change because that was not our mission.’’420 While such a claim may have been technically 
true, the admiral goes on to describe how NATO was trying to assist rebel forces and how this 
involved individual countries providing arms to them.421 Taken together, the evidence from the 
memoirs suggests that the division between political and military goals was emphasised for 
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legal and diplomatic reasons and while it led to the placing of some restrictions on the way in 
which force could be used, it did not automatically mean that such force was not perceived as 
helping to facilitate objectives that went beyond the UN resolution. 
As is implicit in the arguments above, a final means of assessing Britain’s objectives in Libya is 
by inferring the intentions from the manner in which force was used. The tactics and 
capabilities utilised are analysed in greater detail in the following sections of this chapter. The 
insertion of special forces to help assist rebel advances in the summer of 2011 is a tactic that 
strongly suggests a policy of military regime change. This development, however, does not rule 
out the possibility that the initial goals were more narrowly defined or that regime change, as 
some have suggested, may have been pursued precisely because it became the only way of 
protecting civilians.422  The difficulty here is that we are entering far more subjective territory. 
Even before the full commencement of Operation Unified Protector on 31 March, the actions 
taken by the US, Britain and France were interpreted by many at the time as efforts to assist one 
side in a civil war and remove Gaddafi through force.423 It is certainly true that the use of allied 
airpower facilitated territorial gains by the rebel side in late March, and certainly the case, as 
Richards reveals, that Cameron and others favoured targeting Gaddafi personally, as a quick 
means of achieving their goals.424 
It is far from certain that continuing military action was a last resort. During the early stages of 
the campaign, the government adopted a dismissive attitude toward the possibility of diplomatic 
negotiation.  Cameron bypassed directly addressing questions about reports of Turkey’s 
attempts to find a diplomatic solution when this was raised in Parliament, claiming that while 
Ankara might potentially have a role as a ‘‘trusted interlocutor,’’ their immediate priority 
should be the provision of naval assets to support ongoing operations.425 Similarly, Hague 
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sought to present reports of Greek mediation efforts not as an initiative that might potentially 
lead to a negotiated end to the conflict, but as ‘‘a sign of the pressure that the regime is 
under.’’426 A series of comments by the Prime Minister’s official spokesperson, between late 
March and early April, were quite explicit in making clear that Britain was not involved in any 
of the reported efforts to negotiate a ceasefire, had no intention of brokering an exit for Gaddafi, 
and was not contemplating waiving accountability in order to use this as a diplomatic 
bargaining chip.427 
The distinction between civilian protection and various other objectives is as much a conceptual 
issue as it is an empirical one. However, the evidence reviewed in this section suggests that 
Britain’s objectives went beyond a desire to protect civilians and included regime change and 
democratic transition. Although the latter goals were seen in part as a means of removing the 
threat to civilians, they were also valued as an end in themselves as they represented what the 
government took to be a just and legitimate solution to the conflict. Secondly, the distinction 
between political and military objectives rested more in the realm of legal niceties than political 
realities. The UN resolution did impose restrictions on the way in which force could be used 
and military leaders were not given carte blanche to remove Gaddafi from power. Yet the legal 
obstacles to pursuing the objectives do not alter the nature of the objectives themselves and 
policy-makers naturally viewed military action as a means of facilitating the realization of their 
wider political goals. Finally, while there was some uncertainty and confusion over the legal 
interpretation of the resolution and a temporary absence of unanimity within government about 
what exactly would follow the first stage of the operations, there is little evidence to support the 
contention that there was a fundamental change of mission. It is more realistic to conclude that 
democratic regime change was, at the very least, a latent objective from the outset of the 
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intervention, even if the immediate priority was the establishment of a no-fly zone and the 
liberation of Benghazi.  This did not mean that there existed a secret plan to oust Gaddafi. 
Rather, the British government began the campaign optimistically viewing both Gaddafi’s total 
defeat and a process of democratic regime change as the natural byproduct of its intervention 
and therefore continued to pursue the military option for as long as this agenda remained 
incomplete.  
The Anaconda Strategy  
 
By April, the situation on the ground clearly indicated that neither side was capable of a 
decisive breakthrough. Notwithstanding minor territorial gains, and the importance of the 
liberation of Misrata in May, this stalemate would continue until late July and early August. 
The British strategy was referred to by Hague as the ‘‘anaconda strategy’’428 and it involved 
steadily tightening the pressure against Gaddafi through diplomatic isolation, economic 
strangulation and ongoing military attacks. The failure of the rebels to achieve a breakthrough 
on the eastern front and the ability of the Gaddafi regime to retain control in the capital and 
much of Tripolitania threatened to erode the political and diplomatic support for continuing 
military action and made clear that a no-fly zone and air strikes against regime forces were an 
insufficient means of toppling Gaddafi. At the same time, there were legitimate doubts about 
whether the alliance had the capability to sustain its operations beyond September. This patient 
and sometimes constrained use of military force, at least when measured against the scale of the 
objectives described in the preceding section, was ultimately an insufficient route to victory. 
This section explains how and why Britain adopted such an approach, analyses the measured 
escalations adopted during this period, and assesses the constraints that prevented a more 
decisive use of force. 
The anaconda strategy required patience and persistence in recognition of the fact that the swift 
rebel victory that some may have been hoping for was not to be forthcoming. It was reported 
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that Hague warned the cabinet at the end of April that, ‘‘we might have to prepare for the long 
haul.’’429 When asked in Parliament to justify this approach, the Foreign Secretary told the 
Commons that ‘‘the point that I made at the Cabinet this morning was that in this situation, time 
is not on the side of Gaddafi. We are often asked in international conflicts whether time is on 
our side. We should be confident that in this situation—given this coalition, this range of 
sanctions and these intensifying efforts—time is not on the side of Gaddafi, and the members of 
his regime need to know that.’’430 This argument was a recurring theme in the weeks and 
months ahead and was drawn upon by the government to address concerns about the difficulties 
of sustaining military operations indefinitely. In Prime Minister’s Questions in June, for 
example, Cameron responded to the doubters by declaring that ‘‘I want one simple message to 
go out from every part of the Government, and indeed from every part of the House of 
Commons: time is on our side. We have NATO, the United Nations and the Arab League. We 
have right on our side. The pressure is building militarily, diplomatically and politically, and 
time is running out for Gaddafi.’’431  
It is often difficult to interpret the public statements for this period as the demands of 
maintaining a united front and delivering the necessary signals to Gaddafi often prevented 
ministers speaking truthfully about the challenges they were facing. For example, when Fox 
appeared before the Defence Committee in April, he began by informing its members that ‘‘the 
messages that come out of this session this afternoon will resonate with our Forces and with the 
Gaddafi regime,’’ and finished the session by announcing that ‘‘we are, I hope, sending a very 
clear signal today, from this Committee to the regime in Libya, that we intend to fulfil our 
obligations under the UN Resolution.’’432 The government therefore studiously avoided 
acknowledging the situation had reached a stalemate, preferring instead to describe the situation 
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as fluid and emphasising that time was against Gaddafi. A more emphatic demonstration of the 
importance of this political messaging came in June, when Cameron responded to public 
comments by the First Sea Lord casting doubt on Britain’s ability to sustain the operations 
indefinitely. ‘‘You do the fighting, ‘I’ll do the talking,’’’ was the Prime Minister’s response.433 
Privately, the government’s strategy also rested on a heavy emphasis on defection and an 
assumption that this was a viable route to regime change. This underlined the importance of the 
messages that Cameron and Fox were reinforcing, as any hint of a change of course would 
encourage Gaddafi and those around him to continue the fight. Britain scored an early victory in 
this area, with the high-profile defection of Libya’s then foreign minister, Musa Kusa, who 
arrived at Farnborough Airport on 31 March. This was celebrated as a major triumph and a sign 
of the regime’s growing weakness, and Cameron declared that  ‘‘I’ve been clear from the start 
that we want Gaddafi to go and that his henchmen should also come to their senses and abandon 
this brutal regime.’’434 This partially explains the importance attached to promises of 
accountability, the threat of which was often presented as an incentive for would-be deserters. 
When the ICC issued arrest warrants for Gaddafi in June, Hague offered this as one of the 
arguments in favour of supporting judicial action, telling Parliament that ‘‘we cannot provide 
certainty, but these warrants show an ever-increasing risk to supporters of the regime of facing 
that accountability, so more of them should take the opportunity to leave it.’’435  
According to Mark Muller Stuart, a prominent lawyer and civil society activist who met with 
senior members of the government during this period, this approach was based on the Foreign 
Office’s analysis of Libya’s internal dynamics, which held that the regime’s survival depended 
on the continued loyalty of a select number of important families.436 If these could be persuaded 
to abandon the regime then, according to the calculations of the FCO, the regime would 
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collapse from within.437 From this perspective, a stalemate was seen as less problematic, as it 
might be interpreted as a precursor to the significant defections the government was hoping for. 
On the one occasion Hague implicitly acknowledged that there was a stalemate, he offered the 
view that ‘‘I think even the prospect of a kind of stalemate that you’re talking about could 
encourage people in Tripoli to think well Colonel Gaddafi has now got to go.’’438 
This approach naturally relied heavily on alliance unity. It was arguably this factor that served 
as the single greatest check against a more decisive use of force at an earlier stage. As some 
politicians began to call for a steeper escalation in the military effort to break the apparent 
stalemate, Hague outlined the preferred approach with the argument that, ‘it is more important 
to stick to the resolutions, and to achieve success within their constraints, than to expect a lack 
of support among the nations of the coalition for our action in continuing these operations as 
necessary, along without our other diplomatic and economic efforts.’’439 Already in April, 
NATO actions were provoking a backlash at the UN, as some members interpreted military 
action as clearly exceeding the mandate that had been granted and likely to promote continued 
conflict. Hardeep Singh Puri, who was India’s Permanent Representative during this period, 
describes a ‘‘sharp exchange’’ between himself and his British counterpart, Mark Lyall Grant, 
over their contrasting interpretations of Britain’s involvement in the conflict.440 Britain did not 
have military capabilities to achieve its goal without a broad coalition, but more importantly the 
legitimacy of the action and therefore the ability to sustain it depended on widespread 
international support, in addition to the continuing approval of the Arab states. The diplomatic 
effort therefore took place on two fronts, the one within NATO and the other with the Arab 
states.  Alliance unity was fragile. 
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A meeting in Paris on 19 March, prior to the scheduled commencement of military action, was 
intended to strengthen alliance unity, but it ended without any agreement on what would follow 
the initial US-led phase of the operation. Furthermore, the pre-emptive and unilateral actions of 
the French government, which decided to commence air strikes before the agreed time, 
provoked a backlash. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi even threatened to withdraw 
access to his country’s bases, a move that would be especially difficult for Britain given the 
lack of an aircraft carrier.441 The major point of contention within the fragile alliance during this 
early stage was the issue of command and control.442 Britain and the US both favoured a NATO 
takeover as soon as possible, as the alliance’s command and control capabilities were deemed 
necessary to a mission of this kind. Fearing Turkish obstruction and doubtful whether Arab 
states would participate under NATO’s banner, the French favoured joint Anglo-Franco 
leadership instead. The divisions were so acrimonious that French representatives stormed out 
of a meeting in Brussels on 21 March. NATO belatedly assumed full control of the mission 
under Operation Unified Protect on 31 March. Similarly, there were early indications that the 
diplomatic support from the region would quickly disintegrate. On 20 March, the Secretary 
General of the Arab League cast doubt on the prospect of the League’s continued support by 
suggesting that military action was already exceeding what had been called for.443 The UAE, 
having promised to participate in operations, threatened to reverse this commitment in response 
to what it perceived as US criticism of the GCC’s intervention in Bahrain.444 These initial 
divisions were healed, but they attest to the difficulties of managing such a broad coalition and 
highlight a wide divergence of views on the wisdom and purpose of intervening in Libya, even 
among those countries that Britain could expect to call on as close allies.  
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Following the ‘‘London Conference’’ on 31 March,445 the first meeting of the newly formed 
‘‘Contact Group’’ was jointly chaired by Britain and Qatar in Doha on 13 April.446 While 
NATO would lead the military campaign, the purpose of this diplomatic grouping was to 
sustain support for the wider political goals of regime change and democratic transition. This 
was the primary vehicle for the demonstration of the international community’s continued 
resolve in confronting Gaddafi. The members of this group reiterated their commitment to 
continue enforcing the resolutions through military action, issued calls for Gaddafi to leave 
power and stepped up their level of both practical and political support for the rebel National 
Transitional Council. Although there had been widespread support for intervening to prevent 
the fall of Benghazi, and widespread hostility to Gaddafi, this did not mean that Britain and 
France had a free hand with which to dispatch him. If diplomatic support had helped make 
military action possible, it also meant that Britain could not so easily close the gap between its 
political goals and the means available for their fulfilment without unsettling the very alliance 
upon which the whole legitimacy of the mission depended.  
Despite this diplomatic context, the government generally adopted a broad and liberal 
interpretation of the resolution, using it to authorise actions that while perhaps technically 
consistent with the UN mandate, were arguably in violation of its spirit. Paragraph four of 
Resolution 1973, with its ‘‘all necessary measures’’ clause, was open to more than one 
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interpretation.447 As to whether the resolution authorised attacks on military assets not engaged 
in fighting, the British government quickly adopted the position that it did. Britain would target 
not simply those assets that were being deployed in the ongoing conflict but would use 
paragraph four as a legal justification for targeting any and all military assets possessed by the 
Gaddafi regime. The Prime Minister first implicitly defended this position on 28 March, in 
response to the questioning of the bombing of a munitions dump in the desert .448 This meant the 
intention behind many of the strikes was to erode the military capability of the regime, 
ostensibly in the name of protecting civilians, but with the obvious advantage that such an 
interpretation of the resolution would ultimately assist one side in a civil war. Fox 
acknowledged as much before the Defence Committee, stating that ‘‘if we want to change the 
equilibrium none the less, the way to do that is to degrade the regime.’’449 
An even more controversial question was whether or not Gaddafi himself was a legitimate 
target. Richards emphatically ruled this out on 21 March, publicly stating that Gaddafi was not 
a legal target under the terms of the resolution.450 The fact that Richards was quickly 
reprimanded by Number 10, and the fact that ministers generally sought to avoid explicitly 
denying that Gaddafi was a target, attests to the fact that the government was operating in a grey 
zone.451 Cameron announced in Prime Minister’s Questions the following day, ‘‘I do not 
propose to give a running commentary on targets,’’ a line that ministers stuck to in the weeks 
and months ahead.452 For example, when Hague was given the opportunity to rule out targeting 
Gaddafi, he repeated this position, telling MPs that ‘‘we will not go into it.’’453 The official 
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position was that targeting command and control centres was legally permitted, and if Gaddafi 
or other senior members of the regime happened to be present then that was coincidental. When 
explaining what was encompassed within the government’s definition of command and control, 
the Prime Minister explained that it included both ‘‘the organization and the people within it 
who are ordering the killing of civilians.’’454  Another legally difficult area was the 
interpretation of the arms embargo installed under the previous resolution. Reflecting the 
difficulties surrounding this question, the Defence Secretary appeared to confirm that arming 
the opposition would in fact be illegal.455 However, the government quickly backtracked from 
this, claiming that while this embargo applied to the whole of Libya, it might be argued that 
‘‘all necessary measures’’ permitted an exemption that would allow the supply of rebel 
forces.456 Publicly at least, the government was leaving its options open by suggesting that 
arming the rebels might be legal, but that was separate from the question of whether or not it 
was advisable.  
If the British government might have disregarded the spirit of Resolution 1973 by seeking to 
use it as a vehicle for a wider political change in Libya, this did not mean that it ignored 
international law. This was one area in which key players within the government were 
determined to draw a line under the presumed mistakes of previous conflicts. Although the 
analysis in the remainder of this chapter shows that military action went beyond what would be 
called for even under a liberal interpretation of the UN mandate, Britain still observed 
significant legal constraints, particularly during the earlier stages of the campaign. The 
Coalition government adhered to more formal decision-making processes than the ‘‘sofa style’’ 
of the Blair period, and the presence of the Attorney General or other relevant legal 
representation at NSC meetings was consistent throughout. The NSC’s Libya committee 
(NSC(L)), described in a subsequent review of its processes as ‘‘the central forum for collective 
discussion of the government’s objectives on Libya and for their delivery,’’ met 62 times during 
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the conflict.457 The Attorney General attended 39 of these meetings, the Solicitor General 14 
meetings, and representatives of the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) were present at three 
meetings.458 On occasion, this appears to have created greater frustration than was initially 
anticipated, particularly for the Prime Minister. In one incident, Cameron grew especially 
frustrated that the sanctions introduced in Resolution 1970 prevented him from authorising an 
airlift of Libyan banknotes to support rebel forces.459 
The willingness to accept some of the constraints imposed by international law was also a 
pragmatic concession to the needs of alliance unity that were analysed above. Hague repeatedly 
emphasised the need to act within the terms of the resolution, but in doing so he typically rested 
his argument less on a principled commitment to the law and more upon the fact that continued 
compliance would ensure legitimacy in the eyes of world opinion and maintain diplomatic 
support. On 7 June, responding to concerns about the failure to make available frozen assets to 
the NTC, the Foreign Secretary stated in Parliament that ‘‘it is very important that we stay 
within the UN resolutions and retain the moral authority of operating within international law, 
even though that is inconvenient in some respects and requires us to do some things differently 
from how we might wish. So that is a higher priority than finding a way around the UN 
resolutions. If it is possible to change them at any stage, we would be ready to do so.’’460 
Targeting command and control centres was one thing, openly instructing military leaders to 
remove Gaddafi by force was not possible, a situation that created some difficulty given the 
objectives described above. A meeting of NATO defence ministers on 14 April provided 
slightly clearer objectives by giving military leaders a list of targets and territories that regime 
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forces were required to withdraw his forces from. It could not, however, explicitly authorise the 
overthrow of Gaddafi.461  
A further constraint emerged from the need to limit civilian casualties. In comparison with 
previous campaigns, NATO and its partners were successful in keeping these to a minimum.462 
This was possible because of technology such as precision guided munitions, but it was 
primarily the result of a ‘‘strategic decision.’’463 Fox took the decision, without properly 
consulting Number 10, to set targeting policy at a level where it was judged that there was zero 
percent probability of collateral damage, a decision that the Prime Minister described as 
‘‘fucking ridiculous’’ when he discovered it.464 In certain situations, it proved a constraint on 
the RAF’s ability to protect civilians, never mind assist in rebel victories against Gaddafi’s 
forces. In one early instance, the RAF aborted a mission and the Tornados were forced to return 
to Marham, after civilians were observed in the vicinity of their target.465 This constraint was 
arguably more difficult as the conflict moved into its second month, with Gaddafi’s forces 
switching tactics and blending in with civilians and rebel militias more effectively. It was 
especially difficult in the battle for Misrata, a focus of RAF activity during this period, as 
Gaddafi’s forces were often dug in in areas close to civilians.466 
There were two related arguments for this position. Avoiding civilian casualties would help in 
the war of narratives against Gaddafi, ensuring that Britain retained the moral authority. Hague 
set out this position from the outset, telling Parliament that ‘‘we retain the moral and 
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international standing, particularly because of the extreme care we take to minimise – to avoid - 
civilian casualties.’’467 When interviewed on the BBC in June, the Foreign Secretary responded 
to the argument that this approach was prolonging the conflict by referring to the importance of 
sticking to the UN resolutions and retaining the moral authority that came from that position.468 
Furthermore, politicians saw this as contributing to the wider goal of restoring the damage to 
Britain’s moral authority after Iraq. From Fox’s perspective, this was one of the means of 
‘‘exorcising the ghost of Iraq.’’469 Yet Fox was also correct in identifying a second key reason 
for this strategy, telling the Defence Committee in that, ‘‘apart from the argument of being on 
the high moral ground and having a higher respect for life than Gaddafi clearly does, it has also 
been essential in maintaining the coalition internationally, not least with the Arab countries, that 
we have shown that respect for minimising civilian casualties.’’470 As with the commitment to 
uphold international law, the determination to limit civilian casualties was also a natural by-
product of the necessity of alliance unity.  
It is widely acknowledged that the Libya campaign exposed fundamental capabilities gaps 
within NATO and a critical reliance on the US. Although both Britain and France contributed to 
the initial US-led Operation Odyssey Dawn, it was a preponderance of US military power that 
quickly secured the no-fly zone. The British contribution to this effort was rather modest. Data 
provided by the Pentagon records that the coalition flew a total of 1,602 sorties in the period up 
until 28 March, with the US providing 983 of these.471 In a statement to the House of Commons 
on 28 March, the Prime Minister announced that the RAF had flown a total of 120 sorties.472 
When taken together with the Pentagon’s data, this would suggest the UK flew little over 7% of 
the sorties during the most crucial period of military action. In the period up until 28 March the 
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US Navy launched 192 cruise missiles as part of its effort to put in place a no-fly zone.473 In 
contrast, the contribution of the Royal Navy amounted to just seven missiles.474 Following the 
transition to NATO command and control at the end of March, the US fulfilled its promise to 
withdraw from a combat role on 4 April, focusing instead on those unique capabilities that only 
the it could provide.475 
This approach was famously and controversially referred to as ‘‘leading from behind.’’476 Yet 
even with Britain and France occupying political leadership and the US withdrawing from a 
combat role, the American contribution remained essential.  As Fox has subsequently admitted, 
‘‘Britain simply didn’t have the military capabilities, in terms of air to air refuelling… a lot of 
the logistics and a lot of the intelligence was all American.’’477 At its peak, the UK had 2,300 
personnel deployed for the Libya operation, 32 aircraft and four ships.478 The UK flew over 
10% of NATO sorties and 20% of the strike sorties.479 The US, however, continued to provide 
over 75% of the ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities) and to plug 
shortfalls in refuelling capacity, providing 25 of the 38 tankers that were deployed for 
Operation Unified Protector (OUP).480 The US also had to step in when allies ran out of 
munitions. Gate writes in his memoirs that, ‘‘just three months into the campaign, we had to 
resupply even our strongest allies with precision-guided bombs and missiles – they had 
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exhausted their meagre supply.’’481  The MOD’s obfuscation in response to questioning adds to 
the suspicion that Britain was among those suffering from such shortfalls.482 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the government’s austerity program had seen cuts to defence 
spending. These cuts had the potential to impact the conduct of the Libyan campaign and the 
decisions made in the defence review were therefore scrutinised in the context of ongoing 
military operations.483 In May, Air Chief Marshal Sir Simon Bryant, in a private briefing to 
MPs, claimed that while many had hoped for a swift resolution of the mission, ‘‘should 
Operation Ellamy endure past defence planning assumptions the future contingent capability is 
likely to be eroded.’’484 More provocative were the public comments by the First Sea Lord, who 
in mid-June said that if operations were to continue beyond the six-month commitment the navy 
had planned, then the government would need to make ‘‘challenging decisions.’’485 While there 
was strong bipartisan support for the Libyan mission, Labour leader Ed Miliband seized on 
these warnings to call for a u-turn on the defence review.486  Although the Prime Minister 
insisted he had sought assurances from the Chief of Defence Staff that Britain could sustain 
operations indefinitely, such a claim was treated with suspicion.487 So too were claims about the 
financial costs of the operations, which the government optimistically estimated would run to 
just £260 million.488 
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Even with taking into account the partisan and bureaucratic politics that was involved in these 
debates, there is good evidence that Britain’s more modest military capabilities and the 
decisions made in the defence review constituted a tangible constraint on action in Libya. It 
appears the US withdrawal from a combat role did slow the tempo of operations to some 
degree, thereby contributing to the stalemate.489 NATO requested more countries to contribute 
to strike operations in mid-April and although Britain twice increased its deployment of 
Tornadoes, we can assume that had the government had greater resources at its disposal, more 
would have been committed. More importantly, there are sound reasons for doubting the 
government’s repeated claims that it could continue these operations indefinitely. According to 
the planning assumptions outlined in the SDSR, the UK would be able to sustain one ‘‘enduring 
stabilization mission’’ (i.e. Afghanistan) while simultaneously conducting one ‘‘non-enduring 
complex intervention.’’490 The latter was defined as lasting no longer than six months, 
suggesting the UK would struggle to sustain operations beyond September. Initially, part of the 
reason Britain was able to carry out this intervention in spite of the defence review was that 
many of the decisions were yet to be implemented.491 Defence analyst Mark Philips argues the 
main difficulty in sustaining operations beyond September would have been refuelling 
shortfalls, with the ageing VC-10 being used at a very high rate for this purpose.492 Other 
decisions made in the defence review were temporarily delayed in response to Libya, most 
notably the decision to delay the retirement of the Nimrod R1 aircraft until June.493 
Even if it were realistic to suppose that the government could have defied the warnings of 
military chiefs, defence analysts and its own planning assumptions, it is even less realistic to 
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suppose that other members of the alliance could have done so. Italy withdrew its carrier in July 
in response to domestic financial problems while Norway, which at one stage was providing 
10% of NATO sorties, withdrew the last of its F-16s in August.494 It might be assumed that the 
US could have stepped in to bail out its allies, but such an assumption does not take account of 
the domestic political constraints Obama was facing. Without Congressional approval, the US 
involvement was effectively capped at its then current level.495  
It was within the parameters of the various constraints described above, that Britain and France 
pushed for a series of more measured escalations during this period. The first significant 
development was the decision to send military advisors. According to a report by Mark Urban, 
the BBC’s diplomatic and defence editor, this decision was made at the end of March.496 On 19 
April, the government announced the deployment of what it described as a ‘‘military liaison 
advisory team’’ which would operate alongside the diplomatic mission established in 
Benghazi.497 The primary purpose of these advisors was assisting with headquarters 
organization, communications and logistics.498 According to the available public statements, the 
team were not involved in providing training or operational advice.499 No member of the 
government has ever confirmed whether these advisors were involved in calling in NATO 
airstrikes, but informed commentators have typically described this as part of their role.500 
According to Urban, the government also sanctioned a ‘‘train and equip’’ programme at this 
early stage, although the fruits of this initiative would take time to materialise.501  
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Britain raised its deployment of Tornados from eight to twelve jets on 5 April, contributing to a 
small increase in the tempo of RAF activity.502 Targeting policy changed in mid-May, with a 
greater emphasis on ‘‘strategic targets.’’503 This shift was a product of UK strategic analysis and 
a reflection of greater UK influence over the campaign. It involved not simply degrading the 
regime’s military capability, but striking targets in order to achieve a desired psychological 
impact, including the regime’s intelligence network and in line with the policy of encouraging 
defections.504 For example, an MOD briefing on 1 June, describing strikes against Gaddafi’s 
notorious Bab al-Aziziya complex, noted that ‘‘this action sends a powerful message to the 
regime’s leadership and to those involved in delivering Colonel Gaddafi’s attacks on civilians 
that they are no longer hidden away from the Libyan people behind high walls.’’505 At the end 
of May, a joint UK-French proposal led to the deployment of attack helicopters. The UK 
decision was announced on 27 May, and Apaches operating from HMS Ocean performed their 
first aerial attacks over Brega on 4 June.506 The four Apache helicopters operating from HMS 
Ocean flew just 50 aerial missions and carried out only 22 strike sorties.507 In public this 
decision was defended on the basis of allowing greater precision in strikes.508 Within 
government they were seen in the context of the psychological pressure Britain was seeking to 
build. In the subsequent words of a defence official, they were regarded as a ‘‘massive 
psychological handle to crank up.’’509  
Another key development that took place during this period was the creation of an ‘‘oil cell.’’ 
The regime still had control of approximately 75-80% of Libyan production capability, and 
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continued access to the refinery in Zawiyah ensured that Gaddafi was still well-supplied in spite 
of the sanctions.510 The latter were having a perverse effect, by preventing the rebels in the east 
from selling crude oil and making it impossible for them to access refined products. In his 
testimony to the FAC’s inquiry, Duncan described how he drew upon his previous experience 
in the oil industry and warned the Prime Minister of the importance of this issue:  ‘‘I went to the 
Prime Minister and said, ‘‘you are going to lose this. If you don’t win the oil war, you are going 
to lose the Libyan war.’’’511 Cameron responded to Duncan’s prompting, and an ‘‘oil cell’’ was 
established as a cross-Whitehall unit, hosted by the Foreign Office.512 It took forward the work 
of ensuring more efficient enforcement of sanctions against Gaddafi and the more important 
task of making sure the NTC was better supplied. It is difficult to measure the importance of 
this innovation, but Duncan himself claims the conflict would have persisted for another twelve 
months without such an approach.513 
The combined effect of these measured escalations was not, however, sufficient to break the 
stalemate. The use of force could contain Gaddafi, but while steadily eroding his military 
capabilities, its impact stopped short of providing the decisive rebel victory that the British 
government was hoping for.  In the context of the constraints described above, the Anaconda 
strategy made sense. If military force could not quickly achieve a rebel victory, it could steadily 
undermine the Gaddafi regime over time, with a series of smaller escalations gradually tilting 
the balance in favour of the opposition forces. The problem not acknowledged with this 
approach was that while time was not on Gaddafi’s side, time was not on the side of Britain and 
its allies either. This gives rise to the importance of exploring the non-military alternatives, and 
if and how British policy-makers explored any of these. Given the presence of these constraints 
and the continued reluctance of the US to play a more proactive role it is worth exploring the 
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extent to which alternative non-military options existed and the extent to which they were 
explored.   
The Possibility of Peace Talks  
 
As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the British position set a high bar for the 
ceasefire proposed in Resolution 1973.  Following Hague’s statement in Parliament on 26 
April, he responded to questions about the possibility of a political settlement, telling MPs that 
‘‘we have in no way lost sight of that aim, but it will require a genuine ceasefire, which seems 
also to require the departure of Colonel Gaddafi.’’514 It would be harder to find a more candid 
recognition, within the public domain, that the government regarded regime change as a 
precondition for a ceasefire. Following an informal dialogue between the UN Security Council 
and members of the AU’s ad hoc committee on 16 June, Lyall Grant sought to justify this 
position, commenting that, ‘‘it is clear that a ceasefire with Qadhafi in place would not be 
credible. This is not about bringing preconditions to negotiations – a ceasefire would simply not 
be stable while he remained in power.’’515 As a contemporary report by International Crisis 
Group concluded regarding the position taken by many Western governments, ‘‘to insist that 
ultimately, he [Gaddafi] can have no role in the post-Jamahiriya political order is one thing, and 
almost certainly reflects the opinion of the majority of Libyans as well as of the outside world. 
But to insist that he must go now, as the precondition for any negotiation, including that of a 
ceasefire, is to render a ceasefire all but impossible and so to maximise the prospect of 
continued armed conflict.’’516  
 
British policy also seemed to ignore the fact that any ceasefire would be dependent on the 
actions of both sides in the conflict.517 Following a meeting with his Italian counterpart on 11 
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April, Hague subtly added an additional term, announcing that ‘‘there should be no ceasefire 
that does not meet the conditions of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in full, and that is not 
acceptable to those representing the opposition in Libya, including the Interim National 
Council.’’518 Cameron adopted a similar track in his testimony before the Liaison Committee 
the following month. Dismissing the possibility of negotiation, the Prime Minister implored the 
committee members to ‘‘listen to the national transitional council’’ and pointed out that ‘‘they 
do not believe in holding discussions and talks with Gaddafi.’’519 This amounted to handing the 
rebels a veto over any ceasefire proposals. 
 
Equally, the government’s continued support for accountability before the ICC was pursued at 
the expense of a negotiated end to the conflict. Faced with the argument that insisting on 
criminal prosecution gave Gaddafi little choice but to fight to the death, Fox responded that 
‘‘that argument is regularly put, but I would put the converse: do we really want a situation in 
which we give some of those who commit the most heinous crimes against a humanity a get-out 
by saying, ‘If you’ll only stop fighting, we’ll let you go and you’ll not be subjected to 
international law?’’’520   Hague spoke in similar terms and, while acknowledging the argument 
that insisting on this form of accountability might have its drawbacks, he argued that ‘‘the 
deterrent effect on regimes such as that in Libya has to be set against the downside,’’ before 
adding that ‘‘if we believe in the ICC, as we do in the United Kingdom… we must stand by its 
decisions and support the efforts to bring people to justice within its ambit.’’521  
In addition to the obstacles to a ceasefire that were built into the British position, policymakers 
were in any case little interested in mediation. Recalling the details of a meeting he had with 
senior government officials in late April, Muller Stuart writes that, ‘‘it was a very instructive 
meeting vis-à-vis government thinking, as it soon became apparent just how little appetite there 
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was on the part of officials for any initiative that sought to mediate a negotiated solution with 
Gaddafi.’’522 As noted in the preceding section, the government’s public statements during this 
period played down the prospect of mediation. In May, Cameron responded to a question about 
the possibility of negotiated settlement by saying ‘‘I don’t think that is remotely where we are at 
the moment.’’523 Instead of pursuing this possibility, the Prime Minister argued that Britain 
should continue to increase the ‘‘pressure,’’ adding that ‘‘I think that pressure is being quite 
effective.’’524  
Contemporary media reports from mid-July onwards suggested a softening of the British 
position, but this is difficult to verify.525 It was also reported that Britain would only accept such 
a possibility if it was approved by the rebels.526 The NTC’s diplomatic representative in London 
was at the same time quoted as saying that such a proposal ‘‘has no merit and no chance of 
succeeding… Gaddafi will either leave Libya or be killed.’’527 The suggestion of a change was 
also contradicted by the position that the Prime Minister took in a joint press conference with 
South African president Jacob Zuma on 18 July, during which both leaders acknowledged the 
key differences between their respective positions.528 On the question of Gaddafi’s departure, 
Cameron made clear that ‘‘the difference is that the President sees that as the outcome of a 
political process whereas I believe for a political process to work it has be the starting point.’’529 
As Zuma explained, many African states saw negotiation as necessary to deciding the manner 
of Gaddafi’s departure, determining where he would depart to and under what conditions. There 
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was no indication of a change of approach in any of Cameron’s comments, only a more detailed 
and thorough overview of the existing position.  
 
Both D’Ancona and Seldon and Snowdon suggest that privately, the government’s thinking did 
shift in response to the ongoing stalemate.530 D’Ancona reveals in his account that Cabinet 
Office officials and MI6 officers drew up a plan for Gaddafi’s exit which involved his exile to 
Equatorial Guinea, a country not party to the Rome Statute.531 The fact that Andrew Mitchell 
was involved in assisting with negotiations with officials in Malabo suggests this was more than 
a fanciful scheme, yet D’Ancona does not provide any evidence or detail about what came of it.  
What is clear in both of these accounts is that this possibility was explored with great reluctance 
and only because of the growing possibility of indefinite stalemate. As Seldon and Snowdon 
write, the Prime Minister viewed the prospect of a negotiated settlement with ‘‘revulsion.’’532 
Other accounts which draw upon sources within the government further support the impression 
that there was a widespread aversion to non-military solutions. The Guardian’s investigation 
suggests that ministers viewed Gaddafi’s peace feelers as evidence of growing weakness, which 
only served to further convince them that he could be overthrown.533 Jeremy Bowen, whose 
account draws upon sources in the Foreign Office, briefly describes how the regime constantly 
sent out messages to Western capitals indicating a willingness to talk, but ‘‘the reply was 
always the same: we’ll talk, but only when Gaddafi goes.’’534  
The two major diplomatic initiatives carried out during this period were the African Union’s 
peace plan and the mediation efforts of UN envoy Abdul Ilah al-Khatib. Little detail is known 
about Khatib’s diplomacy, although it is known that members of the Contact Group set out 
terms for him to negotiate with both sides following the group’s meeting in Istanbul on 15 
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July.535 At around the same time, US officials met with Gaddafi’s representatives in Tunisia, 
informing them that while Gaddafi’s departure was non-negotiable, anything else was on the 
table.536 It was these initiatives which led to speculation that a deal might involve Gaddafi 
departing power while remaining in Libya but, as already described, the NTC quickly ruled 
such a prospect out. More detail is known about the AU’s mediation efforts, which were carried 
forward by an ‘‘ad hoc committee’’ from April onwards.537 According to De Waal, the AU’s 
peace plan was broadly similar with the proposals of the UN envoy, but more comprehensive.538 
The plan would have entailed a cessation of hostilities and a pause in NATO bombing, a 
comprehensive ceasefire to be monitored by a UN force, and an inclusive, consensual interim 
government paving the way for elections. The plan was designed to secure Gaddafi’s departure 
from power, but without insisting on his prosecution and without insisting that he be removed 
before a ceasefire could be put in place.  
 
Gaddafi was reported to have accepted the proposals in principle, under pressure from Zuma 
and other Africa leaders.539 The major obstacle appears to have been the NTC’s unwillingness 
to accept any solution that did not treat Gaddafi’s immediate departure as the starting point, and 
the continuing support of NATO for this uncompromising position.540 Britain failed to offer 
even symbolic support for such initiatives and exploited divisions within the AU to 
misrepresent the position of African states. For example, the government consistently sought to 
highlight and perpetuate the impression that some African states were taking a weaker position 
because of their closer links with Gaddafi.541 The British approach was to treat the UN envoy as 
the exclusive focal point for all diplomatic efforts, with Lyall Grant warning against ‘‘parallel 
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negotiations,’’ in a coded snub to the AU’s ongoing efforts in this area.542 According to De 
Waal, Britain and France even sent emissaries to an AU summit in Malabo, who privately 
warned African states that they would object to any mention of ‘‘ceasefire’’ in their 
proposals.543 
 
The above facts are surprising, given the difficulties of sustaining military operations that were 
described in the previous section. Ultimately, the AU’s proposals would have led to the 
fulfilment of British objectives, albeit with the tactical concession that Gaddafi would likely 
escape prosecution. It might be rightly argued that Gaddafi’s intransigence and eccentricity 
would have made any negotiated solution extremely unlikely, but that is separate from the 
question of whether Britain invested sufficient effort in testing this assumption. In his account 
of British policy during this period, Muller Stuart offers a plausible explanation for Britain’s 
reluctance to consider a diplomatic route. In reference to the strategy for focusing on defection, 
he writes that, ‘‘any attempt to present potential defectors with an alternative diplomatic 
scenario was counter-productive to the ultimate objective of removing Gaddafi from power. All 
attempts at mediation were viewed through this policy prism.’’544 This is certainly consistent 
with the Anaconda strategy also, as any diplomatic signal suggesting a weakening of resolve 
would undermine such an approach.  
A further explanation might focus more on the meaning the conflict held for policy-makers. The 
Prime Minister opened the London Conference on 29 March by informing the assembled 
foreign ministers that ‘‘our action saved the city of Benghazi. It averted a massacre. And it has 
given freedom a chance in Libya.’’545 The government’s narrative about the Arab Spring 
envisioned the inevitable march of freedom, with Britain steadfastly assisting those on the right 
side of this battle. Libya was often located within this wider narrative and as Richards reveals in 
his testimony before the FAC, the government continued to see the conflict as a ‘‘black and 
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white, good and bad issue.’’546 From this more absolutist perspective, compromise was not seen 
as a purely technical or pragmatic outcome, but as a betrayal of the values that Britain’s military 
action was presumed to be upholding. For example, when Hague effectively granted the NTC 
the right to unilaterally shape the ceasefire terms, he justified this by saying that ‘‘anything 
short of this would be a betrayal of the people of Libya…’’547 This less compromising stance 
also resonated with a longstanding tradition of ‘‘anti-appeasement.’’548 Compromising with 
Gaddafi and failing to show the resolve necessary to ensure an outright rebel victory was more 
at odds with these narratives than the winner-takes-all military solution that Cameron and others 
clearly favoured. Symbolism trumped practicality. As one Western official put it, ‘‘a peace 
conference in Malta would be a defeat for us. It’s not going to happen.’’549 
Breakthrough and victory  
 
The first signs of a changing dynamic were already present in June. At this stage, politicians 
and military leaders began to suggest that the momentum was gradually shifting in favour of the 
rebels, although few at the time expected a sudden breakthrough.550 The campaign in the Nafusa 
Mountains, in the northwest of Tripolitania, witnessed a series of successes.551 What appeared 
to be short-lived gains in June, were followed by the securing of the supply lines from Tunisia 
to Nalut at the end of July and the capture of the strategically located Gharyan in mid-August. 
This paved the way for rebels from the mountain region to launch a successful assault on 
Zawiyah on 13 August. Elsewhere, rebel militias were pressing back against Gaddafi’s forces 
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on the frontlines in Zlitan, 160 kilometers east of Tripoli, and Brega, in the eastern half of the 
country. On 20 August, rebel groups advanced on Tripoli from multiple directions, coinciding 
with a prearranged uprising by the city’s residents.552 Despite some fierce resistance around 
Gaddafi’s Bab al-Aziziya complex and the surrounding neighbourhoods, rebel groups secured 
control of Tripoli more quickly than anyone had expected and by the end of the month a 
modicum of normalcy had returned to the capital. The remnants of the Gaddafi regime were 
now holed up in traditional regime strongholds such as Sebha, Bani Walid and Sirte. The latter 
two towns were the scene of significant rebel bombardments from September onwards, 
culminating in the fall of Bani Walid on 17 October and the capture and killing of Gaddafi in 
his home town of Sirte on 20 October.553 
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Figure 1: Map of Libya 
Source: Bell and Witter, Escalation and Intervention, 12. 
The government provided no indications that it expected this military breakthrough and had 
refused to be drawn into discussion of how long the conflict might last. At the end of June, 
Hague warned Parliament that ‘‘actually, even 1,000 boffins in a think-tank, all working 
together feverishly with all the information available to them, would still not have known how 
long the Libya campaign might last.’’554 According to the insider accounts, Cameron and those 
around him only became convinced that a rebel victory on the battlefield was likely in 
August.555 While greeting the news of the fall of Tripoli and the death of Gaddafi, British 
politicians were keen to avoid excessive triumphalism and stress the Libyan role in securing 
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victory.556 However, British policy contributed substantially to the changing fortunes of rebel 
forces in important ways. This section analyses this contribution and in doing so it supports the 
conclusion that the British government and its international allies were willing to take 
significant risks in furthering their objective of removing Gaddafi from power and in the 
process they sanctioned actions that clearly went beyond the spirit of Resolution 1973.  
During the early months of the campaign western governments had hoped for a military 
breakthrough coming from the east.557 Such an approach was likely based on an over-estimation 
on the strength of rebel forces in Cyrenaica, who lacked the discipline and experience necessary 
to prevail on the ground. Fox recalls how, ‘‘we took the view in the UK that the key was Tripoli 
and unless he [Gaddafi] was feeling the heat in Tripoli, he would not much care what was 
happening on the other side of the country.’’558 A strategic decision was therefore made to shift 
the focus of military activity toward the western half of the country. In this region, rebel groups 
were discovered to be more organised and effective fighters. Contemporary press briefings by 
the MoD show that the RAF began shifting its focus toward targets in the western half of the 
country from mid-July onwards.559 Henceforward, there was an increase in airstrikes in the 
Nafusa Mountains, and air power was important in supporting rebel efforts to take Zlitan and 
Zawiyah. Importantly, the stated motives behind this change of strategy is good evidence that 
the primary mover of British policy was a desire to win the conflict, rather than preserve the 
more narrowly defined civilian protection mandate that the government claimed to be 
upholding.  
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If air power alone could not achieve the breakthrough politicians were aiming for, there was a 
growing recognition of the need to influence events on the ground. It was the Gulf nations, 
Qatar in particular, that provided the route to this option. The scale of Qatari interference in 
Libya’s affairs only became apparent in the aftermath of the civil war, and the motives behind it 
remain somewhat obscure.560 Nonetheless, it is clear that Qatar contributed substantially to the 
rebel cause in the form of financial aid, arms transfers and the insertion of its own special 
forces. The United States, reluctant to increase its own involvement, quietly permitted and 
encouraged the efforts of both Qatar and UAE to assist rebel groups as early as April.561 So long 
as these states were not providing US-manufactured weapons, the White House was happy to 
turn a blind eye, which meant also ignoring the arms embargo that NATO was supposed to be 
enforcing. The effects of these transfers were being to be felt on the ground by June, as Qatari 
arms and training strengthened rebel forces, particularly in the western half of the country. 
According to various reports, Qatar provided approximately 20,000 tonnes of weaponry and 
over $400 million in financial aid.562 Qatar’s Chief of Defence staff even claimed in October 
that his country had ‘‘hundreds’’ of its own forces on the ground in every region of the 
country.563 
Throughout the campaign, when the full extent of Qatari meddling was not appreciated, the 
government praised the contributions made by its Gulf allies, with Cameron calling them 
‘‘absolutely superb.’’564 When details began to slowly emerge about the nature and extent of 
Qatar’s involvement, the government feigned ignorance. The fact that any initiatives took place 
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on a bilateral basis, outside of NATO structures, provided the basis for plausible deniability.565 
When the Defence Committee requested the government to ‘‘clarify’’ how it ensured that any 
such bilateral initiatives were consistent with the UN resolutions the government simply 
avoided providing a straight answer, instead feebly referring to its own bilateral relationship 
with these states as a means of monitoring compliance.566  
The revelations contained in Lord Richards’ memoir straightforwardly contradict the 
impression that the British government was either unaware of or indifferent toward Qatari 
involvement. Richards writes how ‘‘the Libya campaign underlined that well-directed proxy 
forces can be a powerful alternative to Western boots on the ground,’’ and he is especially 
praising of Qatar for its role in facilitating this approach.567 Richards also reveals how he played 
a part in assisting, encouraging and advising the Qataris in their efforts, traveling there to ‘‘help 
them set up an operational theatre-level headquarters’’ and advising them throughout the 
campaign.568  This account is consistent with his testimony before the FAC’s inquiry and Mark 
Urban’s report on the more secretive aspects of Britain’s Libya war. According to Urban, 
Richards took the initiative to encourage greater Qatari involvement as early as April, following 
the government’s decision to sanction a ‘‘train and equip programme.’’569 Some accounts also 
suggest that Britain played a role in brokering Qatari arms transfers, which Seldon and 
Snowdon claim were the ‘‘fruit of Cameron’s productive relationship with HBJ.’’570 None of 
this is to suggest that Doha was pressured into a course of action it would otherwise have 
resisted, only that the evidence suggests Britain played an important role in encouraging and 
facilitating greater involvement.  
This policy of working through surrogates has proven more problematic than was anticipated by 
the government at the time. Qatar appears to have used the opportunity to pursue its own 
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agenda, contributing to the growing divisions within rebel ranks by favouring Islamist militias 
and continuing to interfere in Libyan internal matters beyond the conclusion of the conflict. As 
early as April 2011, the very same month that Obama had approved Qatari arms transfers to 
Libya, US intelligence was already growing concerned that such transfers were being diverted 
to Islamist groups.571 Of the 18 shipments Qatar is reported to have made, only five were routed 
through the official channel created by the NTC for this purpose.572 The government also failed 
to anticipate the possibility of post-conflict interference from its regional allies. Commenting in 
September, Hague suggested that such a prospect was unlikely because, ‘‘I cannot see the 
incentive for neighbouring countries to intervene.’’573 Just weeks later, the NTC leaders that 
Britain had invested so much in were complaining of Qatar’s undue influence in their affairs.574  
Britain also inserted its own special forces into the conflict. As described in the previous 
section, the government had dispatched military advisors to assist rebel forces as early April. By 
the summer, British special forces were working alongside their counterparts from France and 
Qatar, training and preparing rebel forces in the western half of the country.575 Such initiatives 
took place on a bilateral basis, outside of NATO structures. Unlike Qatar and France, Britain 
did not provide arms directly, but as British special forces were working on the ground 
alongside their Qatari equivalents, this made little practical difference. Urban describes how the 
role of these forces expanded as the conflict wore on. Toward the final stages of the campaign, 
members of D Squadron of 22 SAS Regiment were blending in with rebel militias, assisting and 
coordinating ground attacks against Tripoli. Both Richards and Stavridis have acknowledged 
the important contribution made by special forces, and while their numbers were modest, most 
informed commentators see them as having made a decisive contribution to the breakthrough.576 
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Such an approach is clear evidence of an increasing willingness to take greater risks and to stray 
beyond the UN mandate in order to achieve a military victory.  
Finally, while air strikes were still carried out with a keen attention to avoid civilian casualties 
and against targets that could plausibly be claimed as representing a potential threat to civilians, 
the primary purpose of NATO airpower was to facilitate rebel offensives, rather than merely 
contain Gaddafi’s forces from inflicting harm on civilians. The fall of Zlitan, the next city on 
the frontline following the breakout from Misrata, was preceded by an intensification in NATO 
bombing and it was here that credible allegations of civilian casualties first surfaced.577 On the 
eastern front, while still restricted by the difficulties of avoiding civilian casualties, the RAF 
was heavily involved in assisting rebel efforts to finally capture the strategically important oil 
town of Brega.578 A contemporary press report refers to NATO airplanes operating in ‘‘what 
amounts to a combat support role.’’579 Airstrikes also helped paved the way for the march on 
Tripoli, with Richards revealing in his memoirs that bombing raids were used to ‘‘open a 
corridor for the rebels as they moved toward the capital.’’580 A contemporary report by the 
Telegraph claimed as NATO was aware of rebel plans to trigger an uprising in the capital, 
British airstrikes were launched against targets in Tripoli in advance of this and to pave the way 
for its capture by rebel groups.581 Before, military force was being used to prevent Gaddafi’s 
forces from retaking towns and cities that had been occupied by rebel groups, it was now being 
used to assist the rebel advances.  
The government generally sought to avoid acknowledging any evidence of awareness of rebel 
abuses and insisted that if it had evidence that such groups were posing a threat to civilians it 
would act against them. The idea that NATO was wholly unaware of the actions of Misratan 
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militias in depopulating the town of Tawergha, in revenge for its role in supporting Gaddafi’s 
siege of their city, is difficult to take seriously.582 Beyond seeking assurances from the NTC’s 
leadership, Britain and its allies appear to have been relatively indifferent to those caught on the 
wrong side. This became harder to deny during the offensives against the regime’s final 
strongholds in September and October, where the assaults against Sirte in particular involved 
widespread and indiscriminate shelling of civilian populated areas.583 The government defended 
its position by arguing that rebel forces, in contrast to those of the former regime, were not 
‘‘systematically’’ targeting civilians in the way that pro-Gaddafi forces were accused of doing, 
but such a fine distinction implied agreement with the accusation that the actions of rebel 
groups were still causing civilian harm.584 The RAF did not waiver from the need to limit the 
possibility of civilian deaths directly resulting from its air strikes, but the very same air strikes 
undoubtedly facilitated the wanton destruction of a town regarded as having enjoyed excessive 
largesse under the Gaddafi regime. Indifference to such collective punishment is clear evidence 
that the UN Resolution had become, in the words of Bob Ainsworth MP, a ‘‘busted flush.’’585  
It is therefore not surprising that politicians emphasised the role of Libyans themselves in 
defeating Gaddafi. To have acknowledged the role of special forces, of British involvement in 
Qatar’s arms transfers, or to have conceded that NATO was effectively operating in a combat 
support role, would have given further weight to the growing number of states who were critical 
of the way in which NATO and its partners had implemented 1973.  
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Post-Conflict Assumptions  
 
If memories of Bosnia played a fundamental role in shaping the decision to commit force, it 
was memories of Iraq and, to a lesser degree Afghanistan, which shaped British plans for the 
post-conflict phase. Despite this starting point, the government has since faced strong criticism 
for its approach. The FAC concluded that the government’s plans were based on erroneous 
intelligence and were incapable of implementation.586 Although the report did not indulge in 
superficial comparisons with Iraq, media reporting of its findings were quick to highlight this 
appearance of similarity.587 While most earlier accounts of Britain’s role in the intervention 
tended to end on a tone of approval, more recent contributions have drawn attention to the post-
conflict instability that has resulted and hint toward parallels with Iraq.588 A 2018 report by the 
Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, a commission chaired by David 
Cameron, was also critical of some of the assumptions present in the Libya intervention, 
suggesting analogies with the Iraq conflict including the preference for ‘‘pop-up 
democracy.’’589 This section examines British policy toward post-conflict planning. It shows 
evidence that the government’s policy in this area was driven more by idealistic assumptions 
than clear objectives. However, it warns against simplistic parallels with Iraq and argues that an 
attempt to apply the ‘‘lessons’’ of that conflict in fact contributed to some of the weaknesses in 
the government’s approach.  
 
Work on post-conflict planning was carried out on a cross-Whitehall basis, with DFID having 
overall responsibility. The centrepiece of British policy was the work of the ‘‘International 
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Stabilization Response Team’’ (ISRT),590 established in May following the Rome meeting of 
the ‘‘Contact Group.’’591 It pulled together experts from a number of countries involved in the 
coalition, including seven personnel from DFID’s Stabilization Unit.  It was then dispatched to 
the eastern region of Libya to carry out ‘‘fact finding’’ and assess the country’s interim 
‘‘stabilization needs.’’ This initiative, and the resulting report, was held up as evidence that the 
government was taking post-conflict planning and reconstruction seriously, in contrast to the 
experience of Iraq. However, the authors of the report were quite explicit that they were not 
providing a comprehensive transition plan, that it was for Libyans themselves to determine their 
future and that the purpose of the report was ‘‘to capture the ISRT’s fact-finding and analysis 
for rapid use by Libyan leaders and organizations and the international community.’’592  
 
The work of the ISRT rested on some optimistic assumptions. Although the Foreign Office 
described ‘‘Stabilisation Response Teams’’ as providing a ‘‘bespoke’’ approach to post-conflict 
planning,593 Hague later acknowledged during the FAC’s inquiry that those deployed did not 
have any specific knowledge of Libya and that their expertise was of a general and technical 
nature.594 British policy therefore reflected the assumption that all people and all countries were 
in some way fundamentally amenable to the prescriptions of experts who knew nothing of 
Libya’s culture and politics. Secondly, the report implicitly assumed that the transition to a 
more democratic system could be taken for granted. Hague later revealed that, ‘‘they were 
working on the basis that the plans, the advice they were working on could be implemented by 
an elected Libyan government with UN support: that is the model we are talking about here.’’595 
Furthermore, regardless of any underlying assumptions, the report did not define clear 
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objectives or make policy recommendations beyond listing vague aspirations. In his testimony 
to the FAC, Duncan described the plans as an ‘‘unrealistic desktop exercise.’’596  
 
With the ISRT limiting itself to assessments and fact finding, the task of providing more 
concrete plans was assumed to fall to the NTC. The statements made by ministers took for 
granted the assumption that the council would automatically have the legitimacy and capability 
to fulfil the role of providing detailed post-conflict plans and governing Libya in any 
transitional period.597 Following the visit of the council’s chairman, Mustapha Abdul Jalil, 
Hague announced that ‘‘the NTC has already pulled together an interim administration, it has 
already begun to provide services in liberated areas and it has started to plan for democratic 
transition after Qadhafi has gone.’’598 However, at this stage, the council’s plans were little 
more than bold declarations of support for values and principles that their powerful Western 
sponsors would have welcomed. These plans were later conceded by Jalil to have been a 
‘‘utopian ideal.’’599 The government encouraged the council to add further detail and 
refinements to its transition plans and in June ministers agreed a series of areas in which Britain 
would be able to provide assistance and advice to the NTC, upon receipt of a formal request.600 
Despite insisting that the council was not a ‘‘government in waiting,’’ Britain joined France in 
offering diplomatic recognition in July.601 Both Cameron and Hague were clearly reassured by 
what they saw as the genuine commitment to ‘‘freedom’’ and democracy on the part of its 
leaders.  In his testimony to the FAC inquiry, Richards recalled how ‘‘there was a quorum of 
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respectable Libyans who were absolutely assuring the Foreign Office and our political 
leaders… that they had a grasp over these militias and all we needed to do was to win and they 
would all come to heel.’’602 Yet by the time of Tripoli’s liberation in August, the Council was 
already wracked by divisions between secularists and Islamists while at the same time facing 
militia groups who contested its legitimacy and authority during the takeover of the capital.603  
 
The statements made by ministers during this period provide no more evidence of clear 
objectives guiding British policy than did the ISRT. Instead, there was simply a vague and 
implicit assumption that if Gaddafi were to be removed from his position then quick progress 
toward a more liberal, democratic political system was to be expected, as was encouraged by 
the assurances described above. This was often taken for granted by locating Libya in an 
abstract argument about the democratizing power of the Arab Spring. Typical of this pattern of 
thinking was Cameron’s speech to the London Conference, in which he made reference to the 
NTC’s ‘‘Vision of a Democratic Libya’’ by situating it in a wider narrative which saw the 
spread of liberal values as the incontrovertible promise of the Arab Spring: ‘‘These aren’t 
values that belong to any one nation. They are universal. They are embedded in the Vision of a 
Democratic Libya set out by the Interim Transitional National Council today.’’604 Subsequent 
events served to reinforce this idealism. Following Hague and Mitchell’s visit to Benghazi in 
June, the Foreign Secretary explained that ‘‘my visit allowed a window into a Libya free from 
Qadhafi – where legitimate aspirations of the people are welcomed not repressed, and where 
debate, a free media and civil society are encouraged not crushed.’’605  The swift and apparently 
successful liberation of Tripoli provided a further fillip to this idealistic vision. In September, 
Cameron informed the media how ‘‘I’m an optimist about Libya; I’ve been an optimist all the 
way through and I’m optimistic about the National Transitional Council and what they are able 
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to achieve.’’606 As Duncan retrospectively concluded, ‘‘I think there was an assumption – 
clearly now proved to be wrong but at the time it did not feel unreasonable to many – that once 
a nasty dictator who had been there for 40 years was removed, there would be a benign 
background, a natural movement towards a more liberal society, and people would be set free 
so they would all love one another and want to govern the country.’’607   
 
A major focus of the FAC inquiry was whether or not the British government had a good 
understanding of events on the ground and whether its post-conflict planning assumptions 
reflected sounds assumptions and accurate intelligence. The committee reached the verdict that 
the government’s plans were based on ‘‘incomplete and inaccurate intelligence.’’608 In addition 
to their lack of expertise on Libyan politics, DFID’s experts were also limited by the amount of 
time they had to carry out their assessment and the places they were allowed to visit.609 In their 
testimony to the FAC, both Richards and Duncan provided good evidence of faulty information 
and wishful thinking. Richards described how ‘‘I remember at one meeting… asking for more 
explanation of the tribal issues, and some expert said, ‘They’re not a factor in this campaign.’’’ 
Duncan claimed that ‘‘there was no attempt whatever to analyse the political complexion of the 
country… That was a necessary exercise, which was not done.’’610 Hague did not completely 
dispute the accusation that the government did not fully understand events on the ground, but 
justified this by pointing out that neither the NTC nor Gaddafi fared much better in this regard, 
arguing that ‘‘if they did not know, it is probably wrong to expect somebody sitting in the 
backrooms of the Foreign Office or Vauxhall Cross to know better than they did.’’611 This 
informational vacuum allowed the government to persist with optimistic forecasts and impose 
its own idealistic visions on events. 
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In the area of security specifically, there is little evidence of anticipation of the likely 
challenges, still less the presence of adequate planning. The major issue confronting the new 
Libya was security fragmentation, with myriad armed groups operating outside of central 
control.612 Following the death of Gaddafi, Hague publicly acknowledged the ‘‘urgent’’ work of 
disarming and demobilizing the myriad militia groups but beyond warning the NTC leadership 
of the implications of this problem and tentatively offering assistance if it was desired, it is 
unclear how British policy prepared for this eventuality.613 As already highlighted, the ISRT 
report was intended to be implemented by an elected democratic government, rather than an 
interim authority struggling against suspicions that it lacked legitimacy. In his testimony to the 
FAC’s inquiry, Fox explained how he became ‘‘acutely aware of the lack of planning for how 
the armed forces would be dealt with and how the various militias might be brought together’’ 
during his visit to Tripoli in October.614 The Defence Secretary offered to assist by helping draw 
up legislation similar to the UK’s Armed Forces Act but this offer was not taken up and so 
‘‘nothing ever came of it.’’615 
 
A greater rhetorical emphasis on post-conflict planning was not matched by a corresponding 
commitment of resources and political will. According to the government’s own estimates, the 
cost of military operations ran to £212 million and independent analysts place the figure much 
higher.616 In contrast, the government put aside little over £20 million for post-conflict 
stabilisation activities and £20 million to support political and economic reform.617 There was a 
general feeling that Libya was sufficiently wealthy to pay for its own reconstruction, with the 
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priority being on unfreezing the country’s assets. Typical of this sentiment was Cameron’s 
remarks in the Commons following the killing of Gaddafi, when he stated that ‘‘everything that 
I have seen of the Libyan leadership shows that it wants to get on with rebuilding its country, 
and because of its oil wealth and the size of its sovereign wealth fund, it has the means by 
which to do it.’’618  
 
The volume of personnel devoted to the task of post-war planning and reconstruction also 
appears to have been modest.  The NSC did create a committee for officials to take forward 
work on post-conflict planning,619 yet within DFID, just fifteen officials worked full time as 
part of the department’s Libya Crisis Unit and a mere seven personnel were deployed as part of 
the ISRT.620 The Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence were less forthcoming about the 
number of personnel working on this issue, but the evidence conveys the impression that neither 
the military nor the MoD were especially interested in this area.621 In their later testimony to the 
FAC,  Richards and Fox spoke as if this area of policy was outside of their remit, despite the 
government having claimed that post-conflict planning would be done on a cross-Whitehall 
basis.622  The impression that Britain did not devote sufficient attention or resources to this area 
was shared by the American president, who in a revealing interview in 2016, expressed his 
regret that ‘‘I had more faith in the Europeans, given Libya’s proximity, in investing in the 
follow up.’’623  
 
The similarities with Iraq, while superficially pleasing, distract from important differences 
between the two cases. Hague was keen to emphasise that a key difference with Iraq was that 
without a presence on the ground, Britain lacked the capacity to implement any of its plans. 
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Summing up this argument, the former Foreign Secretary tried to persuade the FAC that ‘‘in 
Iraq, it seems that we did not have the plans, even though we had the power. In Libya, we had 
plenty of plans, but no power to implement them.’’624 Even if we dismiss the plans as flawed or 
insufficient, the argument about implementation remains valid. Not having a ground presence 
limited the options. Dominic Asquith, Britain’s Ambassador to Libya from November 2011, 
made a similar argument, pointing out that ‘‘if you are not prepared to commit the force to the 
ground, how do you persuade people to put in place a demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration programme against the will of some of them?’’625 The same factor limited 
Britain’s ability to counter weapons proliferation, with Fox explaining that ‘‘I don’t think there 
was any way that could be prevented, unless we were willing to put forces on the ground, which 
we were not.’’626   
 
Secondly, unlike in Iraq where a coalition of the willing imposed its own solutions on the 
country, the intervening states on this occasion adopted a less prescriptive approach. Hague 
conceded that this was one area in which hindsight provides grounds for a re-evaluation of the 
principles underpinning British policy, acknowledging that ‘‘the approach has largely relied on 
the Libyans sorting it out on their own’’ and suggesting an alternative, more prescriptive agenda 
might be preferable in future.627 Both he and Asquith similarly viewed the UN mission as 
insufficiently prescriptive. Asquith related how ‘‘it came in with the point of view that 
international assistance needed to respond to a Libyan lead, but given the state of the Libyan 
capacity to administer after Gaddafi, to be honest, Libya-led did not necessarily mean well-
led.’’628 In describing the UN role in the post-conflict phase, Ian Martin, the head of the 
mission, drew attention to the undoubted success in helping Libya hold democratic elections in 
June 2012 and rightly pointed out that without a stable democratic government, it was difficult 
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to see how the UN could address the problems in the security sector.629 However, he also 
acknowledged that the mission did ‘‘not attempt to intervene at key moments of internal 
disarray… believing that these decisions were best left to Libyans to work through.’’630 
 
This attitude did not emerge by accident. Although the government was never clear about the 
objectives it was pursuing it was consistent in stressing from the beginning that its approach 
would be ‘‘UN-led’’ and ‘‘Libyan-owned.’’631 The former principle reflected the calculation 
that the UN would possess greater legitimacy with the international community than a coalition 
of the willing.632 The latter rested on the assessment that Western impositions would be viewed 
as suspect by local populations. As Hague explained to Parliament following the publication of 
the ISRT report, ‘‘it would be quite wrong for the international community to say, ‘that is what 
we are going to try to impose on Libya.’’’633  The Prime Minister reiterated this hands-off 
attitude as the military campaign began to wind down, telling MPs that ‘‘of course there is a 
role for foreign advice, help and support, but I do not think we want to see an army of foreign 
consultants driving around in 4x4s, giving the impression that this is something being done to 
the Libyans, rather than something that is being done by them.’’634  By shifting the 
responsibility to indigenous actors, the interventionists were able to absolve themselves for 
responsibility for whatever came next. When in 2015 the Liaison Committee suggested to 
Cameron that he might bear some responsibility for the instability then engulfing the country, 
the Prime Minister responded by arguing,  ‘‘I would defend our action in Libya in that we 
responded to the potential of a genocide by Gaddafi. With allies, we stopped that from 
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happening and saved lives. That gave the Libyan people the chance of a better future, but it is a 
chance they haven’t yet taken.’’635 
 
Some of the potential shortcomings in the government’s approach can in fact be traced to a 
conscious attempt to avoid what were perceived to have been the mistakes of Iraq. Andrew 
Mitchell set out from the beginning to build the government’s policy upon the basis of what 
officials took to be the ‘‘lessons of Iraq.’’636 The rhetoric often suggested that merely by not 
repeating the assumed errors of previous conflicts, a positive outcome was automatically 
guaranteed. Appearing before the FAC following the capture of Tripoli, Hague opened his 
contribution by pointing out ‘‘I think the first thing to say is that this is not like Iraq.’’637 
Cameron informed the press that ‘‘we have learned the lessons from Iraq and past conflicts; 
there have not been occupying armies, there have not been great big invading forces.’’638 The 
fact that Britain did not have a presence on the ground was consistently presented in exclusively 
positive terms, and ministers and diplomats clearly failed to anticipate that this factor would 
hinder their ability to implement any plans that might have been made. The same assumptions 
were made about the role of the NTC and its future plans. The very fact that these plans had 
been drawn up by Libyans themselves was seen as sufficient for allaying fears of post-conflict 
instability. Cameron therefore announced that ‘‘this is not being dropped out of a NATO 
aeroplane, this is being delivered by the Libyan people.’’639 As Jonathan Powell has since 
suggested, ‘‘I do think there were people maybe drawing the wrong lessons from Iraq. They 
thought we don’t want any more Bremers telling them what to do on the ground. Actually, 
again, you were dealing with a country with no institutions, no tradition at all of how to do this 
Government. We should have been more proactive.’’640 It can therefore be concluded that while 
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the lack of well-defined objectives, excessive idealism and ideological self-confidence point to 
parallels with the Iraq experience, the reality is more complicated than these simple 
comparisons would suggest. 
Liberal Interventionism Versus Liberal Conservatism  
 
As military operations were reaching an apparently successful conclusion, Cameron and Hague 
were cautious about distilling a new doctrine from the campaign, still less reviving an old one. 
The Prime Minister did highlight the importance of having the capability to act, of having 
international and regional support and he explicitly emphasised that the lessons of Iraq should 
not take precedence over those of Bosnia.641 His overall rhetorical posture, however, was 
consistent with the ‘‘liberal conservatism’’ he had outlined when Leader of the Opposition and 
he sought to present himself as practical and pragmatic in his approach. On 5 September, 
Cameron told Parliament that ‘‘it was a unique set of circumstances and not something that we 
can or should repeat all over the world.’’642 When one Conservative member explicitly 
commended his leader for not ‘‘rushing to a new doctrine or going back to an old one like 
liberal interventionism,’’ Cameron was grateful, and responded by identifying himself as a 
‘‘practical, liberal Conservative.’’643 Again, on 24 October, the Prime Minister restated this 
position, telling the Commons that, ‘‘I believe it has shown the importance of weighing each 
situation on its merits and thinking through carefully any decision to intervene in advance’’644 
He went on to warn those who were implicitly pressing for action elsewhere, telling the more 
hawkish members that ‘‘as a liberal Conservative, I believe that a bit of scepticism should be 
brought to these schemes before we embark on them.’’645  
Hague shared this aversion to any suggestion of foreign policy ‘‘doctrine,’’ referring back to 
Cameron’s previous remarks when informing the FAC that he had always resisted forming a 
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new doctrine ‘‘because you can be sure there will be an event a few days later which is highly 
inconvenient to the doctrine.’’646 The Foreign Secretary told the Chair that the most important 
lesson was Britain retaining ‘‘the capacity to act,’’ but he also stressed the importance of 
international law and international support.647 This was a consistent theme. On 24 March, 
Hague had reiterated the three criteria that had guided Britain’s decision to intervene, telling 
Parliament that ‘‘the establishment of those principles has put us in a very strong position in 
relation to the crisis in Libya and those principles would guide us elsewhere.’’648 When asked 
again, in June, about the principles that would guide future interventions, Hague informed the 
House of the importance of the UN, arguing that, ‘‘international law is our starting point, which 
must remain a key principle in the years ahead.’’649  
The Deputy Prime Minister did not share this aversion to foreign policy doctrines, explicitly 
championing his own version of ‘‘liberal interventionism’’ and celebrating its resuscitation over 
Libya. Early in the campaign, in a speech in Mexico, Clegg declared that ‘‘it would be a terrible 
mistake if the mistakes of Iraq led to a retreat from the principle of liberal interventionism, from 
the principle that we have a collective responsibility to support freedom and protect human 
rights around the world.’’650 For the Liberal Democrat leader, the lesson of Iraq was ‘‘not that 
intervention in support of liberal aims is always wrong,’’ but that ‘‘such action must only – and 
must always – be multilaterally sanctioned and driven by humanitarian concerns.’’651 He went 
on to list what he saw to be the five key differences with the Iraq episode, declaring the current 
intervention to be ‘‘unambiguously legal,’’ based on a ‘‘clear humanitarian case,’’ with strong 
support from the region, a greater emphasis on post-conflict stabilisation and ‘‘taking place 
within strict constraints and with clear aims.’’652  
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However, and contrary to the claims of Cameron and Hague, to the extent that the Libyan war 
reveals a clear set of beliefs, principles and assumptions guiding policy, these do not appear to 
mark a fundamental departure from those associated with the New Labour period. While the 
impending slaughter in Benghazi might have been the key factor in the minds of those who 
sanctioned action in March, they also shared a belief that military action would help aid the 
democratic transformation they saw taking place across the region. The Srebrenica argument 
gave way to what we might term the ‘‘Arab Spring argument,’’ and policy-makers simply took 
for granted that the continuing use of military force, regardless of the constraints of the UN 
resolution, would help aid the incipient spread of democratization in the Arab world. In 
explaining and justifying the military effort, Libya was not in fact treated as an isolated case, 
but instead was situated in this wider narrative. In his statement to Parliament following the 
death of Osama Bin Laden in May, Cameron acknowledged the ‘‘lessons’’ of the past that 
members of Parliament were articulating, but his optimistic commitment to spread democracy 
appeared to set him apart. While the Prime Minister conceded that ‘‘we have to the learn the 
lessons of successes and failures of past interventions,’’ he immediately added that ‘‘it seems to 
me that there are some constants in all of this, one of which is that the promotion of democracy 
and freedom, along with what I would call the building blocks of democracy, is almost 
everywhere a good thing to do. In as much as we learn the lessons of interventions of the past, I 
hope that we hold on to that.’’653  
Cameron’s approach, and by extension that of the Coalition government more broadly, can be 
defined as liberal interventionist both because it used force in the service of objectives that 
clearly extended beyond civilian protection and because it over-estimated the efficacy of 
military action in achieving these ends. The government’s defence review had claimed that 
future military deployments would only be sanctioned with a ‘‘clear strategic aim’’ and a 
‘‘viable exit strategy,’’ yet neither of these was entirely clear in the case of Libya.654 As the 
analysis in this chapter has shown, underpinning the Libyan intervention was an optimistic and 
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idealistic assumption that simply removing the incumbent government through force would 
fulfil the promise of the Arab Spring. The opportunity for a mediated solution was never 
seriously pursued and the civilian intervention, to the extent that that existed, was premised on a 
light footprint approach regardless of the greater rhetorical emphasis on post-conflict planning. 
Throughout the conflict, Cameron was heavily involved in every detail, and some cabinet 
colleagues complained of their leader’s ‘‘personal obsession.’’655 Yet as soon Gaddafi was 
defeated on the battlefield, political attention shifted elsewhere, reflecting the fact that the 
Coalition government, much like its New Labour predecessor, viewed military action as a quick 
fix solution and a means of spreading its values around the world.  
Such an approach was facilitated by the government’s framing of the Arab Spring, which forced 
Cameron and others away from the contradictions of ‘‘liberal conservatism’’ toward a world-
view that was seemingly devoid of the ‘‘scepticism of grand designs’’ claimed to be a key part 
of this approach. Garnett, Mabon and Smith argue that ‘‘Cameron had emulated American 
neoconservatives who imagined that the Middle East and North Africa were swarming with 
individuals who were desperate for the chance to implement liberal democratic institutions.’’656 
Such an assertion is arguably stretching the point slightly, but it is true that the world-view of 
those who enthusiastically embraced the opportunity to remove Gaddafi was eerily similar to 
the simplistic good versus evil narrative that was present in much of Blair’s crusading rhetoric. 
The government saw the Arab Spring as proof that western values were ‘‘universal values’’ and 
‘‘the natural aspirations of people everywhere.’’657  
Rightly or wrongly, the government did not see the regional unrest as an opportunity for 
extremists but celebrated it as signalling their irrelevance. Libya, rather than assessed on its own 
merits, was viewed through the prism of prior events in Tunisia and Egypt and military success 
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was heralded as vindicating the idealism that policy-makers expounded. In a speech to the 
British Council following the rebel takeover of Tripoli, Clegg announced that ‘‘the momentum 
for change is breathtaking and, for the cynics who said change wasn’t possible, who had written 
off the Libyan uprising, written off the Arab Spring, clearly, they were wrong.’’658 Even Hague, 
who was less hawkish and more pragmatic than Cameron, persistently stuck to this framing of 
events. When one member of Parliament suggested that the removal of Gaddafi might 
potentially leave Libya in a worse state of affairs, the Foreign Secretary dismissed such a 
prospect by saying ‘‘the hon. Gentleman has left the House trying to imagine a regime worse 
than the Gaddafi regime over the last 42 years. I suppose that is theoretically possible, but on 
the basis of my visit to Benghazi and meeting the people there, who  have an inspiring 
commitment to freedom and a better future for their country, I can tell him that huge numbers of 
Libyans are going through what they are going through now in order to have a dramatically 
better situation.’’659  
The Coalition government took efforts to demonstrate it was abiding by international law and 
acting in harmony with regional opinion, both in its decision to intervene and the conduct of 
operations throughout the campaign. The greater priority given to these factors reflected the 
political fallout from past conflicts. The Attorney General was present at many of the key 
meetings of the NSC and as the analysis in this chapter has shown, a desire to avoid openly 
transgressing international law was a constraint on British military action. Yet such facts must 
be weighed in the balance. Cameron showed a willingness to intervene without having first 
secured a UN resolution and the official position of the government was its ‘‘doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention’’ provides legal cover for military action with or without UN 
approval, a position that certainly places Britain outside of mainstream international opinion on 
this issue.660 Additionally, while seeking to conduct operations within the remit of UN 1973, the 
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analysis in this chapter has shown that this was primarily a byproduct of the needs of alliance 
unity and even then, the government stretched the interpretation of the civilian protection 
mandate beyond breaking point, using air power to aid the offensive actions of one side in a 
civil war, inserting its own special forces to assist in these efforts, and facilitating transgressions 
of the UN arms embargo. Above all, the mandate provided by the UN did not alter the true 
nature of British objectives, which stretched well beyond a narrowly defined civilian protection 
agenda. 
In conclusion, Libya showed that despite a change of government and a change of party, post-
Iraq Britain was still willing to use military force not simply to protect civilians from 
widespread harm, but for the purpose of spreading freedom and democracy. In pursuing this 
agenda, the British government prioritised a military solution to the conflict, ignoring potential 
opportunities for mediation, glossing over the difficulties that would be faced in the transition 
period and authorising actions that were, at the very least, a violation of the spirit of the UN 
resolution they claimed to be enforcing. Such a policy was at odds with the ‘‘liberal 
conservatism’’ behind which Cameron and others cloaked their crusading and contradicted the 
claims and planning assumptions made in the SDSR. Such a conclusion is not simply about 
labelling doctrines for the sake of intellectual clarity. Its importance rests on the role that these 
assumptions, beliefs and inclinations had in shaping the government’s objectives in Libya, its 
willingness to use force in pursuit of these objectives, and its assessment of the likely 




Chapter Five: Syria: The Search for a UN Resolution 
 
Unrest in Syria coincided, almost to the day, with the commencement of military operations 
against Colonel Gaddafi’s forces. On 18 March, demonstrations in the province of Deraa 
sparked the beginning of a protest movement against the government of Bashar Assad. While 
moving at a slower pace, the unrest initially followed a similar pattern to its counterparts across 
the region, dispelling the misplaced assumption that President Assad would be immune to the 
Arab revolutions.661 Yet unlike events elsewhere, the dictator’s determination to cling to power, 
the increasing brutality of his security forces and the willingness of his opponents to take up 
arms gradually dragged the country toward civil war, ultimately leading to what many regard as 
the worst humanitarian disaster of the twenty first century. By the end of the period reviewed in 
this chapter, the UN estimated that the conflict had already claimed 20,000 lives, produced 
220,000 refugees and left 2.5 million people in ‘‘grave need of assistance.’’662 Even as early as 
the summer of 2011, the severity of the violence and the apparent parallels with Libya were 
sufficient to raise serious questions about how the international community would or should 
respond. Syria has subsequently become a test case for the principle of humanitarian 
intervention, or R2P as its advocates prefer.663 In Parliament and the press, the assumption that 
intervening in Libya while failing to do so in Syria was evidence of inconsistency or double 
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standards was not uncommon.664 This assumption has made its way into some academic 
commentary on Britain’s Syria policy.665  
This chapter draws upon Hansard, the rolling inquiries of the FAC and the Liaison Committee 
and interviews and speeches given by government ministers during this period to analyse 
Britain’s role within the wider international response to the Syrian conflict. It focuses on the 
period between March 2011, when the unrest in Syria began, and July 2012, when Russia and 
China exercised their third veto at the UN Security Council.  Britain was at the forefront of 
international efforts to isolate and condemn Damascus. The government publicly called for 
Assad’s departure from power and committed itself to this objective, introducing multiple 
waves of EU sanctions and attempting to use its position within the UN Security Council to 
sanction and pressure the Assad government. This strategy was to prove almost entirely 
ineffective and on three separate occasions during this period British diplomatic activism was 
curtailed by Russian and Chinese vetoes. The third and last of these ended the diminishing 
hopes of successful outside mediation, with UN envoy Kofi Annan resigning in frustration.  
This chapter examines the emergence and development of Britain’s anti-Assad diplomatic 
strategy and the assumptions, motivations and structural pressures that shaped it. The first four 
sections of this chapter develop a more or less chronological narrative. The first section traces 
the response to the early stages of the unrest, focusing on the period between March and August 
2011. It shows how during this period British policy sought to use diplomatic condemnation 
and economic sanctions to pressure the Assad government into adopting radical reforms. It 
further demonstrates that Britain was prevented from going as far as the government might have 
liked in its condemnation of Assad, with divisions in the international community and Britain’s 
lack of leverage in Damascus preventing the adoption of a more hawkish position.  
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In August 2011 Britain publicly called for Assad’s departure in a move coordinated with other 
Western governments, including the US. The second section analyses the motives behind this 
decision and its importance in the development of British policy. Henceforward, Britain would 
pursue a policy of democratic regime change, much in the same way that it had done for Libya, 
albeit without the military means to fulfil this ambitious agenda. The analysis in this section 
shows how the decision to call for Assad’s departure was driven primarily by an idealistic 
framing of the Arab Spring and the moral conviction of policy-makers, with domestic political 
pressure and miscalculation also playing a part.  
Following the call for regime change in Damascus, Britain launched a major effort to secure a 
UN Resolution imposing sanctions on Syria in October 2011. This resolution was vetoed by 
Russia and China. A second, weaker resolution was tabled in February 2012 following a further 
deterioration in the violence and an explicit request from the Arab League for the international 
community to support its peace plan. That too was vetoed by Russia and China, in a move that 
left British policy at a dead-end. The third section analyses these developments in more detail, 
in addition to Britain’s support for the Arab League’s peace plan. It shows the full extent of the 
diplomatic divisions British policy had to confront, arguing that these presented a series of 
insurmountable constraints.  
After the second Russian-Chinese veto at the UN in February 2012, Kofi Annan was appointed 
as the joint envoy of the UN and the Arab League in their search for a solution to the Syrian 
conflict. Ostensibly, support for the ‘‘Annan Plan’’ formed the basis of British policy in the 
period between February and July 2012. This section continues the theme developed previously, 
showing how British policy was undermined by the government’s lack of leverage and 
continued divisions in the Security Council. However, this section also argues that despite a 
sincere preference for diplomatic or political solutions, Britain continued to adopt an unrealistic, 
uncompromising and ideologically rigid position by insisting on Assad’s immediate removal 
from power and threatening a ‘‘day of reckoning’’ for those believed to be guilty of crimes 
against humanity. This position, it is suggested, undermined the prospects of Annan’s mediation 
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efforts succeeding. The final section examines separately the possibility of alternatives to the 
diplomatic strategy Britain adopted, looking specifically at the prospect of military intervention 
or providing arms to the rebels. It shows that the US adopted a cautious approach and from the 
British perspective, intervention without American support was simply not possible. Secondly, 
it shows that the risks and limitations of arming the opposition were much greater than its 
contemporary advocates assumed.  
Three core arguments emerge from this analysis. Firstly, Britain’s approach to the Syrian crisis 
was driven by many of the same beliefs and assumptions that underpinned the intervention in 
Libya, albeit such beliefs did not automatically lead to a military response on this occasion. 
Policymakers saw the Syrian crisis through the lens of the Arab Spring and adopted a strong 
moral framing of events and the options before them. They publicly committed themselves to a 
policy of regime change, a decision that was more the product of idealism and moral conviction 
than a judicious evaluation of what was practicable. While ostensibly preferring a diplomatic 
solution and supporting the efforts of Kofi Annan, British policy again showed an ambiguous 
relationship between the twin goals of justice and peace. Secondly, Britain’s room for 
manoeuvre was seriously constrained by the international environment. Divisions in the EU, the 
Arab League and the UN all prevented the adoption of a stronger position and the British 
government had very little leverage to wield in Damascus. This often led to a mismatch 
between the objective of regime change and the bellicose condemnation of Assad’s repression 
on the one hand, and the substance of British policy on the other. Thirdly, military intervention 
was simply not possible without US leadership and arming the opposition would have been an 
exceptionally high risk strategy. British policy was therefore shaped more by the geopolitical 
constraints and diplomatic divisions it confronted, rather than by the prominence of a more 





Syria and the Arab Spring  
 
In March 2011 the Syrian government arrested and tortured a group of children for painting 
anti-government graffiti.666 These repressive actions sparked protests in the southern city of 
Deraa on 18 March. The protest movement then gradually spread, driven by deeper, more 
underlying grievances such as lack of employment opportunities and anger with government 
corruption and unaccountable security forces. The uprising therefore had obvious parallels with 
contemporary events across the region and the contagion effect was an important facilitator of 
the unrest. The Assad government fuelled the growth of the crisis through its inability to 
implement meaningful reform and its willingness to use excessive force in responding to its 
opponents. Its resort to greater levels of violence soon invited comparisons with Colonel 
Gaddafi.  
The interpretive frame through which the British government perceived events in Syria drew 
upon the wider narrative of an ‘‘Arab Spring.’’667 As described in previous chapters, this 
narrative was consistent with a liberal or idealist tradition of thinking. Contrary to the Prime 
Minister’s self-presentation as someone who made decisions on a case by case basis, Syria was 
located within a wider story about the global spread of democracy and the upending of 
longstanding assumptions about the Middle East. As had been the case for Libya, this 
interpretive frame automatically lent the crisis an importance that went well beyond the fate of a 
local uprising. The discourse surrounding the Arab Spring imbued it with a sense of historical 
purpose that raised the stakes both strategically and symbolically. The importance of this point 
was clearest during the Prime Minister’s first speech to the United Nations in September. 
Cameron called on other members to impose strong sanctions against Damascus, but he nestled 
this demand within an optimistic account of what he saw as the region’s democratic awakening. 
Invoking parallels with the fall of the Berlin Wall and heralding what he portrayed as the 
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historic liberation of Libya, Cameron declared, ‘‘my argument today is that Libya and the Arab 
Spring shows the UN needs a new way of working. Because the Arab Spring is a massive 
opportunity to spread peace, prosperity, democracy and vitally security but only if we really 
seize it.’’ It was within this wider context that he argued, ‘‘and above all, on Syria, it is time for 
Members of the Security Council to act.’’668 Viewing Syria through the prism of the Arab 
Spring, the British government felt compelled to take what it regarded as a forward stand 
against the regime of Bashar Assad.  
 
The government also adopted a strong moral framing of the crisis, one that only hardened as the 
crisis escalated in the weeks and months ahead. This often hinted at parallels with the Libyan 
case. Indeed, Hague explicitly placed the two in the same category in his statement to 
Parliament on 29 June, speaking of Britain’s desire to ‘‘stand up to repression and violence, 
which we have seen taken to extremes in Libya and Syria’’669 and in his testimony before the 
FAC in September, he admitted that Syria provided the ‘‘closest analogy’’ with Libya ‘‘because 
that is another country where the incumbent Government have set about systematically, to a 
degree, killing large numbers of their own population.’’670  Phrases such as ‘‘appalling,’’ 
‘‘brutal’’ and ‘‘utterly unacceptable’’ conveyed a growing sense of moral outrage. 671 The 
British government’s condemnation also conveyed an innate preference for action over inaction. 
While often dampening expectations and pointing to the constraints afflicting British diplomacy 
during this period, ministers were equally adamant that, in Hague’s words, ‘‘democratic nations 
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cannot stay silent in the face of such acts.’’672  In one of his earliest public interventions on the 
crisis, Cameron spoke in similar terms, telling Parliament that ‘‘of course, we must not stand 
silent in the face of those outrages, and we will not.’’673  Not taking a strong and principled 
stand was thereby implicitly construed as moral indifference and a betrayal of values that 
foreign policy was claimed to uphold.  
Britain’s approach to the unfolding conflict in Syria was appropriately described by one official 
as the ‘‘escalator of pressure.’’674 Every deterioration in the situation or perceived act of 
defiance by Damascus would be met with a corresponding and proportionate escalation in 
diplomatic pressure and condemnation. At the end of April, Hague announced that Syria was at 
a ‘‘fork in the road.’’675 Either the government could introduce meaningful reforms, or Britain 
and its allies would ‘‘take measures, including sanctions.’’676 By June, mirroring similar 
statements from Hillary Clinton, the British position was that Bashar Assad was ‘‘losing 
legitimacy’’ and should ‘‘reform or step aside.’’677  Metaphors such as the ‘‘fork in the road’’ 
and public judgements quantifying Assad’s diminishing ‘‘legitimacy’’ logically implied there 
would soon come a point where Western governments would call for his departure. 
Furthermore, such pronouncements were often coupled with vague and implicit threats, 
suggesting that such a position was not just a bystander’s judgement about the deteriorating 
crisis, but a representation of a growing will to take a stand against the Syrian government. 
Alistair Burt, the Foreign Office Minister with responsibility for the Middle East, recalled of the 
subsequent decision to call for Assad’s departure that, ‘‘we reached a point where you either 
said something about this or in some way you were implying that he [Assad] could be dealt 
with even though the killing was mounting up.’’678 
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Emphasising Syria’s place as part of the Arab Spring and foregrounding the need to condemn 
the repression led the government to downplay some of the differences between unrest in Syria 
and similar events in other parts of the region. A number of important factors were particular to 
the Syrian context.679 Firstly, while revolutions in other Arab countries had developed rapidly, 
Syria’s uprising was a comparatively slow-moving affair. Secondly, while it was typically Arab 
capitals that had been the focus of popular unrest, in Syria the revolt was more provincial, as 
there were few protests in Damascus and Aleppo. Thirdly, the country’s confessional 
heterogeneity and its bordering with Iraq and Lebanon, both countries with a recent experience 
of sectarian violence, added an additional complicating factor. Fourthly, as the conflict 
developed, its secular and democratic origins receded and its religious and sectarian dimensions 
became increasingly important.680 There is some evidence suggesting these latter dynamics 
were present from a relatively early stage.681 An understanding of these important factors was 
largely absent from the government’s framing of the crisis.  
 
The favourable diplomatic circumstances that made it possible to mobilize the international 
community against Gaddafi were absent in the Syrian case. Cameron and Hague pointed to this 
key difference to defend British policy against charges of inconsistency.682 Typical in this 
regard were Cameron’s remarks in an interview with Sir David Frost in September, when the 
Prime Minister summarized the argument: ‘‘as I said I don’t think there’s a direct read across 
from Libya to Syria because the case of Libya there was UN support, there was Arab backing, 
there was Arab League backing, but in Syria I would like us to do more and to take a more 
forward position.’’683 The exclusive focus on these diplomatic constraints implied that the 
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government was being prevented from adopting a more hawkish position not because it 
assessed the violence in Syria to be fundamentally different from similar scenes in Libya, but 
because the position taken by other states prevented a stronger response. The only other factor 
that was pointed to as an important difference from the Libyan case was the lack of unity within 
the Syrian opposition. However, reference to this factor was not made until November 2011 and 
while it gained increased attention in the months ahead, it was still generally treated as of 
secondary importance to the diplomatic divisions.684  
 
From the beginning of the crisis, Hague warned Parliament that ‘‘we must recognise our limited 
leverage in Syria, but we are exercising that leverage that we do have.’’685 The prospect of a 
resolution like 1973, he acknowledged in an interview in the summer of 2011, was ‘‘so 
hypothetical as to be academic’’ and Britain therefore would ‘‘have to work at this in other 
ways.’’686 This led to a dissonance between ends and means or, as Ralph, Holland and Zhekova 
have put it, a ‘‘plausibility gap’’ in British policy.687 The strong moral framing described above 
and its corresponding pledges of action could not be matched with an effective strategy for as 
long as the majority of other states did not share the British view.  The British strategy therefore 
necessarily relied on multilateralism and the construction of international unity. The goal was to 
build and maintain as wide as possible a diplomatic alliance in favour of increasingly punitive 
measures, hopefully culminating in a strong position from the UN Security Council. The initial 
objective was to use the threat of future sanctions to encourage the Syrian government to pacify 
the demonstrators through radical reform, as was suggested by the ‘‘fork in the road’’ 
analogy.688  
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The position taken by Britain’s P3 allies mirrored their reaction to events in Libya. France was 
the most hawkish member of the international community and British and French diplomats 
often worked together, in both the EU and UN, attempting to build consensus in favour of 
stronger measures.689 The US position was more measured in contrast and the Obama 
administration remained divided between realists and idealists.690 Although the latter 
momentarily gained the upper hand in the summer of 2011, Obama saw Syria both as a low 
priority for US strategic interests and as potential quagmire to be avoided.691 What Cameron 
regarded as Obama’s excessive caution would come to be seen as an obstacle for British 
policymakers.692 Buoyed by the apparent success of their Libyan intervention, British officials 
behind the scenes were working to ‘‘push the boundaries’’ of US Syria policy.693 
Working through the EU potentially gave the government a greater platform from which to 
pressure Assad, but other EU member states did not want to go as far as Britain and France. 
British leverage was therefore still limited. The EU moved to sanction Damascus at the end of 
April, first introducing an arms embargo and following this with targeted sanctions at the 
beginning of May.694 These measures were then extended to President Assad himself at the end 
of the month.695 The delay in adopting this latter option can be explained by the reticence of 
some member states, including Germany.696 In any case, targeted sanctions were of limited 
value. While each wave was typically accompanied by bold claims to be sending a ‘‘strong 
signal’’ on one occasion Hague was to concede that their tangible impact would be minimal. As 
he candidly warned one MP: ‘‘they are a demonstration of our strong view rather than 
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something that will transform the situation.’’697 The EU’s longstanding policy has been to avoid 
the imposition of comprehensive sanctions, out of fear of their negative humanitarian impact. 698 
As the EU was a significant market for Syrian oil, some member states might also have felt 
their interests would be adversely affected by such a move.699  While some British politicians 
were calling for an oil embargo, there was therefore not even a discussion of this prospect until 
at least as late as July.700 For the first few months of the crisis, British policy was therefore 
limited to measures that were mostly symbolic in their value.  
From the outset, British diplomatic efforts at the UN were obstructed not just by the possibility 
of Russian and Chinese vetoes, but by a broader wave of scepticism from the BRICS states.701  
Britain circulated a draft resolution in June, calling for release of prisoners of conscience, the 
lifting of media restrictions and cooperation with the UNHRC, but with a lack of support 
readily apparent it was never formally tabled.702 Ministers had to consistently play down the 
prospects of securing a resolution in the face of widespread expectation of a strong UN 
response. As Hague informed MPs, such a resolution was ‘‘not in our gift.’’703 The most the 
Security Council could muster was a presidential statement, and even this step was not reached 
until August, following further escalation in the violence.704 
The Arab League did not act with the same degree of urgency and unity that it had displayed 
during the Libyan crisis. As Hague explained in July, ‘‘it has not been possible for the Arab 
League to arrive at a clear, strong position, which makes the situation entirely different to that 
in Libya, where the Arab League called on the international community to assist and 
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intervene.’’705 Syria’s location at the heart of some of the region’s confessional fault lines and 
the recent experience of sectarian conflict in neighbours Iraq and Lebanon ensured all regional 
players had more to fear from the prospect of major instability. Assad could also rely on strong 
support from Iran and had closer links with Qatar. Doha attempted to use its bilateral ties to 
persuade Assad to adopt reforms, but even following the Qatari decision to abandon Assad in 
July, the League was unable to adopt a unified position until the autumn.706 For as long as Arab 
states remained divided on this issue, Britain’s ability to propose strong measures was limited. 
 The Turkish position was also a relevant factor. In addition to its geographical proximity, 
Turkey enjoyed growing economic links and strong personal ties between Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and President Assad. Turkey’s ambitions to play a more high-profile regional role 
under the AKP had also been given a fillip by the Arab revolutions and much like Qatar, it saw 
the upheaval as an opportunity to bolster its claims to leadership.707 Given Britain’s own lack of 
influence in Damascus, working through key regional allies was necessary and Turkey was 
especially important in this regard. Hague explained that ‘‘I regard them as holding a central 
position in working with other nations on how we should proceed on Syria’’708 and Cameron 
pledged that Britain would be ‘‘side by side with them.’’709  Turkey followed Qatar in seeking 
to utilise its existing ties to encourage the regime to reform, but to the extent that is persisted for 
too long in such efforts, it undermined any strategy that called for unified condemnation of 
Assad.  It is no surprise that the public call for Assad’s departure did not arrive until after both 
Turkey and Qatar had abandoned their mediation efforts. 
 
The presence of these constraints and the obvious limits of British leverage in Damascus 
necessitated a degree of patience and sometimes led to a lowest common denominator 
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approach, whereby the diplomatic posture adopted simply reflected the strongest position to 
which other key states were willing to acquiesce. For example, when one MP advocated 
declaring that Assad had ‘‘lost legitimacy’’ as early as June, Hague responded by pointing out 
that ‘‘if we are to maintain international unity of pressure on Syria, we must be careful how we 
phrase such things.’’710 It is also worth recalling that at the outset of the crisis and through much 
of 2011, the British government was responding to multiple crises simultaneously. The presence 
of unrest in other Arab countries, the ongoing operations in Libya and the Japanese nuclear 
disaster at Fukushima meant that British policy suffered from what officials referred to as a 
‘‘lack of bandwidth.’’711  According to Seldon and Snowdon, Cameron was preoccupied with 
the conflict in Libya during this period and Syria therefore had to ‘‘take a backseat.’’712 
Nonetheless, it would be quite wrong to characterise British policy as passive. Within the 
boundaries of what was possible, the British government was working consistently to coax 
other members of the international community into the adoption of more coercive measures. By 
August 2011, changing calculations in Washington, Doha and Ankara would provide the 
opportunity for what, from the British perspective, would be a welcome shift in a more 
interventionist direction.  
The Call for Regime Change 
 
As violence escalated during Ramadan, President Obama issued a statement calling for Assad to 
depart power, in a move coordinated with Western allies.713 Britain issued a joint statement with 
France and Germany, which condemned ‘‘this bloody repression of peaceful and courageous 
demonstrators and the massive violations of human rights which President Assad and his 
authorities have been committing for months’’ and called for regime change in Damascus: 
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Our three countries believe that President Assad, who is resorting to brutal military force 
against his own people and who is responsible for the situation, has lost all legitimacy and can 
no longer claim to lead the country. We call on him to face the reality of the complete rejection 
of his regime by the Syrian people and to step aside in the best interests of Syria and the unity 
of its people.714 
In his analysis of this key development in the international response, Christopher Phillips has 
emphasised the importance of domestic political pressure and miscalculation in explaining the 
actions of Western governments.715 He also shows how such pressure was shaped by a wider 
mood of idealism and a need to be ‘‘on the right side of history.’’716 This account is primarily 
focused on the US position, but Phillips suggests such factors were equally applicable for other 
Western governments and that the British decision was the product of ‘‘domestic considerations 
along with the mistaken belief in Assad’s inevitable fall.’’717 While these are important factors 
in shaping the British position, this interpretation requires further qualification. 
The Arab Spring undoubtedly encouraged a consistently idealistic and optimistic view of the 
Syrian uprising. This optimism was further reinforced by the apparent success of the 
intervention in Libya following the sudden liberation of Tripoli in August. Having declared in a 
triumphantly idealist speech that ‘‘the direction of travel is set,’’ Clegg announced that Assad 
was now ‘‘as irrelevant to Syria’s future as Qadhafi is to Libya’s.’’718 The idealism surrounding 
regional developments encouraged the Coalition leaders to make positive predictions about the 
country’s political trajectory, predictions that were difficult to backtrack from in the months and 
years ahead. In April 2012, still taking his cue from events in Tahrir Square, the British Foreign 
Secretary argued that:  
 
                                                          
714 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘‘Joint UK, French and German Statement on Syria,’’ 18 August 2011, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-uk-french-and-german-statement-on-syria 
715 Phillips, Battle for Syria, 79-82. 
716 Ibid., 80.  
717 Ibid., 81. 
718 Clegg, ‘‘Speech on Arab Spring.’’  
181 
 
President Assad cannot crush the spirit of the Syrian people… One of the lessons of the Arab 
Spring is that if a dictatorial regime sets out to try to eliminate by force the desire for freedom 
and democracy of a very large part of their population then they will fail and that is why we 
remain convinced that this is a doomed regime. That is a question of time, a matter of time.719 
 
The assumption that Assad’s fall from power was both inevitable and, if not imminent, a likely 
short-term outcome, was widespread across Western government and diplomatic circles 
throughout 2011 and 2012. This is acknowledged in the autobiographies of key players within 
the US administration and emphasised in those accounts that draw on interviews with key 
decision-makers during this period.720 However, while such assumptions were widespread, they 
were not universal. Obama himself, despite making the decision to publicly call for regime 
change in Damascus, was less optimistic than the majority of his staffers about the prospects for 
Assad’s sudden removal. Ben Rhodes, a senior advisor on foreign policy, recalls the President 
saying at the time that ‘‘Syria could be a longer slog than we think.’’721 Faulty assumptions 
about the frailty of the regime were understandable, but not inevitable.  
More importantly, as Phillips himself has demonstrated, the idea that Assad’s fall was imminent 
was being discouraged by the ambassadors in Damascus. Britain’s Ambassador Simon Collis 
believed that it would require major protests in Damascus, Aleppo and the Kurdish regions, in 
addition to a collapse in the cohesion and effectiveness of the army and security services and 
weakness in the regime’s inner core.722 American and French diplomats reached similar 
conclusions and cautioned against publicly calling for regime change, but this counsel was 
seemingly overruled.723 The British government therefore appears to have reached a premature 
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conclusion on the future of Assad, at least in part, by ignoring the person best placed to offer an 
informed verdict. An assessment that stresses the role of miscalculation must therefore also 
acknowledge how this miscalculation arose and that its existence was symptomatic of a 
particular world-view and framing of events, one that exuded ideological confidence in the 
historic march of values that were part of the Arab Spring. 
It is true that the British government faced political pressure, with the strong response to Libya 
having established a precedent and raised expectations in both the press and Parliament. As 
early as 27 May, in an interview following the G8 Summit, Cameron had to duck a journalist’s 
question about whether military force was being considered.724 In the build up to the public call 
for regime change in August, the media were pressing Number 10 on why Syria was so 
different to Libya and if and when the British government would call for Assad to leave 
power.725 The lack of media access to the country and the role of Syrian exiles in shaping 
Western political discourse on the conflict reinforced a simple, moralistic, black and white 
framing of events.726 This was further encouraged by clear instances of misreporting, such as 
false claims that the Syrian government was firing on its own soldiers for their alleged refusal to 
shoot demonstrators.727 Finally, NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch 
and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights also added to the pressure. In addition to 
reporting facts about the conflict, these organizations introduced a moral framing which was far 
from politically neutral and began pushing for their favoured prescriptions, lending their 
authority to calls for the international community to adopt sanctions or refer the situation to the 
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ICC.728 British officials have since noted that Cameron called for more action from the Foreign 
Office after the lobbying efforts of groups like Amnesty and editorials in the Economist.729 
However, the political pressure the British government faced during this period was not all-
encompassing. Those factors described above undoubtedly played their part in shaping the 
framing of the options and made a policy of caution and restraint harder to defend, but they 
should not be privileged in our explanation of British decision-making to the extent that Phillips 
suggests. Unlike Obama, Cameron did not face an aggressively partisan domestic environment 
in which his stance on issues such as these would be deployed against him. Britain’s Middle 
East policy was underpinned by a spirit of bipartisanship and the Leader of the Opposition was 
in any case little interested in challenging the Coalition in this area. Syria was barely ever 
mentioned in Prime Minister’s Questions, reflecting Miliband’s determination to focus on 
domestic priorities.730 Douglas Alexander, Labour’s Shadow Foreign Secretary, was generally 
supportive of the existing policy and carried out any criticism in the traditional spirit of 
bipartisanship that has been a regular feature of past British foreign policy.731 Additionally, with 
political attention divided between multiple crises during this period, Parliament collectively 
spent relatively little time questioning the government on its approach to Syria in 2011. 
The anecdotal evidence about Cameron’s private thinking, although limited, suggests he was 
morally outraged by Assad’s actions and desired a tougher stance toward Damascus. These 
feelings were instinctive, and therefore authentic. They were not responses to outside pressure. 
Seldon and Snowdon, for example, write that the ‘‘initial crackdown incenses Cameron’’ but he 
was preoccupied with events in Libya during this period.732  Furthermore, when political 
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pressures suggested that the government might dampen its enthusiasm for action against Assad 
in the months ahead, both the Foreign Office and Number 10 continued to urge for a tougher 
stance. At the time of the call for Assad’s departure in August 2011, domestic political pressure 
was certainly encouraging British policy in this direction, but it was a direction that the 
government was in any case inclined to pursue.  
It was the government’s framing of the crisis and the moral conviction underpinning its policy 
that best explains the call for regime change. This public declaration represented multiple things 
simultaneously: a statement of intent and a threat against Assad, a prediction or calculation 
concerning what was believed likely to happen, but also an assessment of the ethical rights and 
wrongs of the conflict. British policymakers were obscuring the boundary between what they 
assessed was likely to happen and what they believed ought to happen. Illustrative of this 
confusing position were Hague’s comments to the House of Commons in November. Asked for 
an assessment of the staying power of the regime, the Foreign Secretary offered his judgement 
that the regime was ‘‘not very secure’’ before adding that ‘‘we believe the regime has lost all 
legitimacy… so the regime should understand that is has no future, that democracy should be 
introduced in Syria, and the regime should leave office.’’733 This is perhaps a more extreme 
example, but the government consistently presented Assad’s removal as a moral necessity.734 
General Richards, having been sceptical about the decision to intervene in Libya, would 
gradually emerge as a forthright opponent of the government’s Syria policy, providing a more 
traditional, realist and consequentialist assessment of the crisis, in contrast to the politicians. He 
later recalled how, ‘‘they had this moral disgust of Assad. They didn’t want to think through 
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second- and third-order questions, to find out what is really happening on the ground, where our 
intelligence wasn’t good.’’735  
It is also worth highlighting that the call for regime change was not an appeal for a simple 
change of personnel while maintaining the existing political structures in Syria but was a signal 
of support for a much wider, more ambitious and idealistic project of democratization. 
Although Cameron would on occasion suggest British policy was not trying to ‘‘ferment 
revolution’’ the statement on 18 August had pledged support for ‘‘democratic transition.’’736 In 
general, the rhetoric of the British government simply took for granted that whoever or 
whatever replaced Assad would be democratic. In autumn Britain began liaising with political 
opposition groups and it justified this on the basis of preparing for ‘‘democratic transition.’’737 
Just like in Libya, British policy was therefore working towards the wholesale political 
transformation of a country that had little or no prior experience of democratic governance, 
albeit on this occasion with comparatively more modest means. 
The decision made by Western governments, including the US and Britain, to call for Assad’s 
removal had important consequences for the evolution of the crisis.  Calling for regime change 
served as an accelerant of the conflict.738 It hardened Russia and Iran in their suspicions of 
Western intentions, narrowing the possibility of the diplomatic settlement British policy was 
working for; it raised expectations in Turkey and the Gulf, encouraging their later efforts to 
militarise the conflict; and it raised expectations among opposition groups, who were now even 
less willing to contemplate solutions that did not automatically lead to Assad’s immediate 
removal. Enthusiastically calling for Assad’s departure was typical of an approach that was 
animated more by what was emotionally satisfying and symbolically appealing, rather than 
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what best advanced practicable solutions to closing down the conflict. As a contemporary report 
by International Crisis Group warned, this would be a ‘‘feel good option that would change 
little.’’739 British policy was about taking a principled stand more than it was about advancing a 
specific objective. 
Having called for regime change, Western governments moved to impose stronger sanctions on 
Syria. In September, the EU finally introduced an oil embargo and shifted toward 
comprehensive sanctions, coinciding with similar moves from the US. 740 The oil embargo 
would certainly damage the economy and deprive the Syrian government of significant revenue, 
given the importance of EU markets for Syrian oil.741 Subsequent sanctions packages were also 
targeted at individuals guilty by association and regime entities, including financial 
institutions.742 The EU had therefore abandoned its traditional preference for more targeted 
measures, but as Collis had warned London from the outset, a policy of sanctions alone would 
take at least eighteen months to unseat Assad.743 This move therefore did little to close the gap 
between ends and means in British policy. In the intervening period, these measures threatened 
to harm the very people British policy was claiming to defend.744 Much like the regime change 
declaration that preceded it, the adoption of more comprehensive sanctions was driven more by 
a need to symbolise the government’s willingness to confront Assad and a lack of viable 
alternatives.745 When questioned on the value and wisdom of comprehensive sanctions, the 
government typically offered a description of the measures in place, rather than an explicit 
defence of their utility.746 
                                                          
739 ICG, Slow-Motion Suicide, ii and 30. 
740 HC Deb, 12/09/2011, cc. 34-35WS. 
741 The British government estimated oil revenues constituted one quarter of all government revenue. See 
HC Deb, 13/10/2011, c. 496. 
742 For good analysis of EU sanctions see Peter Seeberg, ‘‘The EU and the Syria Crisis: The Use of 
Sanctions and the Regime’s Strategy for Survival,’’ Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 1 (2015): 18-35. 
743 Phillips, Battle for Syria, 78. 
744 Moret, ‘‘Humanitarian Impacts.’’ 
745 Phillips, Battle for Syria, 86-88; ICG, Syria’s Mutating Conflict, Middle East Report No. 128, 1 
August 2012, i.  




Stalemate in the Security Council 
 
The intended culmination of British diplomatic pressure against Damascus was the adoption of 
a strong UN Security Council resolution, introducing sanctions and demonstrating the 
international community’s resolve in confronting Assad.747 The first major effort to secure this 
outcome was made in October 2011. Britain and its European allies desired a Chapter VII 
resolution to automatically impose sanctions on Damascus. This demand was softened and the 
resolution that was tabled contained instead a trigger for sanctions after a thirty-day review 
period, in order to win the necessary support in the Council.748 The resolution was vetoed by 
Russia and China. Furthermore, while the resolution secured the nine necessary votes and 
would therefore have passed without this veto, Moscow and Beijing were not entirely alone in 
their opposition. The three other BRICS states abstained on the vote and put on record their 
criticism of Western policy, echoing many of the arguments presented by their Russian and 
Chinese equivalents. The debate revealed a fault-line within the international community, with 
the BRICS demonstrating both a different view of the conflict itself and a different assessment 
as to what kind of policy tools would be necessary and appropriate.749  
These countries and their delegates presented a more technocratic, politically neutral and 
cautious view of the conflict, with a correspondingly diminished appetite for anything perceived 
as outside meddling. For example, during the debate on the resolution, the Indian delegate 
spoke of the ‘‘complexity of ground realities’’ and the necessity for all governments to deal 
with ‘‘militant groups.’’750 From the vantage point of British policymakers, this was an 
unnecessary obfuscation of what was a more black and white situation. As Cameron explained 
during an interview a month before the vote, ‘‘I mean let’s be clear about what’s happening in 
Syria. This is a dictator who is, you know, murdering, maiming, killing his own people in huge 
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numbers.’’751 Furthermore, what was at stake on this occasion was not simply the international 
community’s response to the Syrian conflict, but the status of the responsibility to protect norm 
in the aftermath of the controversies surrounding NATO action in Libya.  As Hague had 
recognised in a speech just weeks before the vote, ‘‘there is far from universal support among 
the rising powers of the 21st century for collective measures when international laws and norms 
are flouted in countries like Burma, or Iran or Syria.’’752 Part of the suspicion from these states 
stemmed from disagreement over the way NATO had interpreted the UN mandate in Libya and 
Britain’s UN Ambassador Lyall Grant later conceded that this intervention made it more 
difficult to adopt stronger measures against Syria.753 The South African delegate openly spoke 
of how previous resolutions had been ‘‘abused’’ and worried that the resolution on the table 
was ‘‘part of a hidden agenda aimed at once against instituting regime change.’’754 The division 
at the UN cut away at Britain’s diplomatic leverage and continued to undermine the anti-Assad 
strategy in the months ahead. 
With the Security Council paralysed, the position of the Arab League therefore took on a 
growing importance. Upon his return from meeting the League’s foreign ministers in October, 
Burt reinforced this point by calling for them to deploy their leverage with Damascus, ‘‘which 
may well be greater than ours.’755 Belatedly mobilized under Qatari leadership, the League 
began a mediatory effort in late October.756 With Damascus failing to comply with the proposed 
‘‘plan of action,’’ the League took the unprecedented step of suspending Syria and introducing 
sanctions in November. A revised version of the peace plan was ostensibly accepted by the 
Assad government on 12 December, leading to the dispatching of observers to monitor its 
implementation. On 22 January, Saudi Arabia declared the failure of the monitoring mission 
and withdrew funding, while Qatar, acting on behalf of the Arab League, proposed a new peace 
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plan. Qatar then referred the situation back to the Security Council on 24 January, calling for 
the UN to put its weight behind the new peace plan.757 
The British government did act pragmatically in its determination to align with the Arab League 
as it had done in the build up to the Libyan intervention. Alert to Britain’s limited leverage over 
Syria and the need to reduce the appearance of Western meddling, Burt pointed out that ‘‘it is 
far more powerful for the Arab League to condemn the repression in Syria, one of its own 
members, than for the West to do so.’’758 Hague was pessimistic about the prospects for success 
but identified the League’s peace plan as the ‘‘best way forward’’ and pledged that Britain 
would use ‘‘every lever at our disposal’’ in support of its aims.759 Britain pressed for the League 
to refer the situation back to the UN, knowing that the acquisition of ‘‘regional support’’ would 
strengthen its case for strong measures.760 Qatari and Saudi actions provided the opportunity for 
Britain and France to make a fresh attempt at securing a UN resolution in early 2012. 
With the violence in Syria worsening and the support of the Arab League secured, the 
government was cautiously optimistic that a second major attempt in the Security Council in 
February 2012 would prove more successful. However, Britain and other Western governments 
were forced to significantly water down and weaken the proposed text in an attempt to win 
enough support. The resolution that was ultimately tabled was not only much weaker than the 
government was hoping for, but weaker still than the resolution that had been rejected in 
October. This was merely a Chapter VI resolution that symbolically placed the support of the 
Security Council behind the efforts of the Arab League.761 It explicitly ruled out military action 
and rather than introduce sanctions, it simply referred to the consideration of ‘‘further 
measures’’ after a review period. 
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The decision by Russia and China to exercise their vetoes again was a major blow to British 
policy. Although other states were willing to support the Arab League’s position, Moscow and 
Beijing remained determined in their opposition. Divisions in the UN therefore fatally curtailed 
Britain’s leverage in responding to the Syrian crisis and effectively brought the ‘‘escalator of 
pressure’’ to a decisive halt. This reality was glossed over or ignored in much of the 
government’s rhetoric in the weeks and months ahead, but as Hague acknowledged in the 
immediate aftermath of the veto, while there would be a tightening up of the existing sanctions 
that were in place, ‘‘most of the sanctions that we can introduce we have already 
introduced.’’762  
At this stage in the conflict, events in Syria were beginning to reveal some disturbing trends. By 
2012, Assad’s portrayal of the uprising as driven by a sectarian agenda was increasingly 
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and he succeeded in convincing minority groups, such as 
the Allawite community, that their fate was tied to the continuity of the status quo.763 The main 
political opposition grouping, the Syrian National Council (SNC), was dominated by political 
Islamists and failed to represent the country’s minority groups, with the absence of Kurdish 
leaders particularly notable.764 2012 also saw the first incidents of major terrorist bombings with 
the emergence of the Al Qaeda affiliate, the Nusra Front, in January.765  Extremist infiltration of 
the opposition would become an increasing problem, a development that was in part encouraged 
both by Qatari sponsorship of Islamist forces and funding from private donors in the Gulf 
region.766  
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Different actors would interpret these developments in different ways, but for the architects of 
British policy, the deterioration in the violence reinforced their anti-Assad position, their good 
versus evil depiction of the conflict and their sympathy for the Syrian rebels. By March 2012 
Cameron was speaking regularly about a ‘‘criminal’’ regime and referred to violence in Homs 
as a ‘‘scene of medieval barbarity.’’767 The Syrian opposition, in contrast, continued to be 
presented in exclusively idealistic terms. Most of the government’s statements referred to a 
conflict between the Assad ‘‘regime’’ and the ‘‘people’’ of Syria. From this perspective, 
government policy was politically neutral and Britain was not taking sides in a civil war, it was 
assisting the ‘‘the people of Syria.’’ For example, in his criticism of Russia’s position at the 
UN, Hague declared that it was ‘‘a mistake to side with a brutal regime rather than the people of 
Syria.’’768  On other occasions, the government referred to ‘‘protesters’’ or ‘‘demonstrators.’’769 
Rhetorical alternatives such as ‘‘opposition,’’ ‘‘groups’’ ‘‘factions’’ or ‘‘parties’’ were rarely, if 
ever, used in official discourse. 
 
Furthermore, the government generally avoided describing the conflict as a civil war, resisting 
the efforts of Conservative backbenchers to frame the growing crisis in this way.770 As some 
began to question the optimism and idealism in which the government had couched its 
assessment of the region’s pending transformations, Hague reinforced the official view that ‘‘if 
we were to downgrade our expectations and allow pessimism to prevail; if we and other nations 
send the signal that repression and violence will be tolerated, then these immense opportunities 
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will be squandered.’’771 While this was more an argument about the wider region rather than 
Syria specifically, the idealistic framing of the Syrian conflict drew strength from this broader 
claim. Even when the government began belatedly to accept the characterisation of the conflict 
as a civil war, ministers still preferred to avoid such language and to stress what they saw as the 
democratic and secular origins of the conflict. For example, having acknowledged the growing 
risks of ‘‘deep sectarian violence’’ in June 2012, Hague chose to play down this dimension of 
the conflict, emphasising that despite the presence of this factor, ‘‘there are also many people in 
Syria, of different ethnicities, religions and beliefs, who want freedom and democracy in their 
country, and who want to be rid of their repressive regime.’’772  
 
On occasion, the Prime Minister hinted at an alternative framing of the situation. Speaking 
before the Liaison Committee in early March 2012, Cameron argued that Britain’s main 
objective was ‘‘ending the bloodshed’’ and that the best route to this was Assad’s quick 
departure.773 His depiction of this approach suggested little more than a change of personnel 
within the existing system and in advancing this position he argued that ‘‘the idea of transition 
at the top is possibly a better and less bloody outcome than a revolution from the bottom.’’774 
Cameron repeated a similar logic throughout March and April, suggesting that British policy 
was ‘‘not trying to ferment a revolution.’’775 This language, with its accompanying Burkean 
scepticism of revolution is perhaps suggestive of a more cautious or conservative approach, in 
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line with the liberal conservatism Cameron claimed as the basis of his approach. However, this 
positioning was not consistent with the broad thrust of the government’s rhetoric on Syria, the 
majority of which appeared to draw a line under the assumptions that had guided a previous 
generation of Conservative politicians.  
For example, when a minority of backbenchers raised concerns about the fate of Syria’s 
Christian community, which had traditionally enjoyed protection under the Assad regime, 
Hague implicitly dismissed such concerns by arguing that ‘‘we have to consider that the regime 
there is doomed, one way or the other. It is a question not of whether, but of how and when, it 
will fall.’’776 Arguments such as these implied any bloody consequences resulting from the 
collapse of the existing government were beyond the remit of Britain’s moral responsibilities.  
Similarly, when it was pointed out that the dislodging of Assad might lead not to a stable 
democracy but to a more volatile situation, Hague put forward the opposing view, arguing that 
‘‘I have to point out that there has been, I think, a better trend than that during the last year, 
which can be seen if we look at events in Libya and Tunisia and at democratic developments in 
Morocco and Jordan.’’777 
 
The interpretive lens described above both guided and justified British policy toward Syria 
throughout this period, reinforcing a strong hostility toward the ‘‘regime’’ and person of Bashar 
Assad in particular. At times, it encompassed assumptions of dubious veracity, many of which 
were to prove mistaken as events did not bear them out. In other instances, it rendered complex 
ethical judgements into more simplistic dualisms. Yet this framing was not, in any final or 
definitive sense, right or wrong. It was, however, only one among several alternative framings 
of events and its presence should therefore not be taken for granted. This framing provided the 
ideational backdrop against which the government developed its position and while it did not 
inevitably correspond to a single outcome, it helped lay the ground for the public calls for 
Assad’s departure, the adoption and escalation of various sanctions and the later moves in 
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favour of military options which are analysed in subsequent chapters. Without the dominance of 
this particular view of the conflict, British policy would likely have looked very different. 
 
One consequence of this framing was a refusal to reconsider the anti-Assad strategy that had 
been adopted in August 2011, despite the repeated setbacks at the UN. As was observed in the 
Libyan case, policymakers wanted not only to end the conflict but to end the conflict on certain 
terms.  In advance of the vote at the UN in February, when asked by a journalist if regime 
change was regarded by the British government as an ‘‘absolute precondition’’ for resolving the 
crisis, Hague responded by saying ‘‘well, it’s certainly our view. It’s been our view for a long 
time that President Assad should go and has lost all credibility, not only internationally, but 
with his own people, so many of his own people as well.’’778 A month after the veto, when 
Cameron was asked if Britain would consider dropping the demand for regime change to 
achieve unity within the Security Council, he avoided answering the question directly while at 
the same time insisting that ‘‘I cannot see a future for Syria where the people of Syria are 
offered any sort of life with President Assad still in charge.’’779 It was the rigidity of this 
position and the bellicose language in which it was often presented that added to the suspicions 
of Russia and China that Western governments desired another Libya-style intervention. Yet 
even after the veto in February 2012, Britain did not backtrack from this uncompromising 
position. In April Hague boldly declared that:  
 
To Bashar Al Assad we must say: you may think you can cling to power or shore up your rule 
through yet more murder, torture and the incarceration of your opponents. But you have 
forfeited all right to lead in the eyes of the world and of most Syrians. We will not turn a blind 
eye to what you have done to them. Until you accept a transition that reflects the will of the 
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Syrian people the diplomatic and economic stranglehold will tighten. We will increase 
sanctions and pressure for as long as it takes.780 
The Annan Plan and the Friends of Syria 
 
Following the Security Council veto in February 2012, Kofi Annan was appointed as the joint 
envoy of the UN and Arab League to lead mediation efforts. The Annan plan proposed a 
ceasefire to be observed by a UN monitoring mission, paving the way for a ‘‘Syrian-led 
political process.’’781 The six-point proposal was primarily a means of de-escalating the conflict 
in lieu of a more long-term solution. Having first called for a ceasefire via a Presidential 
Statement, the Security Council unanimously agreed to support the plan’s proposals on 14 
April, albeit without committing to any means of enforcement.782 This was followed, a week 
later, with a second resolution establishing the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS).783 
Annan’s mediatory efforts, alongside the dispatching of the supervisory mission, did at least 
slow the pace of further escalation during this period.784 Officially, support for the Annan plan 
formed the basis of British policy between the spring and summer of 2012.785  
Another development following the February veto was the creation of the ‘‘Friends of Syria,’’ a 
broad diplomatic grouping bringing together those states supportive of the Arab League’s 
position and in favour of stronger measures from the UN.786 The British government presented 
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its involvement in this group as consistent with support for the Annan plan, but it might be 
questioned whether this parallel diplomatic track was creating the kind of environment 
conducive to peace talks. The Friends welcomed into its ranks both Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
The former, as later described, was flooding the country with arms, while the latter appeared to 
be increasingly motivated by a sectarian agenda and shunned Annan from the beginning.787 
From the British perspective the Friends was primarily a vehicle for furthering the anti-Assad 
strategy. Mirroring language he had used against Gaddafi, Cameron spoke of the purpose of this 
alliance as being to ‘‘co-ordinate our efforts with respect to getting rid of that dreadful 
regime.’’788 In any case, while the size of this diplomatic grouping demonstrated the widespread 
and growing isolation the Assad government was facing, suggesting Russia and China were 
increasingly marginalised in their opposition to a stronger position from the Security Council, it 
did little to compensate for Britain’s lack of leverage. This was clearly displayed in the response 
to the ‘‘Houla massacre’’ in May. Referring to an ‘‘unacceptable situation,’’ Cameron and 
French President Hollande promised to ‘‘increase the pressure,’’789 yet the only tangible 
measure that followed their bold statements was the expulsion of the Syrian charge d’affaires.790  
 
During this period Britain began to jettison its more cautious position on the question of justice 
and accountability. Previously, the government had made a tactical concession by postponing 
any attempt to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC as such a proposal would have further 
undermined unity within the Security Council. However, Cameron began calling for 
‘‘accountability’’ in the aftermath of the February veto. In Parliament, the Prime Minister 
agreed with the description of Assad as a ‘‘war criminal’’ and while he recognised that Syria 
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was not a signatory to the ICC, he insisted that ‘‘that does not mean that we should not collect 
the evidence to hold these people to account for their crimes, and Britain and others are doing 
that work right now.’’791 Henceforward, ‘‘accountability’’ was increasingly identified as a key 
area of Britain’s Syria policy.792 At the end of February, following a joint ‘‘UK-France 
Summit,’’ a communiqué was issued promising a ‘‘day of reckoning.’’793 This commitment was 
reiterated at the EU Council the following month.794  
This approach to the relationship between justice and peace, with its dogmatic position on what 
the government regarded as significant points of principle, showed continuity with the 
government’s Libya policy. When Cameron set out his more cautious and conservative framing 
of the options before the Liaison Committee in March, he would insist that Britain was calling 
for regime change as the best way of ‘‘ending the bloodshed.’’795 Yet when one committee 
member suggested that this outcome might be facilitated by waiving the prospect of 
international justice through some form of ‘‘Idi Amin-style solution,’’ the Prime Minister’s 
ambiguous non-answer suggested that he was reluctant to compromise on the question of 
accountability.796 As Hague explained in relation to Britain’s wider policy on this question, 
international justice was ‘‘not a foreign policy tool that can be switched on or off.’’797 As with 
the uncompromising position on regime change, these threats of accountability only heightened 
divisions in the Security Council and moved British policy further away from the kind of 
compromises necessary to secure a diplomatic breakthrough.  
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A degree of compromise between the permanent members of the Security Council appeared to 
have been achieved during discussions in Geneva in June. The second major initiative of Annan 
in his role as joint envoy was the convening of an international conference involving the major 
outside players. The ‘‘contact group’’ met in Geneva on 30 June and its outcome, the ‘‘Geneva 
Declaration,’’ represented an agreement on the principles of a political transition.798 On one 
level, the unanimous endorsement of the P5 was a measure of progress and Geneva I would 
remain the basis for future rounds of diplomacy in the months and years ahead. However, 
although Annan’s proposals called for a political transition, they did not prejudge the outcome 
to the same degree as Western governments clearly did. Even if the former Secretary General 
believed that Assad’s departure was necessary in the long run, which he almost certainly did, he 
avoided openly advertising this in public.799 The tension between Annan’s position and that of 
those Western governments who were ostensibly supporting his activities was clear in these 
negotiations. Britain joined the United States in opposing Iranian participation at Geneva, 
contrary to Annan’s own desires, and Hillary Clinton has made clear that she devised the 
communiqué’s key phrase ‘‘mutual consent’’ as ‘‘code for excluding Assad.’’800 This meant 
that both the regime and opposition would have to provide consent for any arrangement and as 
the British government repeatedly pointed out ‘‘it is our clear understanding that this would 
preclude President Assad.’’801 The appearance of agreement at Geneva was therefore superficial 
and it is no surprise that in the weeks before his resignation in July, Annan criticised both 
Russia and Western governments for what he described as their ‘‘destructive competition.’’802  
As the violence increased into the summer months and the UN monitoring mission was forced 
to withdraw, Hague acknowledged that the Annan plan ‘‘has clearly failed so far.’’803 In 
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Parliament, he and other ministers came under increasing pressure to defend the existing policy 
and outline what measures Britain would take in the event that the plan were to fail 
completely.804 The Foreign Secretary raised expectations that such an eventuality would be 
addressed through a successful return to the Security Council or the introduction of ‘‘sweeping 
sanctions’’ by the Friends of Syria.805 The dim hope of a change in the Russian position was 
coupled with the standard mantra that ‘‘no options were off the table.’’806 Statements and 
threats such as these implied an entirely artificial and disproportionate impression of Britain’s 
leverage and persistence with the Annan plan therefore masked the extent to which Britain was 
unable to influence events. 
Britain tabled another UN resolution in July, which was again vetoed by Russia and China.807 
On this occasion, Western governments knew in advance that a veto would be forthcoming and 
merely used the occasion as an opportunity for a minor propaganda victory. This outcome was 
always the most likely, but policymakers seemed unprepared for its implications. Even 
following this veto and Annan’s frustrated resignation in its aftermath, Hague and Cameron 
continued to speak about the necessity of supporting the Annan plan and of the Security 
Council coming together.808 Although British policy did not immediately adjust to the impact of 
the continued divisions at the UN and Annan’s departure from the scene, the third veto was to 
prove a watershed in the development of Britain’s response to the crisis and it ultimately led to 
the pursuit of a more unilateral, high-risk and military solution. This is the subject of the 
following chapter. 
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Throughout the development of the conflict, and particularly during the period reviewed above, 
British policy was therefore limited by the international environment, particularly the divisions 
within the UN Security Council, which cut away at British leverage and made it difficult to 
adopt a stronger response. The presence of these constraining factors make it difficult to tell 
what Britain wanted to do. In an interview on Sky News in June 2011, Hague described the 
prospect of resolution like UNSC 1973 as ‘‘so hypothetical as to be academic’’ and this 
remained the case throughout the conflict.809 It cannot be argued that British policymakers 
would have automatically favoured a military solution, if only the diplomatic environment had 
been sufficiently permissive. Yet what is undoubtedly true is that throughout this period and 
beyond, both Cameron and Hague favoured an approach that was bolder and stronger than other 
states were willing to support and were frustrated with the divisions within the international 
community. This was true from the very beginning of the crisis. Cameron was persistent in his 
claim that ‘‘we need to go further.’’810  
From the perspective of the British government, the main difference between Libya and Syria 
was not to be found in the conflict itself but in the international environment. This can be 
inferred from the government’s framing of the Syrian uprising, but it was made explicit when 
ministers responded to questions about the differences between the two cases. As observed, the 
government emphasised the divisions in the international community as the most significant 
difference with the Libyan case, where the Arab League had quickly adopted a strong position 
and there was a higher level of unity at the UN. However, it would have been entirely 
reasonable to have argued that while the loss of life in Syria was tragic, civilians were not yet 
threatened to the same degree as had been obvious in Libya, particularly during the first year of 
the crisis. No member of the British government ever dared to suggest such a view, nor did they 
point to the myriad other differences between the two cases. Such positioning not only made 
clear the fact that Britain favoured a much tougher stance vis-à-vis Damascus than other 
members of the international community were willing to support, it also tended to suggest that 
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the government was sympathetic to the idea of military intervention, at least in principle. When 
Hague confronted questions about the selective application of humanitarian intervention in 
response to the Arab Spring, he argued that Britain could not intervene in every case even 
where the moral arguments for doing so were strong, claiming that ‘‘we may feel the same 
impulsion and moral imperative to do so, but we may be constrained by other factors.’’811 It was 
obvious which ‘‘other factors’’ he was referring to. 
Furthermore, ministers were persistent in pointing out that no options were being ruled out for 
the future, even while playing down the immediate prospects of military action. The diplomacy-
first approach was based on an implicit threat that military intervention or arming the rebels 
were future possibilities. As Hague explained, ‘‘we do not want to see the Annan plan fail, but 
if, despite our best efforts, it does not succeed, we would have to consider other options for 
resolving the crisis and, in our view, all options should then be on the table.’’812 This might 
have been a way of stalling the consideration of difficult questions, but it was not simply a 
bluff. As the following chapter will show, Hague and Cameron went to great lengths to revise 
the British position on arming Assad’s opponents toward the end of 2012.  
Military Alternatives? 
 
An assessment of the key drivers of British policy must also reckon with the possibility of 
various alternative approaches. The Chief of Defence Staff developed what he regarded as a 
superior alternative in late 2011. ‘‘Extract, Equip and Train’’ represented General Richards’ 
efforts to match the government’s insistence on ending the conflict through regime change with 
the appropriate means. In short, the plan would have involved training and arming a Syrian 
rebel army in neighbouring countries, over a period of twelve months, before inserting it into 
the conflict with the support of Western naval and air power.813 The extent to which such ideas 
were debated at the highest levels is unclear. Although Cameron was later made aware of these 
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proposals, they were reportedly rejected by Hugh Powell, a senior advisor to the NSC, on the 
grounds that they were ‘‘unsellable in Washington’’ and ‘‘more than the market could bear.’’814 
The general has since suggested the politicians failed to take up his plan because of a lack of 
courage,815 while Goodman has asserted that its rejection is evidence of poor leadership on 
Cameron’s part.816  
Such criticisms do not take account of two incontrovertible drawbacks to the Richards’ plan. 
Firstly, the implementation of this strategy would have entailed casting international opinion 
and international law to one side.  Given the diplomatic backlash following the Libyan 
intervention – an intervention in which Western support for its proxies was modest, covert and 
often via indirect means – to have repeated a similar operation here without Security Council 
approval would not simply have incensed the Russians and Chinese but would have inflamed 
international opinion in much the same way that the 2003 Iraq invasion had done. The 
suggestion that a ‘‘Right to Protect Doctrine’’ would have provided a legal basis for such action 
in the absence of UN approval was also surely misplaced.817 From a purely military perspective, 
the strategy might have appeared a suitable and appropriate response, but the military man 
seemed not to appreciate the legal and diplomatic implications of what he was proposing. 
Secondly, despite its author, this was primarily a plan for US action, with Britain and others 
playing the usual supportive role. When General Martin Dempsey outlined the demands of 
enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria in early 2012, he informed the White House that such an 
operation would require 70,000 servicemen and significantly more than the $1.6 billion that had 
been required for the Libyan operation.818 While such figures may have been inflated, they 
serve to highlight the magnitude of resources Richards was demanding. His plan called for a no-
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fly zone in addition to the active use of air and naval assets in conjunction with a rebel army of 
100,000 men, all of whom would have to be trained and armed by Western governments. There 
were some within the US administration who were sympathetic to the idea of providing much 
greater support to the opposition, but when Secretary Clinton and General Petraeus presented 
more detailed plans to Obama in the summer of 2012, the President decided against such an 
approach.819 Ultimately, the viability of the Richards’ plan depended not on the courage of 
British politicians, but on the will of Barack Obama. 
This observation leads into a wider acknowledgement about the importance of the US position. 
The scale of resources demanded by Richards certainly exceeded the limits of Britain’s military 
capabilities. Yet so too did more modest proposals for ‘‘safe havens’’ and ‘‘no fly zones.’’ 
Following the second UN veto in February 2012, some more hawkish Labour members of 
Parliament began agitating in favour of such measures,820 but as military chiefs had warned 
Cameron in the summer of 2011, ‘‘Syria is not Libya.’’821 For one, Assad could rely on vastly 
superior anti-aircraft defences. The implications of such facts were not publicly conceded by the 
British government until much later in 2012, following the third Russian veto at the UN. In his 
first statement to the House following this development, Hague responded to the suggestion that 
Britain impose a no-fly zone without US support by admitting that ‘‘such an option would only 
be practicable with the full support of the United States of America’.822 He reiterated the same 
facts in his testimony to the FAC two weeks later and spelled out the reality even more starkly 
in April 2013, observing that ‘‘the decision [to impose a no-fly zone] would essentially be one 
for the United States, given the scale required. No such decision by the United States has been 
taken. We are working in an environment where we do not have a no-fly zone and we have to 
consider the options available to us in light of that.’’823   
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On one rare occasion, the Foreign Secretary also acknowledged that the consequences of 
intervening in Syria would be ‘‘far more difficult to foresee’’ than had been the case in 
Libya.824 This was slightly different from pointing to the diplomatic constraints or the necessity 
of US support. There are always practical considerations relating to different types of military 
action. For example, Hague could allude to past experiences in warning against the limitations 
of safe areas that were inadequately protected.825 Similarly, enforcing an arms embargo against 
Assad would be futile without cooperation from neighbouring countries.826 Yet all these 
arguments were merely academic given the realities of the diplomatic environment and 
Britain’s reliance on the military might of the US. British policy should not therefore be 
assessed in the presence of background assumptions that over-estimate the options available to 
decision-makers.  
Direct intervention was practically impossible, but intervention via proxy was merely difficult 
and risky. The government began a gradual process of engagement with opposition groups in 
late September 2011, but this approach was exclusively limited to supporting political 
opposition groups.827 Britain ruled out even liaising with groups like the Free Syrian Army 
which, in Hague’s words, was ‘‘engaged in a different kind of struggle.’’828 Those groups and 
individuals that the British government was disposed toward viewing as viable successors to 
Assad were largely based in exile, controlled no territory within Syria and had little ability to 
directly shape events on the ground. While not ruling out options for the future, ministers had 
consistently opposed the idea of providing military support to the opposition. Even following 
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the emphatic demonstration of the limits of the diplomatic route in February, Hague made clear 
that ‘‘we are not contemplating arming anybody.’’829  
The reticence toward arming the rebels was to a significant extent founded on a pragmatic 
recognition of the dangers and limitations of this option. There was the risk that any such arms 
would fall into the hands of dangerous extremists or that arming one side would escalate the 
conflict. Even as the prospect of a diplomatic solution receded into the summer months, Hague 
pointed out that ‘‘it is difficult to know in the current situation what those arms would be used 
for, and whether they could also be used to commit atrocities that we would find appalling. 
They could contribute to the cycle of violence that is building up and create a further reaction 
on the other side.’’830 Instead, the government gradually increased its level of engagement with 
the political opposition, lobbied them to adopt a more unified position and continued to provide 
relatively small-scale ‘‘practical assistance’’ in areas such as training for human rights activists 
and citizen journalists. Hague announced £500,000 in funding for the opposition in March 
2012, in addition to the £450,000 Britain had already provided since August 2011.831 
The divisions within the opposition and the lack of intelligence about those groups carrying out 
the fighting compounded the risks referred to above. As Cameron informed the Liaison 
Committee in March, ‘‘it would be welcome if there was a clear establishment of who the 
Syrian opposition are and a clearer sense that they are genuinely representative of a future for 
Syria that would be democratic, open, tolerant of minorities, and all the rest.’’832 Further 
engagement with opposition groups served to reveal a highly divided movement. Behind the 
scenes, the Foreign Office continued to caution against providing arms to Assad’s opponents 
throughout 2012.833 Publicly, the divisions within the opposition, and the fact that the Syrian 
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National Council controlled no territory on the ground began to be acknowledged as another 
major difference with the Libyan case and an argument that justified a different approach.834 
The diplomatic and legal obstacles were also greater than most advocates of arming the rebels 
were willing to acknowledge. Such a move would have first required lifting the EU’s arms 
embargo, and any attempt would have been strongly opposed by the majority of member 
states.835 The situation was further complicated by the fact that the embargo itself was part of 
the broader package of sanctions. Most importantly, if arming the opposition was consistent 
with the escalatory logic built into existing policy, it also represented a radical break with the 
effort to build and maintain a broad coalition to isolate Damascus. There would be zero 
possibility of any agreement at the Security Council if one of its permanent members began 
openly arming one faction in a civil war. It would have amounted to publicly signalling that 
British policy favoured working against the mediation efforts of UN envoy Kofi Annan. 
Finally, the persistence with the diplomatic track was also encouraged by a faulty assessment of 
Russian motivations. Believing that Russia’s position on Syria was motivated by nothing other 
than a traditional view of its national interests, British policy assumed that a further 
deterioration would be more likely to lead to a change of approach in Moscow, rather than a 
hardening of the existing position. Speaking before the FAC in March 2012, Hague therefore 
explained that ‘‘this depends, of course, on one’s analysis of what will happen ultimately, but if 
our view is correct… it is actually in the national interests of Russia and China to support a 
political transition at some stage.’’836 At almost every stage, the British government failed to 
detect any shift in Moscow’s position, but as Burt recalls ‘‘as long as we had the Russians 
saying, ‘yeah, we’ll think about it,’ we kept hoping they would shift their view.’’837 This 
excessively optimistic calculation therefore helped keep alive a strategy that otherwise had 
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clearly reached a dead-end and appeared to reflect the assumption that while British policy was 
driven by a sense of altruism and responsibility, Russia motives were more likely self-
interested. In fact, Moscow’s motivations were more complicated and the disagreement within 
the Security Council reflected a genuine ideological divergence just as much as a clash of 
competing interests.838 
If this area of British policy shows a certain level of restraint, caution and pragmatism it should 
also be observed that Britain adopted a laissez-faire approach toward its regional partners, who 
were increasingly willing to pour arms into the conflict. Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia played 
their part in the growing internationalisation of the conflict, with Doha occupying the 
predominant role in arming and financing the opposition beginning in 2012.839 Opposition 
groups of an Islamist persuasion also benefited from financial flows from private donors in the 
Gulf region. It is difficult to establish whether Britain passively accepted this or actively 
encouraged it but ministers avoided any public criticism of this development, choosing instead 
to praise the ‘‘constructive’’ role of their allies.’’840  It might be supposed that the government 
effectively acquiesced to this to maintain as broad as possible an alliance against Assad. In her 
memoirs, Clinton treats this development almost as if it were a fait accompli, but she writes that 
while the US was not willing to provide arms, ‘‘we also didn’t want to splinter the anti-Assad 
coalition or lose leverage with the Arab countries.’’ 841 There is also some evidence suggesting 
Western intelligence agencies, including MI6, played a role in facilitating arms supplies for the 
purpose of monitoring what was often a chaotic and disorderly operation.842 An obvious 
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consequence of all of this was an increase in the factionalism that greater engagement with the 
opposition was attempting to overcome. 
Conclusions 
 
In an interview with Rowan Williams in June 2011, the Foreign Secretary set out his philosophy 
that Britain must ‘‘temper idealism with pragmatism.’’843 There were clearly pragmatic 
elements to British policy, both in style and substance. There were calculated concessions to the 
need for diplomatic unity and the recognition of Britain’s lack of leverage during the early 
stages of the crisis, there was the occasional presentation of British policy in the traditional 
language of ‘‘pragmatism’’ familiar to previous Conservative foreign secretaries, and there was 
a clear and consistent preference for regional ownership. Above all, there was a cautious 
attitude toward arming the opposition and a willingness to pursue diplomatic, i.e. non-military 
options, until the point at which they had been exhausted. This might suggest affinities with the 
conservative pragmatic approach described in Chapter Two or, at the very least, it might be 
concluded that Britain’s Syria policy had a closer proximity to traditional liberal 
internationalism than the more hawkish variants of liberalism that have gained notoriety in the 
post-Cold War period. 
This chapter has cautioned against such conclusions. If British policy had elements of 
pragmatism or realism, then these more often existed at the tactical level. Britain’s broader 
strategy for Syria was driven first and foremost by a firm sense of moral conviction and less by 
a calculated assessment of British interests or a judicious evaluation of what was practicable. It 
is true that the diplomatic approach was often based on a more realistic assessment of Britain’s 
lack of leverage, but British objectives in Syria were almost identical to those in Libya. In both 
cases, the government pursued a policy of democratic regime change. The very fact that the 
government pursued this agenda in Syria without deploying military capabilities could just as 
                                                          




easily be interpreted as evidence of even greater idealism. The gap between ends and means 
made this a decidedly un-pragmatic and unrealistic policy. 
Furthermore, to the extent that elements of pragmatism were incorporated into British policy, 
the overall result was not an equidistant middle ground between the twin poles of idealism and 
realism, as the doctrine of liberal conservatism liked to suggest. Britain’s approach to the Syrian 
conflict was much more the product of the idealism of its architects than it might initially 
appear. The government framed the Syrian crisis as the final battleground of the Arab Spring, a 
battle between a ‘‘criminal’’ regime and a secular and democratic opposition. It publicly called 
for Assad to be removed from power and imposed strong sanctions against Syria, less because 
this was calculated to advance a specific objective, but more because it demonstrated that 
Britain was taking a principled stand against Assad’s repression. And it continued to insist on 
regime change and accountability to the detriment of unity in the Security Council and the 
prospects of Annan’s mediation efforts. While policymakers were sometimes accused of 
inconsistency for not intervening in Syria, the closer one looks the greater are the similarities 
with the Libyan case. 
What prevented the British government from not using force against Assad as it had done 
against Gaddafi was not so much a lack of leadership, an indifference toward suffering Syrians 
or a more conservative mindset. The primary reason the British government did not seriously 
consider deploying force was because the diplomatic constraints rendered debates about 
intervention largely academic. If these constraints had to be mediated through the perceptions of 
key decision-makers, they were sufficiently tangible that no amount of discursive or 
psychological gymnastics could wish them away. The Syrian conflict would demonstrate that, 
without the uniquely permissive diplomatic environment that greeted the self-styled protectors 
of Benghazi in March 2011, the geopolitical terrain of the contemporary Middle East is 
inhospitable to Britain’s ‘‘punching above our weight.’’ This is a reality that any British 
government, interventionist or not, would have to reckon with. Additionally, even if one were to 
dismiss the significance of such constraints, a minority coalition of the willing could not 
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intervene without US support. Decisions about intervention were therefore the preserve of 
Washington, a fact that was somehow lost on British lobbyists for the interventionist cause. 
While much of the research in this thesis has focused on the beliefs and attitudes of individuals 
within the government, this chapter has sought to give equal weight to those structural factors 




Chapter Six: Syria: Arming the Rebels? 
 
The previous chapter showed how diplomatic and practical constraints contained the 
interventionist impulses of the Coalition government in its desire to remove Bashar Assad from 
power in Syria. The diplomatic impasse at the UN led to a reappraisal of the existing approach 
in late 2012. This chapter details how this reappraisal led not a sober acceptance of the limits of 
British leverage, nor a retreat from a maximalist diplomatic position, but instead a more radical 
shift in favour of intervention via proxy. Beginning in late 2012, Britain stepped up the scale 
and nature of its support for the opposition and began preparing the ground for the provision of 
lethal military support. The momentum toward arming the opposition halted in July of 2013 in 
the context of growing opposition to the direction of British policy in Parliament, divisions 
within government and warnings from the military that the conflict was now too far advanced 
for British arms to make a difference. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to assess the strength of the government’s growing 
enthusiasm for arming Assad’s opponents, the motives behind this shift in policy and the 
reasons for its abandonment. The interpretation developed conceives of Cameron and Hague’s 
stalled attempt to arm the opposition as a form of liberal intervention, shaped by a continued 
sense of moral outrage with Assad, an abstract set of principles about the duties and obligations 
of the British state in such circumstances, and the need to symbolise this with some form of 
tangible action.  This chapter further argues that the effort to arm the Syrian rebels was 
abandoned, less because of the practical objections raised by senior military advisers as was 
reported at the time, but more because of domestic political constraints. This chapter shows 
how, in a lesser known instance of parliamentary activism, the House of Commons exercised a 
de facto veto over British Syria policy in July 2013, a mere six weeks before the more emphatic 
vote against military action in August.  
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The first part of this chapter traces the development of the government’s relationship with the 
Syrian opposition and its position on the EU arms embargo. It shows, firstly, how the nature of 
Britain’s engagement with the Syrian opposition changed and secondly, how Britain was the 
driving force behind efforts to amend and lift the EU’s arms embargo from late 2012 onwards. 
Despite ultimately succeeding in its ambition to lift the embargo, the government continued to 
insist that no decisions had been taken regarding whether to send military support to the rebels. 
This section argues that such claims were at best disingenuous and that from spring of 2013 at 
the latest, both Cameron and Hague favoured arming the rebels even if they had yet to make 
any formal decisions to this effect.  
The second section is the core of the chapter and it analyses the rationale and motivations 
behind the apparent enthusiasm for this intervention. This section outlines an interpretation that 
situates the growing move toward arming the opposition within some of the themes and ideas 
developed in previous chapters, showing how this interventionist streak is consistent with an 
idealistic framing of the conflict, an abstract set of prescriptions related to the question of 
intervention and an approach that prioritises an intuitive sense of right and wrong over more 
practical considerations. Furthermore, analogies with the Bosnian conflict of the 1990s, while 
less important than in the build up to the Libyan intervention, were a key feature of the Prime 
Minister’s thinking during this period and displaced the more cautionary tales that others had 
drawn from the experience of Iraq in the 2000s.  
The final briefer section examines why, having gone to such lengths to prepare the legal ground 
for arming the opposition, the government held back from exercising this option. The analysis 
in this section supports the conclusion that while there were many factors that discouraged the 
government from taking this step, it was the weight of domestic political opposition in 
Parliament that was most important in accounting for the backtracking. Not only was the scale 
of opposition in the Commons clear and overwhelming, it also acquired a formal edge. This 
section reveals how a backbench rebellion forced Cameron and Hague to reluctantly concede 
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Parliament’s right to vote ahead of any decision to supply arms, a concession that effectively 
paralysed the government’s ability to act.  
The evidence this chapter draws upon is largely taken from parliamentary debates and myriad 
official announcements made by the government during this period, including press releases, 
speeches and transcripts of media appearances. This chapter also draws upon the rolling 
inquiries of the FAC and the Liaison Committee. This provides a larger base of evidence than 
was available for the previous chapter. As the Syrian conflict rose up the international agenda in 
2013, and as the potential for British involvement became increasingly apparent, there was 
more detailed scrutiny of government policy. At the same time, using these sources to infer the 
motives behind policy is less straight forward, as the government’s rhetorical positioning had to 
take into consideration growing opposition to its policy both domestically and internationally.  
Lifting the Embargo  
 
In the weeks and months following the veto in July, Britain increased the level and nature of its 
engagement with the opposition. In August, following a pledge of a further £500,000 in 
practical assistance to the political opposition, Hague announced a commitment, ‘‘in principle,’’ 
to provide non-lethal assistance in the form of communications equipment and body armour.844 
By the end of the year, Britain had provided approximately £7 million of ‘‘practical’’ support to 
the opposition.845 The key focus of this effort was in assisting the opposition in providing basic 
services in areas under its control. Additionally, the agenda of ‘‘political transition’’ received 
greater focus and attention during this period and Hague made clear that continued increases in 
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British assistance were conditional on the development of ‘‘detailed plans’’ for a post-Assad 
Syria.846 
Coinciding with these changes were wider efforts to reorganize the ineffectual political 
opposition. Much of this activity was conducted through the ‘‘core group’’ of the Friends of 
Syria, a smaller grouping of eleven states, established at British initiative.847 The efforts of 
outside actors to shape the opposition, encouraged by Western governments but led by Turkey 
and the Gulf states, culminated in the creation of the National Coalition in November.848 Most 
independent analysts have concluded that the coalition continued to be beset by factionalism 
and the rival actions of its foreign sponsors, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, but the British 
government immediately celebrated is formation as a major breakthrough.849  
Britain therefore quickly followed France, Turkey and the Gulf states in offering diplomatic 
recognition to the National Coalition.850 If opposition disunity was previously pointed to as a 
constraint on possible action, the Coalition was celebrated as having resolved this problem, with 
Hague telling Parliament that ‘‘a credible alternative to the Assad regime is emerging that has 
the growing support of the Arab League, the European Union, the United States and an 
increasing number of other countries.’’851 In fact, the US initially held back from taking this 
step, reflecting concerns that the coalition had not overcome the problems that undermined its 
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predecessor.852 Britain and France hoped to persuade the European Union to offer diplomatic 
recognition at the following Foreign Affairs Council, but their efforts proved unsuccessful.853  
In addition to these graduated increases in support for the political opposition, this period also 
saw Britain establishing links with the Free Syrian Army for the first time. Having previously 
focused on engaging with the political opposition exclusively, Hague announced in September 
that he had instructed officials to begin liaising with the political leadership of the FSA outside 
of Syria.854 A month later, it was announced that contacts would now be extended to the group’s 
military leadership.855 This was a significant change in policy, as Britain was now liaising with 
armed groups involved in the fighting on the ground for the first time. While the modest scale 
of British support for the opposition should not be overstated, there was therefore a qualitative 
and quantitative change in this area in the months following the collapse of the Annan plan. The 
NSC also held a series of important meetings in November, during which the full range of 
policy options were discussed.856 We cannot know the details of these discussions, but Seldon 
and Snowdon have cited them as the basis of a change of approach.857 According to their 
account, the Prime Minister expressed his growing frustration with the rising death toll and at 
an NSC meeting on 14 November he made clear he wanted ‘‘movement’’ on Syria.858 The 
subsequent trajectory of British policy, which from December onwards purposively set about 
altering and then removing the EU’s arms embargo, is consistent with this interpretation.  
The first public indications that Britain was considering revisiting the question of arming the 
opposition were in December. British diplomats quietly modified the renewal period for the 
sanctions package, introducing quarterly reviews, before announcing the government would be 
making ‘‘fresh arguments’’ in favour of amending the embargo before the renewal deadline in 
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March.859 During the European Council meeting on 13-14 December, member states, under 
pressure from London and Paris, mandated the Foreign Affairs Council to ‘‘work on all options 
to support and help the opposition and to enable greater support for the protection of 
civilians.’’860 
The language used by the British Prime Minister was far more forceful. In the press conference 
following the adoption of these Conclusions, Cameron sought to build momentum in favour of 
a more interventionist approach, declaring that, ‘‘I want a very clear message to go to President 
Assad that nothing is off the table.  That further support, further work, further help with the 
Opposition who are now better formed, better organised, better coordinated, is robustly on the 
table.’’861 While it was not explicit what options were being considered, the emphasis on 
Britain’s ‘‘good relations with the opposition,’’ when coupled with the threat against Assad, 
clearly hinted toward the possibility of providing arms.862 When Miliband subsequently 
questioned whether Cameron was considering lifting the embargo altogether, as opposed to 
merely amending it to allow for greater practical assistance, Cameron responded by pointing out 
that ‘‘we will be keeping the arms embargo on the regime,’’ a response which clearly implied 
anything else was open to revision.863 
From this point onwards, the official position of the British government on the question of the 
arms embargo was the prisoner of deliberate obfuscation. The clearest statement of this position 
was provided by Alistair Burt, during a Backbencher Debate on EU sanctions on 21 May 2013:  
 
I want to make this Government’s position clear: no decision on arming the Syrian opposition 
has been taken. Amending the embargo on opposition forces would not mean that we would 
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automatically and immediately begin arming them, although we cannot rule that out in the 
future; but even without acting on it, providing an exemption from the current arms embargo for 
opposition forces would send a powerful and timely signal to both sides.864 
 
This was arguably the British position from as early as January 2013. On 14 January, long 
before there was any explicit talk of lifting the embargo in public, a junior defence minister 
stated in Parliament that, ‘‘the United Kingdom would like greater flexibility in the embargo on 
Syria, so that at some point in the future, possibly, we can supply the opposition groups that we 
are comfortable with the means to deal with the situation; but there are no plans to do so at the 
moment and we will keep the situation under review.’’865 
 
In most instances, Cameron and Hague preferred to couch their position in far more inscrutable 
language. It was simply easier to make vague arguments about ‘‘amending’’ the embargo, or 
providing ‘‘technical assistance,’’ than it was to talk openly about lifting it; it was more 
expedient to cite the need for ‘‘flexibility’’ in response to a changing situation than it was to 
explicitly favour a controversial intervention.  Above all, it was certainly convenient to 
repeatedly claim that the government had made ‘‘no decisions’’ about whether or not to send 
arms to Assad’s opponents.866 Between December of 2012 and June of 2013, Britain therefore 
removed all of the legal obstacles in the path of arming the opposition and ministers repeatedly 
made abstract arguments about the potential benefits or necessities of taking this approach, all 
the while avoiding explicitly committing themselves to an outcome that, to contemporary 
observers, appeared increasingly inevitable by spring of 2013. 
 
Part of the reason for this orchestrated equivocation was that even amending the embargo to 
permit the provision of ‘‘non-lethal’’ military assistance presented a diplomatic challenge. 
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Aside from France and Italy, most member states were opposed to changing the status quo. 
Opposition to British policy at the February Foreign Affairs Council was led by Germany, 
Sweden and EU Foreign Policy chief, Baroness Ashton.867 Britain’s determination to secure 
amendments was clear from the willingness to allow the entire sanctions package to collapse if 
EU states were not willing to assent to changes, with UK officials having quickly drawn up 
legislation to prepare for such contingencies.868 Member states reached a compromise solution, 
allowing the UK and France to provide ‘‘non-lethal’’ military assistance to the opposition under 
a specific exemption and for the purpose of ‘‘protecting civilians,’’ while maintaining the 
embargo in place.869 Some contemporary press reporting hinted that the British intention had 
been to lift the embargo in full.870 Hague’s denials were undermined by his pointedly describing 
the outcome as a ‘‘compromise,’’ a description which left unanswered the question as to what 
further amendments could be sought without effectively lifting the embargo entirely.  
 
Regardless of whether Britain was already seeking to lift the embargo, or whether the 
government was only looking to alter its terms, the amendments paved the way for increases in 
assistance to the rebels. On 6 March, Hague announced that the UK would provide £3 million in 
practical support for the coming month, and a further £10 million thereafter.871 The total UK 
contribution, it was claimed, would therefore run to $20 million, on top of the $60 million in aid 
that US Secretary of State John Kerry had pledged at the last Friends of Syria meeting in Rome 
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at the end of February.872 The UK had provided a total of £9.4 million in practical assistance up 
until this stage, so such a shift represented a significant increase in relative terms. Furthermore, 
the amendments now permitted the UK to provide non-lethal military equipment, including 
body armour and armoured jeeps, as well as training in providing security in areas under 
opposition control. Hague subsequently informed the House of the details of a ‘‘gift’’ to the 
Syrian opposition, which included, among other things, 25 trucks and 20 sets of body armour.873 
 
More significantly, the adoption of these amendments was immediately followed by efforts to 
build diplomatic and political momentum in favour of further changes. Having declared the 
existing arrangements to be a ‘‘compromise,’’ Hague announced in his first statement to the 
House following their adoption that ‘‘the policy is clear, and above all I want to make it clear 
that its direction is clear: we must be prepared to do more in a situation of such slaughter and 
suffering, and a more static policy would not measure up to the gravity of the situation.’’874 This 
direction was further reinforced on 15 March, when Cameron joined his French counterpart 
François Hollande in calling for further amendments to the embargo during a press conference 
in Brussels.875 It was not until April, following weeks of ambiguity, that Hague acknowledged 
publicly that further amendments would mean lifting the embargo. In a statement following the 
G8 foreign ministers’ meeting, the Foreign Secretary announced that Britain and France would 
approach the next renewal period seeking further amendments to the embargo, ‘‘or even to lift it 
all together.’’876 
 
Lifting the embargo amounted to a decisive break with the multilateralism that had been a 
central part of the British strategy outlined in the previous chapter. In what was subsequently 
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described by the Chairman of the FAC as a ‘‘bold unilateral statement,’’ the Foreign Secretary 
announced that Britain would be willing to take ‘‘domestic measures’’ where further 
amendments could not be secured.877 As explained in a House of Commons Library Briefing 
Paper, this ‘‘could be taken as a veiled threat that unless the sanctions regime accords with UK 
views, the UK could veto the next extension.’’878 The Prime Minister reiterated this boldness in 
Brussels, declaring that, ‘‘Britain is a sovereign country; we have our own foreign security and 
defence policies. If we want to take individual action, we think that’s in our national interest, of 
course we’re free to do so.’’ 879 
 
This set the stage for a major diplomatic showdown at the Foreign Affairs Council in May. 
Aside from leaving the existing measures in place, the EU’s foreign ministers could either 
support an Anglo-French proposal to lift the embargo while maintaining sanctions, or else adopt 
the ‘‘compromise’’ supported by 25 states, including those who were strongly opposed to 
arming the opposition.880 This compromise would have further relaxed the embargo, either 
providing a specific list of those items allowed, or a list of those blacklisted. However, this 
move would have been delayed until August, and would have required a further consensus vote 
before becoming operational, meaning any member state could veto it. In talks that lasted 14 
hours, Hague led the way in obstructing the consensus, and in a show of brinkmanship he used 
the threat of a British veto to force EU foreign ministers to accept an immediate lifting of the 
embargo.881 The Conclusions stated that EU states had agreed not to proceed with arms 
transfers immediately and that the position would be renewed again in August, but future 
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decisions had been returned to the national level.882 Although the British government continued 
to rule out making any final decisions, it could now credibly threaten to do so in future.883 In 
short, the outcome paved the way for Britain to begin sending lethal military assistance. 
The idea that Britain desired these changes to the embargo purely for the purposes of keeping 
the options open or to send a ‘‘signal’’ to Assad, as was often claimed at the time, is simply not 
plausible. As the following section demonstrates, the government made many forceful 
arguments in favour of arming the opposition and even when not explicitly championing this 
position, the logic inherent in much official rhetoric generally precluded any alternative. More 
significantly though, that the government was determined to overcome the significant legal and 
diplomatic obstacles described above is quite revealing. If exploring the options was the only 
agenda, this was an excessive and unrealistic price to pay.  When one adds to the diplomatic 
and legal obstacles the domestic political ones that are described in the third section of this 
chapter, the lengths that Cameron and Hague were willing to go to in order to lift the embargo 
leads to the conclusion that both were, even without having made any final decisions, strongly 
in favour of arming the insurgency.  In fact, British officials have since admitted that in their 
belief, the intention behind lifting the embargo was to arm the opposition.884 In both word and 
deed, British policy was clearly headed in this direction from March 2013 at the very latest.  
 
British policy made this shift despite no fundamental change of approach from the US. The 
previous chapter described briefly how Obama had a more cautious view of the Syrian conflict 
and rejected proposals, from Petraeus and Clinton, to provide military assistance to the 
opposition in the summer of 2012. There were many within the US administration supportive of 
a more interventionist approach, including key advisors such Ben Rhodes and Samantha Power 
and, perhaps to a lesser extent, John Kerry, who succeeded Clinton as Secretary of State in 
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February 2013.885  The deterioration in the conflict, in addition to the subsequent problems 
experienced in Libya, merely reinforced their President’s caution.886 Rhodes describes in his 
memoir how he presented Obama with an opportunity to meet a handful of journalists who had 
visited Syria, hoping that the encounter and the description of the worsening situation would 
win the President over toward a more interventionist policy, before realising that, ‘‘where I 
heard a call to action, Obama had heard a cautionary tale.’’887 This would mirror the approach 
subsequently taken by many Conservative backbenchers, as later described in this chapter. As a 
consequence of the White House’s unwillingness to get involved in the Syrian conflict, the US 
did not follow Britain in sending non-lethal military equipment to the opposition in Spring, 
focusing instead on increases in food and medical aid.888 When Obama belatedly decided to 
provide limited military aid to the rebels in June, he did so solely in response to growing 
evidence that Assad’s forces were using chemical weapons, an issue that he viewed in isolation 
from the wider conflict.889 Obama, as Ryan Lizza described, was a ‘‘consequentialist.’’890 In 
fact, his approach to foreign policy, while drawing upon different antecedents, had much in 
common with the conservative-pragmatism described in Chapter Two.  
An Interventionist Logic  
 
The worsening of the violence in Syria was a necessary if insufficient reason for a change in 
British policy. During this period, Assad’s forces increased their resort to the use of heavy 
weapons such as barrel bombs and by mid-2013 Western intelligence agencies were also 
                                                          
885 Rhodes, World As It Is; Ch. 16; John Kerry, Every Day Is Extra (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2018), Kindle, Ch. 19. 
886 US diplomat Christopher Stephen was assassinated in Benghazi in September 2012. 
887 Rhodes, World As It Is, Ch. 16. 
888 Jay Solomon, ‘‘US to Provide Food, Medicine to Syrian Fighters,’’ The Wall Street Journal, 28 
February 2013. 
889 This is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
890 Ryan Lizza, ‘‘The Consequentialist; How The Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy,’’ The 
New Yorker, 26 April 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist 
223 
 
alleging the regime was using chemical weapons on a small scale.891 Regime forces continued 
to benefit from Iranian support and the intervention of Hezbollah, unforeseen by Western 
governments, made a significant difference on the ground.892 On the other side, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey increased their poorly coordinated support for the opposition groups, further 
fuelling the conflagration. Within the opposition, the strength of extremist groups increased, 
laying the ground for the subsequent emergence of ISIS.893 All sides increasingly succumbed to 
a sectarian narrative, raising the prospect of large scale massacres and further undermining the 
possibility of a political solution. Different actors and commentators interpreted these 
developments in different ways, but from the perspective of the British government the 
worsening situation both intensified the moral fury with Assad and magnified the shortcomings 
of the existing diplomacy-first strategy.     
The government did not fundamentally revise its view of the conflict, despite the developments 
listed above. As some commentators and politicians began to speak of an ‘‘Arab winter,’’ the 
British government launched a concerted effort to reinforce its preferred narrative. It was with 
this objective in mind that Cameron spoke before the UN in September 2012 and warned his 
audience against drawing the wrong conclusions from Syria. Acknowledging the situation did 
present ‘‘profound challenges,’’ Cameron would insist that ‘‘those who look at Syria today and 
blame the Arab Spring have got it the wrong way round. You can not blame the people for the 
behaviour of a brutal dictator.’’894 These sentiments maintained the propensity for fusing moral 
judgement with an analysis of the situation.  
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The lens within which the British government viewed the Syrian conflict remained based on an 
idealistic celebration of the Arab Spring and a Manichean view of the conflict. Ministers sought 
to counter the claims of those who forecast an ‘‘Arab winter’’ by reiterating the faith in the 
march of democratic progress. As Burt asserted in a speech celebrating the Foreign Office’s 
Arab Partnership, the current violence in Syria was ‘‘not the destination of the Arab Spring’’ 
and Hague and others continued to stick to the previous line that the Arab Spring was a 
‘‘grievous blow’’ to Al Qaeda which ‘‘contained the seeds of their irrelevance,’’ even as 
growing evidence of extremism within the opposition began to emerge.895 As the Foreign 
Secretary warned on a separate occasion, ‘‘we must bear in mind that it suits the Syrian 
regime’s narrative to portray the opposition as a collection of extremist groups, whereas, as I 
pointed out earlier, the vast majority of them are not.’’896 Although there were instances where 
Hague and Burt offered a more nuanced view of the conflict, it remains the case that the 
interpretive frame adopted in spring of 2011 was, at a fundamental level, impervious to 
revision. As the Foreign Secretary continued to argue, we ‘‘cannot revert to arrogant or 
outdated views.’’897  
In Syria, however, the failure of British policy to assist in the fulfilment of the idealistic 
promise of the Arab Spring was becoming increasingly clear. The shift in favour of arming the 
opposition was in part a reaction to the failures of this policy. When Hague began pledging 
increased support for the opposition in August, he linked this to a belated acceptance that 
Britain’s diplomatic efforts had largely failed to remove Assad from power and facilitate the 
transition that British policy desired.898 As the government edged closer toward lifting the 
embargo in March, the Foreign Secretary countered the sceptics by pointing out that the search 
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for a diplomatic solution ‘‘has not worked for the previous two years,’’ adding that, ‘‘that being 
the case, it is not adequate to watch slaughter on this scale and say we will stick our heads in the 
sand about it. It is important to have a foreign policy that relieves human suffering and upholds 
human rights.’’899  
The existing approach therefore came to be seen not simply as a policy failure, but as a moral 
failure too. Cameron spoke in similar terms when he sought to overcome parliamentary 
scepticism by arguing that, ‘‘it is worth recalling—we should all recall it—the fact that current 
policies are not working for the people of Syria. Seventy thousand people are dead and this 
hateful regime is still in place.’’900 Those who opposed the apparent direction of policy were 
seen as favouring ‘‘inaction’’ or ‘‘doing nothing,’’ suggesting that the existing strategy was not 
the inevitable consequences of Britain’s paltry influence over the conflict, but an approach 
which, if continued, was tantamount to a betrayal of its growing victims. Stark reminders of the 
inadequacy of efforts to forge a diplomatic solution therefore paved the way for a change of 
approach, without automatically determining the content of that change.  
 
What did determine the content of that change was the perception of the alternatives. The 
government, and Cameron in particular, saw any softening of the position on Assad as morally 
unconscionable. Retaining the pattern of blurring the distinction between what would happen 
and what ought to happen, Cameron had reacted to the Russian veto in July by continuing to 
argue that, ‘‘the regime has done some truly dreadful things to its own people. I do not think 
any regime that carries out acts, as they have, against their own citizens and continues to do so 
by the way, should survive; I think that regime should go.’’901  The subsequent acceptance that 
the diplomatic approach had failed did not lead to any change in this position. In November, 
Cameron revealed, ‘‘when you watch the television now and you see helicopters, aeroplanes, 
bombing from the air whole districts of whole towns and cities, you know that Bashar Assad 
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cannot possibly stay running his country.  There are no circumstances in which he could be part 
of a transition for a peaceful Syria.  So he has to go.’’902  Policy was therefore hostage to an 
overriding sense of moral outrage. When the Prime Minister was ultimately frustrated by his 
political opponents in June of 2013, he criticised the Labour Party, not so much for failing to 
appreciate the wisdom of his policy, but for failing to share his contempt for Assad.903 Refusing 
to withdraw this accusation, Cameron reiterated that ‘‘the point I was making was simply that, 
whenever we talk about these issues, we should put out there, front and centre, how much we 
abhor this form of dictatorship, brutalisation and use of chemical weapons. It cannot be said 
often enough and it needs to be said by everybody, all the time.’’904 This reflected the tendency 
for British policy to be a statement just as much as it was a solution tailored to a specific 
objective.  
 
There were rare hints of a softening of this stance. In some instances, ministers adopted 
language which subtly shifted the presentation from insisting upon Assad’s departure as a moral 
necessity, toward the softer claim that the calls for regime change simply reflected their 
‘‘view’’ as to what was necessary and appropriate.905 For example, in May Hague reaffirmed  
the British position that the Geneva communiqué ruled out the possibility of Assad participating 
in a transitional government, by stating that, ‘‘my view, like Secretary Kerry’s, is that Assad 
should have left long ago in order to save lives in his own country.’’906 Yet such indications, 
always shrouded in equivocation, were quickly contradicted by hawkish recalcitrance. Hague 
shared the same moral compass as Cameron.  For example, when Peter Hain MP, a rare critic of 
Syria policy throughout 2012, challenged the Foreign Secretary to retreat from the insistence 
that Assad depart power, he responded by asserting that, ‘‘if he wants us to make a further 
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compromise with forces who have killed indiscriminately and oppressed the people of their 
country with appalling human rights violations, I can tell him that that we are unable to do 
so.’’907  
 
All of this meant that the British policy was constrained within the parameters of what Cameron 
and Hague took to be morally and politically acceptable, a situation that did not allow for much 
manoeuvrability. Cameron had set the stage for this in his Brussels press conference in 
December 2012, when he informed Europe’s press that ‘‘people will ask in future years and 
generations, ‘What did you do?  What action did you take in order to help deal with this 
situation?  In order to help deal with this situation?  In order to help bring about a transition?  In 
order to help get rid of President Assad?’  There is no single simple answer but inaction and 
indifference are not options.’’908 By treating the need for Assad’s removal as axiomatic and 
construing the existing approach as ‘‘inaction and indifference,’’ the government had 
effectively rendered arming the opposition as the only remaining option.  
 
This process of reasoning, which relied just as much on a discrediting of the alternatives as it 
did on any positive argument in favour of increasing support for the opposition, was an element 
of continuity with the Libyan intervention. The government’s framing of the options would 
consistently suggest any form of action was preferable to ‘‘inaction,’’ a default setting which 
showed an innate preference for a more interventionist approach. In most instances, as the 
political context ruled out openly championing arming the rebels, Hague and Burt sought to 
paint the impression that not intervening was, at best, no less risky than the alternative, with the 
latter referring to the film Argo and succinctly concluding, ‘‘there are no good choices, there are 
only bad choices.’’909 On other occasions, the suspicion that ‘‘inaction’’ made its advocates 
culpable for the killings that were taking place was more explicit. By June Cameron was 
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publicly arguing that, ‘‘with 80,000 killed, 5 million fled from their homes, rising extremism 
and major regional instability, those who argue for inaction must realise that it has its 
consequences too.’’910   
 
Another principle that formed a central part of the argument for a change of direction was a 
vague sense of proportionality. The refusal to rule out any options, including the prospect of 
full-scale military intervention, could be justified as a prudent approach to retaining flexibility 
but it was primarily a position that symbolized an evaluative assessment of the severity of the 
situation. As Hague explained in January, ‘‘yes, I am not ruling out options, but I do not think 
we can do so when we are facing a situation where a six-figure number of people might die this 
year.’’911 The most salient and recurring theme in the Foreign Secretary’s rhetoric was the 
appeal that ‘‘we must be prepared to do more in a situation of such slaughter and suffering, and 
a more static policy would not measure up to the gravity of the situation.’’ 912 The consideration 
of more drastic and high-risk options was presented as self-evidently appropriate in the context 
of the rising death toll.  
 
Alongside the need to match British policy with ‘‘the gravity of the situation,’’ it was equally 
important that such a policy been seen as supporting the ‘‘right side.’’ In September, Hague 
declared at the ‘‘core group’’ of the Friends of Syria that, “the Syrian people have lost enough 
in lives, blood and suffering. It is down to us not to let them lose all hope too. They need to 
know that even when some countries still side with their oppressors, the vast majority of the 
world will stand with them and will support a peaceful and free future for the Syrian people.’’913 
Having warned that drawing attention to extremism would hand a propaganda victory to Assad, 
Cameron sought to rally support in the Commons by insisting that, ‘‘we should stand for 
something else in the House and in this country—we should stand up for people who want 
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democracy, freedom and the sorts of things we take for granted right here.’’914 Burt was more 
nuanced in his assessment of the situation and more willing to acknowledge the arguments on 
both sides, but even he insisted that ‘‘there are millions of Syrians who want a peaceful and 
democratic future, and legitimate forces are fighting for their interests. We should be on their 
side.’’915 There was no suggestion of playing the role of honest broker in search of a practicable 
peace deal. Instead, ministers took for granted the importance of British policy symbolising an 
ideological solidarity with the right side in this conflict.  
Memories of Bosnia, while less prominent in official thinking than they were on the eve of the 
Libyan intervention, were another relevant factor. In March, Cameron began comparing the 
sceptics in Europe with those who had stood in the way of providing greater support for the 
Bosnian government in the 1990s.916 By June, he made the same argument more explicitly, 
suggesting that, ‘‘those who argue against amending the arms embargo and doing more to 
support the opposition are making some of the same arguments used in the Bosnian conflict 20 
years ago. We were told then, as we are now, that taking action would have bad consequences, 
but not taking action is a decision too, and in Bosnia it led to the slaughter of up to 200,000 
people and did not stop the growth of extremism and radicalisation, but increased it.’’917 
If Bosnia compounded the arguments about inaction and moral responsibility, so too did 
Cameron and Hague’s understanding of Britain’s identity as an international actor. Both drew 
upon a narrative which encouraged an inflated sense of Britain’s influence and importance and 
injected Britain’s role in the world with a strong sense of moral purpose. They were fond of 
retelling the past glories of British history and foreign policy, with the Foreign Secretary having 
an especial interest in the slave trade.918 The confrontation with Assad would fit within a well-
worn story. As Cameron declared in his speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in November, 
‘‘we spoke up for the Arab Spring, led international action to support the Libyan people in 
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getting rid of Gaddafi, stepped up the EU sanctions on Iran and are at the forefront of efforts to 
isolate Assad in Syria.’’919 Britain, as always, was both an international leader and a force for 
good. Viewed through the lens of this vision of Britain’s role in the world, the Syrian conflict 
implicated British prestige and moral standing. This was apparent in the way in which the 
conflict’s deterioration was presented as taking place ‘‘on our watch,’’ a position which subtly 
took for granted the notion that Britain was something more than a marginal outside actor in 
this affair.920 In April, as the government was clearly heading toward providing arms, Hague 
pledged that, ‘if no peaceful settlement is possible, the world will have to find other means of 
confronting Assad’s aggression and be ready to do more to support the opposition and save 
lives, and we are determined that Britain will not be found wanting.’’921  Having previously 
acknowledged the limited influence Britain had, policymakers began promising more at the 
very same time that the existing leverage was largely spent.  
 
There was too a strategic case for greater British involvement. Of course, nobody could deny 
that the growing scale of the conflict, its potential challenge to regional stability and the 
increasing presence of Islamist extremists all impacted British interests in some way. If Burt 
could not persuade the doubters in Parliament, he could at least remind them that, ‘‘whatever is 
done—whatever decision is taken—nobody in this House can escape the fact that there is 
British interest in Syria. Accordingly, our main interest is in closing this down and ending the 
conflict. This is not a plea from me to arm; I am saying that unless the conflict is ended, British 
interests will continue to be further damaged.’’922 Much like Libya however, the presence of 
these interests did not easily translate into any particular set of policies.  
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Cameron and Hague clearly did see a national interest in supporting the Syrian opposition, but 
this judgement was primarily a by-product of the arguments already described, rather than a 
central driver of decision-making. Responding to the growing signs of extremism, Cameron 
suggested that, ‘‘the argument we must engage in is this: are we more likely to help the good 
elements of the opposition by standing back, or are we more likely to help by getting in there 
and shaping and giving that technical assistance, so that we can play a part in building up the 
Syrian opposition, so that they are a legitimate and credible alternative to this hateful 
regime?’’923 Of course, the very same set of circumstances led others, including President 
Obama, to draw the opposite conclusion to the one that the British Prime Minister clearly 
favoured.  
 
Yet regardless of how Cameron and others defined Britain’s national interest in this particular 
instance, the construction of policy derived more from an intuitive sense of what was morally 
right than a calculation as to how Britain’s humanitarian objectives could best be advanced.  
Illustrative of this pattern of thinking was Hague’s earnest appeal that: 
 
 We will all have to weigh heavily all the different sides of the argument, but we must bear it in 
mind that, as things stand, people who have done nothing wrong—except to want dignity for 
their country and freedom for themselves—are being butchered. We must bear in mind what 
that does to their political opinions and whether that is acceptable, to us in the western world or 
to any part of the world. We will have to make our choice about that.924 
 
Cameron appears to have taken a growing personal interest in the conflict and became 
increasingly determined that something had to be done. Senior figures within the government at 
the time noted the parallels with Tony Blair and in the media there was speculation that 
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Samantha was urging her husband to do more to resolve the humanitarian situation.925 Insider 
accounts describe Cameron as increasingly obsessed with Syria during this period. D’Ancona 
refers to it as something that ‘‘verged on a fixation’’ and quotes an unnamed aide as saying, in 
the spring of 2013, that Cameron ‘‘talks about it all the time.’’926 Although there is less 
anecdotal evidence available concerning the Foreign Secretary’s private thinking, it seems 
sensible to conclude that he was an equal party in the drive to arm the opposition and that he too 
was driven primarily by his personal convictions. Goodman’s account, which is in part based on 
an interview with Hague, suggests that in contrast to some of the sources cited above, the shift 
in approach originated with Hague and the Foreign Office.  Goodman describes Hague as, ‘‘a 
driving force behind UK foreign policy in a way that many of his predecessors were not.’’927 
Hague viewed the choice confronting them as a ‘‘very important foreign policy and moral 
choice’’928 and he was consistent in the heavy emphasis he placed on this moral dimension and 
on his passionate support for the Syrian opposition. Contemporary press reports suggest Hague 
was slightly more concerned about some of the practical issues than Cameron, but was ‘‘fully 
supportive’’ of the Prime Minister’s growing determination to provide arms and felt that peace 
talks were ‘‘doomed to fail.’’929 Hague stepped down from government in 2015, apparently 
inspired by Angelina Jolie, to continue his quest to confront the issue of sexual violence in 
conflict, an issue he had first been able to pursue in relation to the Syrian conflict in 2012.930 
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Despite the apparent sincerity of the commitment to saving the Syrian revolution, it is difficult 
to believe that ministers were genuinely convinced of the practical benefits of inserting more 
arms into the conflict. Burt recalls that in 2013 the FCO shifted its view on this issue in 
response to the growing use of heavy weapons by regime forces.931 It is unclear why the 
previous cautiousness was revised, given the provision of small arms would do little to counter 
the increased threat. In February 2013, at the very time that Britain was moving more openly in 
the direction of arming the rebels, the Telegraph quoted what it described as a ‘‘confidential 
options paper’’ as warning supplying the opposition in this way ‘‘could also fuel further 
militarisation of the conflict, increase risks of dissemination among extremist groups and of 
arms proliferation in a post-Assad Syria. It could trigger an escalation in arms supplies and 
further involvement in the conflict by external supporters of the Assad regime.’’932 It was these 
kind of arguments that made members of Parliament on both sides of the political divide 
reluctant to endorse further British involvement. There was also little reason for revising the 
previous assumption that opposition disunity was a barrier to a more interventionist strategy. 
Although the National Coalition was initially celebrated as a ‘‘credible alternative,’’ such a 
conclusion was premature. It seems more likely that the British government embraced a sub-
optimal outcome because a more genuine united opposition organization was simply not 
possible. This was suggested in Hague’s admission that, ‘‘I do not think that we shall see a 
better attempt to create an umbrella opposition group, and I think that we should therefore get 
behind this one.’’933  
 
The main rationalization for arming the opposition was that such a move would convince Assad 
that a military victory was unobtainable, thereby paving the way for some form of transition. 
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Cameron persistently made the case that ‘‘Assad is most likely to change his view and accept a 
transition if he believes that he cannot win militarily.’’934 The government even suggested that 
merely lifting the embargo, without actively taking advantage of this change, would alter the 
calculations in Damascus. In a debate on EU Sanctions policy in May, Burt asserted that ‘‘even 
without acting on it, providing an exemption from the current arms embargo for opposition 
forces would send a powerful and timely signal to both sides.’’935 A related argument was the 
claim that providing arms could alter the balance of power on the ground, an objective 
embraced by the ‘‘core group’ ‘of the Friends of Syria. In a joint statement in April, the eleven 
participating states formally announced that ‘‘the ministers recalled that in the Rome meeting 
they underlined the right to self defense of the Syrian people and the need to change the balance 
of power on the ground.’’936 This provocative diplomatic statement was not widely advertised 
by ministers at the time, but by June the Prime Minister himself was making similar arguments, 
suggesting that Britain should ‘‘help tip the balance that way’’ to increase the prospects of 
‘‘political transition.’’937 
 
These arguments make little sense in the context of British Syria policy, even if they sound 
plausible when viewed in isolation. The actions of Turkey and the Gulf states were simply 
exacerbating the divisions within the opposition and weapons were quickly coming into the 
possession of extremist groups. These developments could force a stalemate but they were 
hardly consistent with the aim of civilian protection, still less that of democratic transition. 
Although British support was more carefully targeted toward favoured recipients, arming more 
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‘‘moderate’’ or ‘‘secular’’ forces would merely prolong the conflict by keeping these groups in 
the fight while failing to deliver a decisive victory. This argument was made by General 
Richards, who felt that any move which threatened to prolong the conflict without bringing it to 
a decisive termination might be, as warned the Attorney General in the summer of 2013,  
‘‘inimical to our humanitarian purpose.’’938 We know from contemporary media reports that the 
British military warned Cameron of this fact in June 2013, but there is no reason to suspect that 
the politicians were completely ignorant of this reality until such a late stage.939 The assertion 
that simply lifting the embargo would send a powerful signal was even less convincing. 
Without US support, such signalling would be largely symbolic. The lifting of the embargo 
simply had precisely the impact that the sceptics had warned, with Russia immediately 
responding with a fresh shipment of hardware to Assad. 940 Cameron’s disingenuous response to 
this development was to suggest that as Moscow had consistently supported the regime, there 
was no causal connection between the lifting of the embargo and an act that was clearly 
intended to warn Britain away from increasing its involvement.941  
 
The government also made the case that arming the National Coalition could alter the balance 
of forces within the opposition. As described above, this was part of the national interest case 
for action. Hague argued that ‘‘giving our assistance to moderate forces and not to extremist 
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forces is … one way in which we can try to shape the situation in a more sensible direction.’’942 
As the threat of extremism increased, ministers claimed that British support for the ‘‘moderate’’ 
opposition ‘‘could help boost their appeal and effectiveness relative to extremist groups.’’943  
This proposal did not take into consideration the obvious fact that the distinction between 
‘‘moderate’’ and ‘‘extremist’’ was far blurrier than the rhetoric of the British government 
suggested.944 Furthermore, the multiple fighting groups had fluid alliances and ‘‘moderates’’ 
often fought alongside ‘‘extremists’’ in shifting ad hoc alliances.945 Hague insisted that Britain 
would only provide arms ‘‘under carefully controlled circumstances,’’ while ruling out 
clarifying these criteria with appeal to the mantra that ‘‘no decisions have been taken.’’946 Both 
he and Burt were forced to concede to their backbenchers that ultimately, the British 
government could not provide any guarantees that their fears would not be realised. Instead, 
Burt pointed out, ‘‘I can give a categorical assurance that it is not the intention of the United 
Kingdom,’’  an admission that suggested noble intentions mattered at least as much as practical 
outcomes.947 
 
It would be surprising if the intelligence being received was not warning of these dangers, but 
in their public statements ministers appeared to rely heavily the politically motivated assurances 
provided by their favoured opposition leaders.  Hague made clear that ‘‘given the chaotic 
situation in Syria, it is not possible to quantify accurately the number of extremist, or al-Qaeda 
supporting, fighters in Syria.’’948 Yet this recognition did not preclude his persistent view that 
they represented only a minority, despite the only concrete evidence offered to support this 
assertion being the promises he had received from the leadership of the National Coalition. He 
therefore went on to add that ‘‘in the opinion of opposition leaders, they represent a small 
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minority of what is perhaps a six-figure number of opposition fighters.’’949 While 
acknowledging the difficulties, the Foreign Secretary generally favoured this assessment, 
claiming that ‘‘acquaintance with the leading figures of the National Coalition corroborates that 
view.’’950 
 
The relationship between threats to arm the opposition and prospects of a fresh attempt at a 
diplomatic breakthrough was another area of contention. The lifting of the arms embargo 
coincided with a diplomatic initiative, which culminated in a second conference in Geneva in 
January 2014. The initial impetus for this conference began following a meeting between US 
Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in May 2013.951 
According to Seldon and Snowdon’s account, British efforts to play an important role in these 
discussions were cut short by Kerry’s unwillingness to reveal the detail of his discussions with 
the Russians.952 Preparations for Geneva II would remain stalled for months, but the timing of 
this development naturally led to questions about the relationship between arming the rebels 
and the potential success of this diplomatic conference. When Hague informed Parliament of 
the details of this development, he therefore insisted that ‘‘we must make it clear that if the 
regime does not negotiate seriously at the Geneva conference, no option is off the table.’’953 It 
was also suggested that the future prospect of British arms could be used to incentivise the 
opposition to participate, with Burt claiming that ‘‘it would tell moderate opposition forces and 
politicians not to lose faith in their fight against oppression or against the extremists who are 
seeking to capitalise on the continued instability.’’954 When some members of Parliament began 
to shift in favour of greater flexibility in Britain’s diplomatic position, arguing that this would 
increase the chance of success in Geneva, Cameron simply dodged the difficult questions by 
repeating his insistence Assad was more likely to comply if he was convinced of the 
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impossibility of military victory.955 It was entirely coincidental that British moves to arm the 
rebels occurred at the very time that Kerry’s diplomatic opening was made. Britain had little 
choice but to publicly argue that its policy was consistent with plans for Geneva II yet just 
weeks before Cameron and Hague had been justifying their search for amendments to the 
embargo on the basis that the search for a diplomatic solution had largely failed.956   
The First Syria Veto  
 
In the end, the government failed to actively take the step of arming the opposition, despite the 
political and diplomatic build-up described above. Broadly, there are two plausible reasons that 
the policy was abandoned and neither should be viewed as mutually exclusive. Firstly, Cameron 
and Hague might have finally succumbed to arguments concerning the limited practical and 
military value of such a policy. This is consistent with contemporary press reports, which 
suggest a decision was made to step back from arming the rebels on advice from the British 
military. Secondly, domestic political opposition and divisions within government would have 
also been a factor in any potential decision. Other members of the Cabinet did not necessarily 
share Cameron and Hague’s enthusiasm for greater British involvement in the conflict and in 
Parliament there was strong opposition both from the Labour Party and from Conservative 
backbenchers.  
According to a report in the Telegraph on 15 July, Downing Street ‘‘confirmed’’ that Cameron 
had ruled out providing arms, ‘‘on advice from the British military.’’957 It was claimed that 
military chiefs in the NSC had argued that ‘‘the conflict was now too advanced for basic 
weapons supplies to make much difference.’’958 Yet if military utility was an argument against 
providing arms, this was surely the case prior to July 2013. Richards’ opposition to the 
government’s approach did not suddenly emerge in the summer of 2013 and while the situation 
on the ground was continuing to escalate, it would be remarkable if the government was not 
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receiving similar advice in May, before it committed to lifting the embargo with all the 
diplomatic and political furore that this entailed. Hague immediately contradicted these reports 
in the FAC, insisting that British policy remained unchanged.959 
 
The press also reported on the presence of divisions within government.960 Both the Daily Mail 
and the Independent claimed there were serious divisions in the cabinet over the wisdom of 
arming the rebels. Gove and Osborne supported Cameron’s position. Defence Secretary Philip 
Hammond, while concerned that weapons might potentially fall under the possession of 
extremists, was also broadly supportive. However, it was reported that five or six ministers 
raised ‘‘serious reservations,’’ including Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg. As leader of the 
coalition’s junior party, Clegg’s position was especially important and the Lib Dem leader felt 
that there could not be a military solution to the conflict and that if Britain were to arm the 
rebels, it should only do so with the full support of the United States. Development Secretary 
Justine Greening also counted among the sceptics and concerns were raised that British arms 
might prolong the conflict and fall into the hands of extremist groups. Attorney General 
Dominic Grieve was also described as a ‘‘dove’’ who warned Cameron against intervening in 
Syria without a UN resolution and his persistence was apparently a source of frustration for the 
Prime Minister. Although a lack of detail about some of these splits and divisions precludes 
reaching firm conclusions, there is enough evidence to suggest this was a potentially significant 
factor.  
 
In contrast, we can be far more certain about the position of Parliament, which steadfastly 
opposed greater British involvement in Syria. Having fully supported the government’s decision 
to recognise the National Coalition, Shadow Foreign Secretary Douglas Alexander was more 
sceptical about the increasing provision of ‘‘technical’’ assistance.961 When suspicion began 
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growing in January and February of 2013 that the government might be willing to provide lethal 
equipment, Alexander made clear that the Labour Party would oppose such a move.962 
Alexander reiterated a widely shared view in the Commons that providing arms would simply 
make the situation worse and that weapons might fall into the hands of jihadists. As the 
government’s support for arming the opposition became clearer in the weeks and months ahead, 
Cameron was forced to concede the existence of an ‘‘honest disagreement’’ between himself 
and Miliband.963 While the tone of such debates was often cordial, the bipartisan consensus that 
had previously underpinned the Britain’s Syria policy had entirely evaporated by the time that 
Hague’s brinkmanship secured the government’s objectives in the EU.  
 
More significant than this breakdown of bipartisanship was a vociferous backbench rebellion 
against the direction of policy. For the period analysed in this chapter, Cameron and Hague 
were battling against the direction of political opinion within their own party, even if their 
position enjoyed support in some quarters.964  Key to this development was a bifurcation of 
parliamentary opinion on the conflict. Ralph, Holland and Zhekova, in their analysis of 
parliamentary discourse on the Syrian conflict, point to two rival or alternative perspectives. In 
addition to the discourse that drew upon the Arab Spring, they contend that an alternative 
narrative emerged which emphasised the differences with the Libyan case and the growing 
similarities with Iraq.965 During a debate to mark the tenth anniversary of the Iraq War, 
references to Syria were common.966 The consensus view was that Iraq presented a series of 
lessons, the overriding one being to not intervene.  
 
However, the opposition of Conservative backbenchers is better explained, primarily, in 
reference to the tradition of conservative-pragmatism sketched in Chapter Two. Consistent with 
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their bleak view of human nature, these MPs rejected the government’s Manichean framing of 
the conflict and the emphasis on democracy and universal values, seeing instead a complex and 
messy affair where rival warring parties were equally guilty of atrocities. This general feeling 
was captured in crude terms by Gerald Howarth, who declared that ‘‘the House and the country 
need to be clear on whether the good boys are on one side and the evil boys on the other, or 
whether there are faults on both sides.’’967 Similarly, while Cameron and Hague presented 
optimistic arguments about the ability of outsiders like Britain to positively influence 
developments, their backbenchers applied a much more conservative estimate of their capacity 
to achieve any desirable outcome, instead suggesting that British involvement could further 
aggravate the situation. For example, during the ‘‘Debate on the Address’’ in May, John 
Redwood warned Cameron, ‘‘to be very careful about the idea that killing some more Syrians  
might be a helpful contribution to an extremely dangerous situation.’’968 This was not just a 
rejection of a specific set of policies because of the recent memory of Iraq, but a manifestation 
of rival philosophical approaches whose antecedents go back much further. In some respects, 
Cameron was correct in his efforts to draw parallels with Bosnia. His backbenchers echoed the 
anti-interventionist philosophy of the Major government, in both style and substance.969  
 
More importantly, backbench opposition to the Coalition’s policy acquired a formal edge. In the 
context of the Commons’ growing assertiveness and the cementing of precedents concerning its 
right to vote on military deployments, many sought to extend this power further. In Parliament, 
Conservative backbencher John Baron led the way in demanding that the government allow 
Parliament to vote in advance of any decision to send arms.970 On 5 June his colleague Andrew 
Bridgen handed a letter to the Prime Minister, signed by 81 Conservative MPs, expressing 
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concerns that Britain might become involved in the Syrian conflict and calling for a vote ahead 
of any decision to supply arms.971 The government had initially resisted these demands. In 
April, Hague had responded to pressure in Parliament only by suggesting that the House would 
have a right to ‘‘express its view.’’972 The growing weight of pressure placed Cameron and 
Hague in a difficult position. On the one hand, they did not want to be seen as ignoring 
parliamentary opinion or obstructing the growth in its democratic power, yet on the other hand 
they knew that such a move would set a dangerous precedent and weaken their capacity to act.  
 
The weight of this political pressure forced Hague to concede on 18 June that pursuing a policy 
without parliamentary support was ‘‘neither feasible nor desirable’’ before adding that ‘‘so of 
course we have made clear there would be a vote.’’973  It took a further pledge on 10th July to 
reassure the opponents of the government’s Syria policy, with Hague confirming that any 
decision on sending arms would be ‘‘put to the House on a substantive motion.’’ 974 In a 
backbench debate the following day, a debate originally organised by Baron in order to 
mobilize pressure for this concession, the Tory rebel celebrated the success of this bipartisan 
coalition in asserting parliamentary power, beginning his statement by correctly pointing out 
that ‘‘in many ways, the debate on this matter has already been a success.’’975  This debate also 
served as a further demonstration of the growing strength of feeling on this issue. Although the 
motion was supposed to be limited to whether Parliament should have the right to vote, most of 
the participants instead used it as an opportunity to make clear their position on the substantive 
issue of arms to the rebels. Opposition to government policy was clear and overwhelming, if 
that had not already been the case. Hague and Cameron would now need an extremely powerful 
whipping operation to compel their own backbenchers into supporting their stance, or else rely 
on Miliband and Alexander to reverse course. The whips apparently informed Cameron such 
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support would not be forthcoming and the prospect of Miliband reversing his position was no 
more likely.976 
   
It is true that military advice would have discouraged Cameron and Hague from continuing on 
their path toward intervention via proxy. It is also worth pointing out that despite returning 
decision-making to the state level, EU members had agreed not to proceed with any arms 
transfers until August in order to allow the Geneva negotiations to proceed.977  It is also true 
that whatever enthusiasm the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary had for arming Bashar 
Assad’s opponents, such enthusiasm was far from universal within the Cabinet and the NSC. 
Yet all of this appears superfluous given the incontrovertible fact Parliament would have 
blocked any move to arm the opposition, with or without the presence of the above factors. The 
Commons exercised what was effectively a de facto veto over the government’s Syria policy, 
by forcing it to acquiesce to an extension of its right to vote ahead of any decisions and in the 
process of mobilizing to secure this demand, demonstrating the full strength of parliamentary 
opinion against further British involvement in the conflict. This lesser known chapter in the 
Common’s growing war powers has largely escaped scholarly attention, yet it is important both 
in its own right and in providing a precursor for the vote against military action in August.  
Conclusions  
 
Britain’s Syria policy took a decidedly interventionist turn in the latter half of 2012, as the 
limits of the diplomatic route became impossible to deny and the violence on the ground 
continued to worsen. If Britain could not intervene directly, this did not rule out intervention via 
proxy. Accordingly, Britain pushed for the removal of the EU’s arms embargo and succeeded in 
securing this outcome in May 2013. That Cameron and Hague persisted with this course of 
action, in the face of opposition both domestically and internationally, is testament to the 
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strength of their determination to increase British involvement in the conflict. If the previous 
chapter showed how divisions in the international community constrained the interventionist 
impulses of the Coalition government in 2011 and early 2012, this chapter has shown how 
domestic political forces fulfilled a similar role in 2013.  
The move toward arming the rebels was driven by a strong moral conviction and an intuitive 
sense that continuing to insist on Assad’s departure and increasing support for his opponents 
was the only morally defensible option. Considerations about the practical consequences of this 
strategy appear to have played a distant second place in the thinking of Cameron and Hague, 
whose approach to this issue resided more in the domain of abstract principle than 
practicability, notwithstanding their previous claims to be prudent and pragmatic. What 
mattered most to the advocates of arming the rebels was that Britain was doing something, not 
whether that something was likely to improve the situation or advance the government’s stated 
objective of saving lives and ending the conflict.  
The arguments made both in favour of arming the opposition, and against the available 
alternatives, are consistent with an uncompromising set of principles that have strong parallels 
with the Libyan intervention and strong parallels with previous British interventions in Iraq and 
Kosovo. These included an approach to decision-making that privileged moral convictions 
ahead of more practical and strategic concerns, a reflexive suspicion toward ‘‘inaction,’’ an 
unrealistic level of optimism in the possibility of military solutions and a tendency toward 
viewing conflicts in black-and-white terms. It is also worth reiterating that while Britain 
persisted with a multilateral strategy throughout 2011 and much of 2012, British advocacy of 
lifting the embargo amounted to a decisive break with this approach and a willingness to pursue 
more unilateral solutions. 
 
Within the British government, the key advocate of this approach was, again, Prime Minister 
Cameron and both ministers and officials noted the similarities with Blair. However, Foreign 
Secretary Hague was a key figure in the development of British Syria policy and was clearly 
245 
 
supportive of this approach also. It is significant that there were some divisions over this policy 
in the NSC and especially significant that Nick Clegg was reportedly among the sceptics. In 
many ways, Clegg shared the interventionist vision of Cameron and others. He supported 
intervention in Libya, referred to himself as a ‘‘liberal interventionist’’ and, as the following 
chapter shows, he was an automatic and firm supporter of military action following the Ghouta 
attacks just a few weeks later. The common denominator appears to be the importance of the 
US position in Clegg’s calculation.  
 
These internal divisions and the advice from the British military may be part of the explanation 
for why Britain ultimately failed to take the step of providing arms to the Free Syrian Army in 
the summer of 2013. What is more certain though, is that parliamentary opposition made it all 
but impossible for Cameron and Hague to pursue this route by forcing the government to 
acquiesce to a vote and thereby paralysing the ability of the British government to act on the 
international stage. The Conservative backbenchers who led this rebellion were guided by a 
fundamentally different set of principles, a fundamentally different framing of the Syrian war, 





Chapter Seven: Syria: The Ghouta Attack 
On 21 August 2013, news broke of a chemical weapons (CW) attack in the Damascus suburb of 
Ghouta. While not the first attack of its kind, this atrocity differed in scale from those that had 
preceded it. President Obama, determined to defend the ‘‘red line’’ against the use of chemical 
weapons he had first announced in August 2012, momentarily abandoned his cautious stance on 
greater US involvement in the conflict and proposed a round of air strikes against the Assad 
regime. The British government quickly pledged to participate in pending military action, but 
again found its determination to confront Assad thwarted by parliamentary opposition, this time 
in far more dramatic fashion. On 29 August 2013, having been recalled early from their summer 
recess, MPs voted 285-272 against a government motion in support of military action. It was 
the first Parliamentary defeat for a British government on an issue of foreign policy since 
1782.978  
Existing academic literature has sought to explain the outcome of the vote and its future 
implications for British foreign policy.979 While these are both self-evidently worthy areas of 
enquiry, the reasons and motivations behind the government’s original decision to pursue the 
military option has received scant attention. Once more, we are left to rely primarily on the 
‘‘insider’’ accounts of D’Ancona and Seldon and Snowdon, both of which are also primarily 
focused on the politics of the vote.980 While these accounts offer a narrative which reconstructs 
some of the key developments in the frenetic period between 21st and 29th August, they do not 
offer a systematic evaluation of the reasons the government felt military action was necessary. 
Instead, the narrative is written as if answers to such questions can be taken for granted: 
military action was simply a natural and inevitable response to an atrocity of this kind. The 
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primary purpose of this chapter is to therefore fill this gap by reconstructing the government’s 
response to the chemical attacks and demonstrating how and why it favoured military action.  
There are two main parts to this chapter. The first part is a more or less chronological 
reconstruction of British policy. It begins with Obama’s declaration of a ‘‘red line’’ in August 
2012 and outlines Britain’s stance in relation to this announcement and to growing reports of 
CW use in the conflict. The bulk of the analysis focuses on the period between 21 and 29 
August 2013, showing how the demands of a military timetable set in Washington forced the 
government to recall Parliament from its summer recess and enter into negotiations with the 
Opposition in an increasingly desperate attempt to secure enough votes in the Commons. It 
shows that the key figures within the British government, especially Prime Minister Cameron 
and Deputy Prime Minister Clegg, reached a very quick judgement that military force against 
Assad was appropriate and necessary, in circumstances where there were legitimate doubts 
about what exactly had happened in Damascus, the practical consequences of military action 
remained unclear and the legal implications of acting without UN support were contentious. 
The second part of the chapter examines in greater depth the reasons and motivations that led to 
the proposal for military action. It suggests there were, broadly, three interrelated motivations 
behind the resort to intervention. Firstly, this episode should not be seen in isolation but should 
instead be located within the wider context of the development of Britain’s policy toward the 
Syrian conflict. The Ghouta atrocity, by leading to a decisive change in US policy, created an 
opportunity for the interventionists in the British government at a juncture where they were 
otherwise out of options. Secondly, the key rationale emphasised by government ministers was 
the need to uphold norms against the use of CW. From this perspective, this was about more 
than just the Syrian conflict and this combined both moral and national interest arguments about 
the need to deter further use of such weapons. Thirdly, military action had an intuitive appeal as 
it satisfied a powerful and pervasive feeling that ‘‘something must be done’’ and was 
represented as taking a principled stand against the atrocity and punishing the alleged 
transgressor as a form of international justice. The analysis further shows that, much like its 
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approach to the Libyan crisis, the government placed a heavy emphasis on moral arguments and 
repeatedly emphasised the risks of inaction ahead of any serious discussion of the possible 
consequences of military force. 
The sources that this chapter can draw upon are more limited. For previous chapters, the 
analysis could often cite the evidence sessions of various parliamentary committees. Even 
where this was not available, the timeframe of the events in question left months and months of 
official statements and parliamentary debates, during which policy evolved gradually and was 
subject to consistent scrutiny. In this instance, there were a mere eight days between the attack 
itself and the vote in Parliament. As a source of evidence, the debate in the Commons provides 
an extensive window into parliamentary attitudes toward the use of force but it is more 
problematic as a source of governmental attitudes, given the overriding need to win votes. The 
first section draws heavily on a series of insider accounts, narratives written on the basis of 
interviews with some of the key participants in the events being described.981 By cross-
referencing these accounts and supplementing the analysis with other primary source material, 
such as statements made by ministers and the publicly released Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC) assessment, a more definitive account of the events can be provided. In assessing the 
motives behind the proposals for military action, the analysis in the second section combines 
the claims made in some of the insider accounts with detailed scrutiny of the public statements 
and interviews given by Cameron, Clegg and Hague in response to Ghouta and the lengthy 
statement and debate in Parliament on 29 August. 
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The Red Line and the Commons Veto 
 
Previous chapters suggested that the US position on the Syrian conflict, specifically the 
reluctance of President Obama to support greater American involvement, was a constraint on 
British policy. Britain could not entertain the possibility of military options without substantial 
US support. While Obama had called for Assad’s departure, his obvious caution undermined 
the credibility of the threatening rhetoric made by the British government. In August 2012, 
approximately a year prior to the Ghouta attack, Obama had publicly made clear that one thing 
that might cause him to change his position would be the use of chemical weapons. The US 
President set out a ‘‘red line’’ against the use of chemical weapons, warning that: 
We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a 
red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being 
utilized.  That would change my calculus.982 
The British position on the red line sought to closely align with that of its larger ally. In the 
aftermath of the President’s comments, following a phone call between Obama, Cameron and 
French President Hollande, Downing Street quoted the two leaders as agreeing that the use of 
such weapons would cause them to ‘‘revisit their approach so far.’’983 Hague reinforced this 
stance in his statement to the House of Commons on 3 September, referring to Obama’s 
‘‘very strong warning’’ on this issue.984 When Obama chose to reiterate the red line in 
December, apparently in response to intelligence indicating possible movement of Syrian CW 
stockpiles, the Foreign Secretary again echoed this position, promising that the use of such 
weapons would ‘‘draw a serious response from the international community.’’985 He 
                                                          
982 The White House, ‘‘Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps,’’ 20 August 2012, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-
corps  
983 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘‘Prime Minister’s Phone Calls With Presidents Hollande and Obama,’’ 23 
August 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-ministers-phone-calls-with-presidents-
hollande-and-obama  
984 HC Deb, 03/09/2012, c. 64. 
985 HC Deb, 04/12/2012, c. 719.  
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reinforced this threat at the Friends of Syria meeting, warning that ‘‘the Assad regime should 
not doubt our resolve, or miscalculate how we would react to any use of chemical or biological 
weapons against the Syrian people.’’986 
Such rhetoric certainly ratcheted up the likelihood of military action in future, but it was not 
part of a clear strategy. When asked in Parliament what Obama had meant when he threatened 
‘‘severe consequences,’’ Hague simply avoided providing a direct answer.987 Despite the 
potential implications of the red line, many in the Obama administration, including the 
military, were unclear as to what their president had intended by his original comments.988 
For the US, this utterance appeared to transcend the Syrian conflict, placing the entire 
credibility of US foreign policy at stake. As Defence Secretary Leon Panetta recalled, ‘‘when 
the president as commander in chief draws a red line, it is critical that he act if the line is 
crossed.’’989 For Britain, it was arguably less critical. In the summer of 2013, while many in the 
British government were not indifferent to the growing use of chemical weapons and concerns 
about their security, their primary focus was increasing support for the rebel forces, as was 
detailed in the previous chapter. Whereas Cameron and Hague genuinely favoured increasing 
military support to the rebels, Obama’s decision to sanction limited military assistance to rebel 
groups in June, which amounted to an important reversal of his previous policy on support for 
the opposition, was intended to defend the red line.990 
From the British perspective, the use of CW was something that further encouraged and 
justified the interventionist trajectory of British policy throughout 2013. Initially, the 
government did not differentiate the issue of CW from the wider dynamics and dilemmas that 
emerged from the conflict. When asked why chemical attacks should be treated differently from 
attacks using conventional weapons, Hague did not explain that it was important to uphold the 
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wider system of rules against using CW. Instead, he simply put it that chemical weapons were 
‘‘even more abhorrent’’ than anything they had seen so far.991 The use of CW was then cited in 
support of Britain’s evolving position on the arms embargo. In Prime Minister’s Questions in 
March, for example, Cameron explained that, ‘‘the French president and I are concerned that 
we should not be restricted for months and months ahead when we do not know exactly what 
could happen in Syria – there are very worrying reports of the use of chemical weapons.’’992 
Further reports of its use were seen as a vindication of Britain’s anti-Assad position, at a time 
when some MPs were questioning why Britain was not considering a more flexible negotiating 
position. For example, when reacting to the possibility of Assad participating in a transitional 
government, Cameron proclaimed that ‘‘in my view, someone who has seen the murder of up to 
80,000 people, the destruction of so many communities and the use of chemical weapons has no 
part to play in the Government of a civilised country.’’993  
Throughout this period, Western governments had been slowly accumulating evidence relating 
to the use of these weapons. In March 2013, in the context of growing claims and counter 
claims that CW were being deployed in the conflict, a UN investigation was mandated. It was 
at this stage that British intelligence began to slowly gather evidence of what it claimed were 
CW deployments by regime forces. By May, Cameron was able to announce that the UK had 
gathered ‘‘limited but credible evidence’’ of the small-scale use of such weapons, for which it 
held the Assad regime responsible.994 Samples were tested at Porton Down and information 
provided to UN investigators.995 By the time of the attacks in August, it was the judgement of 
British intelligence that the regime was responsible for at least fourteen separate incidents of 
chemical weapons use but on a relatively limited scale.996 When enquiring about the possible 
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motives behind such use, the government speculated that Assad was ‘‘testing’’ the resolve of 
the international community.997 Such an assumption naturally shaped the way in which it 
reacted to their use on a much larger scale. As the JIC assessment of Ghouta explained, in 
reference to these fourteen previous attacks, ‘‘a clear pattern of regime use has therefore been 
established.’’998 
The Ghouta attack on 21 August was therefore not the first use of CW in this conflict, but its 
scale was certainly greater.999 News of the attack travelled fast, not only because of the 24-7 
media environment but because social media was soon saturated with uploaded videos of 
alleged victims. For the US, this was a threat to American credibility given Obama’s previous 
warning to Damascus. On this occasion, Obama’s response was unusually swift and decisive, 
at least initially. Within the administration, there was near unanimous agreement in favour of 
military action and so the debate was on when and how to strike, not whether.1000 On the day 
of the attacks, Obama spoke to Cameron and the two agreed on the need for further 
discussion.1001 The timing of the Ghouta attack is an idiosyncrasy that explains, in part, some 
of the political chaos that resulted in Britain. Parliament was in recess and many members of 
the government, including Cameron and Clegg, were in the middle of their holidays.1002  
In public, the initial response of the British government strongly condemned the attacks and 
emphasised the importance of UN access to the site.1003 We know there was a second phone call 
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between Obama and Cameron on 24 August. According to Seldon and Snowdon’s account, 
Obama informed Cameron that America would be commencing military action as early as 
Monday 26 August and Cameron indicated his support.1004 Following this conversation, the 
Prime Minister announced that officials had been tasked with ‘‘examining all the options,’’ and 
warned that significant use of chemical weapons merited a ‘‘serious response from the 
international community.’’1005 From this point onwards, Hague and others began playing down 
what could be achieved by the UN inspectors, pointing to the ongoing bombardment of the area 
and the absence of a mandate to apportion blame.1006 Behind the scenes, there was a meeting of 
key advisers at Chequers on Sunday 25 August, which sought to explore how Britain might 
provide military support.1007 According to one insider, this was seen as very difficult within the 
US timetable. Seldon and Snowdon claim that Cameron then wrote a ‘‘note’’ to Obama, 
supporting intervention but seeking reassurance on the issue of establishing exactly what 
happened, providing a clear legal basis and securing UN support.1008 The US delayed taking 
action, most likely because of the presence of the inspection team.1009  
The decision to recall Parliament was made on Monday 26 August.1010 As Parliament was due 
to return from summer recess the following Monday in any case, this decision was not 
necessary unless parliamentary approval was being sought for action that would take place 
that weekend. By 26 August at the very latest then, the British government had decided, in 
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principle, to support US-led military action against the Assad regime. Cameron, Clegg, 
Osborne and Hague, the key players within the Coalition government, reassembled in London 
and established what D’Ancona describes as a ‘‘virtual war cabinet.’’1011  The decision to recall 
Parliament was announced early on 27 August and on that day a clear effort was made to 
prepare both public and parliamentary opinion for swift military action. Both Cameron and 
Clegg gave interviews in which they made the case for intervention, while Hague set out the 
arguments in an article for the Telegraph.1012  
Over the following two days, the priority of the government was on persuading the Labour 
Party to support the motion in Parliament. It is these discussions that are the focus of many of 
the insider accounts.1013 Knowing that Labour support would likely prove essential if the motion 
were to pass, the Coalition was forced into a series of concessions. As Clegg later recalled, ‘‘we 
had bent over backwards,’’ and ‘‘changed our motion constantly, even right up until the last 
minute.’’1014  On the Labour side, the two participants were Miliband and Shadow Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Alexander and both made clear they would only support the government’s 
motion under certain conditions. The government therefore had to adapt its motion to meet the 
demands of the Labour duo, incorporating their insistence that the inspectors be allowed to 
complete their work and the government should make a sincere effort to secure a UN resolution 
authorising action. Even after this concession, Miliband informed Cameron late on 28 August 
that he could only support the government if it agreed to a further second vote.  Knowing that 
Labour support would be essential, Cameron was belatedly forced to make a concession which 
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entirely ruled out the prospect of military action that weekend, which was the sole purpose for 
having recalled Parliament earlier.  
Two main explanations have been offered to explain the Labour position. Firstly, many on the 
government side suspect straightforward political opportunism from Miliband, who seized a 
chance to inflict a humiliating defeat on his opponent. Secondly, there is some suggestion that 
Labour equivocation was the result of internal disagreement within the party and that it was 
following discussions with senior Labour colleagues that Miliband began backtracking.1015 
Regardless of the above factors, the position of Miliband and Alexander was consistent with a 
more traditional, liberal internationalist perspective. In their private discussions with the 
government, and in their statements during the debate in Parliament, both individuals placed 
greater emphasis on international law and on the role of the UN. They prized ‘‘process’’ over 
instinct and caution over hawkishness, even if supportive of some form of military action in 
principle. This was also consistent with Labour’s previous policy toward the Syrian conflict 
throughout 2013, which had been to oppose greater British involvement in the conflict and 
called for the continued search for diplomatic solutions instead of threatening to arm the 
rebels.1016  
The motion that was presented to Parliament on 29 August was just as much a reflection of 
Labour’s demands than a statement of the government’s original intentions. The motion called 
for military action, in principle, for the purpose of ‘‘saving lives by preventing and deterring 
further use of Syria’s chemical weapons.’’1017 It called for allowing the UN inspectors to 
complete their work and committing to a UN process prior to military action. Finally, it also 
made clear that a further, second vote in the House of Commons would be required before any 
military action.  It is often now forgotten that even if the government had won the vote on 29 
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August, this would not have provided an automatic mandate for air strikes. The outcome of the 
vote was a narrow defeat for the government, with 272 voting for the motion and 285 against. 
30 Conservative and 11 Liberal Democrat MPs voted against their own government.1018 Labour 
tabled its own alternative motion that was in key respects identical to the government’s motion, 
the major difference being its call for the presentation of ‘‘compelling evidence’’ to first 
establish Assad’s responsibility for the attack.1019 The Labour motion was also defeated. In the 
aftermath of this defeat, Hague contemplated resigning and Osborne publicly stated that the 
episode would lead to much ‘‘national soul searching about our role in the world.’’1020 
It is worth commenting on the circumstances in which Cameron, Clegg and other key figures in 
the government quickly reached the conclusion that there was no alternative to a military 
response. This decision was not the outcome of an extensive deliberation. According to 
D’Ancona’s account of the initial reaction to news of the attacks, Cameron and Ed Llewellyn, 
his Chief of Staff, instantly agreed that ‘‘something bloody well needed to happen.’’1021 Seldon 
and Snowdon paint a similar picture, writing that Cameron ‘‘knows what it means the moment 
he hears.’’1022  They were not the only ones who reached a quick judgement as to who was 
responsible and what was an appropriate response. The Conservative leader spoke to his Liberal 
Democrat counterpart while the latter was still on holiday. Clegg, in his own words, ‘‘didn’t 
need long to think about it. If Obama thought it was right to remove chemical weapons from the 
battlefield, why would we not?’’1023 These anecdotes suggest that the key decision-makers 
simply did not feel it was necessary to have a lengthy discussion and assess in detail the 
different options and their potential risks. Furthermore, even if they had felt this was necessary, 
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there was little time for discussion.  The NSC did not have the opportunity to discuss pending 
military action until 28 August, at which point Parliament had already been recalled to provide 
a mandate for action. Cabinet did not even discuss the situation until the morning of the vote.  
As a result of this, when publicly questioned on the practicability of military action, the 
objectives of air strikes and the possible consequences, it was shown that little consideration 
had been given to these questions. The media quoted former military chiefs openly questioning 
the  proposed intervention, suggesting nobody knew the possible consequences of airstrikes.1024 
Behind the scenes, the government struggled with poor communication from the US, which 
meant committing to support military action without necessarily understanding what this might 
entail.1025 In Parliament, the Prime Minister repeatedly described the objective of military action 
as ‘‘deterring and degrading,’’1026 yet when Jack Straw enquired how military action would 
achieve this purpose, Cameron responded by claiming, ‘‘I do not want to set out at the Dispatch 
Box a list of targets, but it is perfectly simple and straightforward to think of actions that we 
could take relating to the command and control of the use of chemical weapons, and the people 
and buildings involved, that would indeed deter and degrade.’’1027 Many MPs focused on 
practical issues such as these in the debate and the fact that it was not so ‘‘simple and 
straightforward’’ as Cameron wished it to be explains why neither he nor any other member of 
the government ever explained what these simple and straightforward actions were.   
The speed and confidence with which the government determined that Assad was responsible is 
another factor worthy of comment. It was natural for the government to quickly see the attack 
as a vindication of its longstanding anti-Assad position. Hague declared on the day of the 
attacks that, ‘‘I hope this will wake up some who have supported the Assad regime to realise its 
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murderous and barbaric nature: a government that cares so little for the lives of its own 
country.’’1028 While initially calling for UN access, statements such as this hinted toward a 
predetermined verdict. Already by the 23 August, Hague was dismissing the possibility of a 
‘‘conspiracy’’ as ‘‘vanishingly small.’’1029 By 25 August, Cameron was quoted as saying there 
was ‘‘little doubt’’ that Assad was responsible and on 27 August, in an article in the Telegraph, 
Hague determined that the evidence left ‘‘no doubt’’ that Assad was responsible.1030 The JIC, 
which first met on 25 August, reaffirmed its confidence in the verdict of regime culpability on 
the 27 August.1031 In the intelligence summary that was made public, while conceding a lack of 
clarity about the motives for the attacks, the JIC said it was ‘‘highly confident’’ in its 
assessment of regime responsibility.1032  
The argument that there could be no doubt about Assad’s guilt, at such an early stage and with 
apparently so little investigation, was largely based on circumstantial evidence, as was shown in 
the JIC assessment. When listing this evidence ministers referred to factors such as the regime’s 
prior use of CW, the claim that its forces were bombarding the area when the attack took place, 
and the fact that they continued to shell the area afterwards, thereby undermining the possibility 
of the UN gathering evidence.1033 Most importantly though, was the argument that the 
opposition forces simply lacked the capability to execute a CW attack, still less one on this 
scale. The JIC summed up this point with the claim that there were therefore ‘‘no alternative 
scenarios to regime responsibility.’’1034 All of this provided firm grounds for suspecting that 
regime forces were responsible for the attack, but there was no clear trail of evidence leading 
directly back to Assad.  
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The question mark in this version of events was the absence of a convincing explanation for 
Assad’s motives in ordering such an attack, especially given the nearby presence of the UN 
inspection team. This was the one action that was likely to provoke US entry into the conflict 
and it was also timed to coincide with the very moment when the inspectors were arriving in 
Damascus. The JIC and the Prime Minister conceded that the motivations for the attack were 
unclear. Facing this question in Parliament, Cameron offered that, ‘‘for my part, I think the 
most likely possibility is that Assad has been testing the boundaries. At least 14 uses and no 
response—he wants to know whether the world will respond to the use of these weapons, which 
I suspect, tragically and repulsively, are proving quite effective on the battlefield.’’1035  Such 
speculation clearly encouraged the perceived necessity of a military response to prevent further 
uses.  
According to a contemporary report, British officials fretted over what to include in the 
intelligence assessment that was made public.1036 This report implied that officials were 
concerned not because they were agonising over whether to disclose sensitive material, but 
instead because most of the intelligence they had was open source and therefore already in the 
public domain. When the Obama administration later defended its insistence that Assad and 
only Assad could have been responsible, it placed significant emphasis on intercepted 
communications. In the US government intelligence assessment that was publicly released on 
30 August, reference was made to human, geospatial and signals intelligence.1037 John Kerry 
would later insist that it was signals intelligence that proved Assad’s guilt.1038 Yet the JIC 
assessment that was released made no reference to signals intelligence and in Parliament on 29 
August Cameron was unusually candid in conceding that there was no secret piece of 
intelligence that further strengthened the case against Assad: 
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I am not standing here and saying that there is some piece or pieces of intelligence that I have 
seen, or the JIC has seen, that the world will not see, that convince me that I am right and 
anyone who disagrees with me is wrong. I am saying that this is a judgment; we all have to 
reach a judgment about what happened and who was responsible.1039 
Cameron would repeatedly insist upon the importance of forming a ‘‘judgment’’1040 but many 
MPs, particularly on the Labour benches, did not understand why it was necessary to reach such 
a judgment quite so quickly, while evidence was still being gathered, investigations were still 
taking place and legitimate doubts remained. Whatever partisan motivations he may or may not 
have had for voting against the government’s motion, Miliband’s insistence that ‘‘evidence 
should precede decision’’ and that Britain should not be rushed by a ‘‘timetable that was set 
elsewhere’’ illustrated the difference between Cameron and Clegg on the one hand, and the 
more cautious and methodical instincts of their Labour counterpart on the other.1041  
Finally, the legal case for action was far from clear. As had occurred for Libya, the government 
published a ‘‘note’’ providing what it described as a summary of the legal position, based on 
advice provided by the Attorney General.1042 Again, the Attorney General did not take formal 
responsibility for this in the same way that Lord Goldsmith had done in the case of Iraq. The 
document is therefore understood, from a legal perspective, to constitute the view of the British 
government.1043 Unlike in Libya however, on this occasion there was no Security Council 
resolution authorising force. The government was in the process of tabling a resolution in New 
York, as per Labour’s demands, but it did so in the knowledge that it would be vetoed by both 
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Russia and China.1044 The legal case relied exclusively on an untested and unsupported 
‘‘doctrine of humanitarian intervention.’’1045 
The conventional view of the legal use of force in international affairs holds that it is only 
justified in situations of self-defence or when the express approval of the Security Council is 
obtained. The position of the British government on the use of force in international affairs is 
that this ‘‘doctrine of humanitarian intervention’’ empowers it to take ‘‘exceptional measures’’ 
without Security Council approval for the purpose of alleviating humanitarian suffering. As the 
Defence Committee subsequently suggested, it is doubtful that this interpretation of 
international law and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is widely accepted among the 
international community.1046 Yet even if one were to accept this doctrine, the criteria it 
contained were not self-evidently satisfied in this case. For instance, the second criteria insisted 
that ‘‘it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if 
lives are to be saved.’’1047  
It would appear that the key figures in the government instinctively felt military force was 
needed and then worked backwards from this conclusion, treating international law as an 
obstacle that needed to be navigated around, rather than a principle that ought to be upheld. 
Reflecting this pattern of thinking, Cameron acknowledged that a Chapter VII resolution would 
be preferable, but he spoke about international law as if it was something that could be agreed 
or disagreed with, depending on how one felt about the ethical consequences: 
However, it cannot be the case that that [A UN Resolution] is the only way to have a legal basis 
for action, and we should consider for a moment what the consequences would be if that were 
the case. I cannot think of any Member from any party who would want to sign up to that.1048 
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The Motives for Action 
 
The motives behind the proposals for military strikes can be roughly broken into three main 
categories. Firstly, this episode should be located within the context of the government’s 
longstanding policy toward the Syrian conflict, its hostility toward Assad and the frustration 
with its lack of leverage. Britain had first spent over a year prioritising the pursuit of a UN 
resolution, while calling for Assad to leave power immediately. This strategy had resulted in 
Russia and China vetoing three separate resolutions and ended in failure in the summer of 
2012. The government had followed this by spending the first half of 2013 increasing its 
support for the Syrian opposition and lifting the EU’s arms embargo in preparation for an 
attempt to provide lethal military assistance. With Parliament having acquired the right to 
vote on any decision to send arms, this option was blocked off also. In sum, British policy in 
the summer of 2013 had reached a dead end and policymakers were out of options. From this 
perspective, the Ghouta attack provided an opportunity, through its impact on the US 
position, for Britain to finally do something to match its anti-Assad rhetoric with tangible 
action. 
Despite the above facts, the government itself sought to compartmentalise the issue of CW, 
arguing that its proposals for military action were entirely separate from its wider position on 
the conflict. When he first publicly made the case for military action, Cameron insisted that 
‘‘this is not about wars in the Middle East. This is not even about the Syrian conflict. It is about 
the use of chemical weapons and making sure, as a world, we deter their use and we deter the 
appalling scenes that we’ve all seen on our television scenes.’’1049 The government’s 
parliamentary motion was explicit, stating that ‘‘it does not sanction any action in Syria with 
wider objectives.’’1050 The Prime Minister repeatedly tried to reassure his parliamentary 
colleagues of this point, arguing that, ‘‘it is not about invading, it is not about regime change, 
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and it is not even about working more closely with the opposition; it is about the large scale use 
of chemical weapons and our response to a war crime – nothing else.’’1051  
There is good evidence for arguing that this kind of rhetoric misrepresented the government’s 
motivations. Based on the research presented in preceding chapters, it cannot be denied that 
both Cameron and Hague favoured a more interventionist approach throughout 2013. 
Regardless of the extent to which it recognised the wider need to uphold rules against the use 
of chemical weapons, this motive, at least prior to August 2013, was not treated as entirely 
separate from the government’s wider policy and its growing inclination to pursue a more 
interventionist approach. For example, at the end of June, Cameron warned Parliament that: 
 
There is a growing risk to the peace and stability of Syria’s neighbours and the long-standing 
international prohibition on chemical weapons is being breached by a dictator who is brutalising 
his people. None of this constitutes an argument for plunging in recklessly. We will not do so, 
and we will not take any major actions without first coming to this House. But we cannot 
simply ignore this continuing slaughter.1052  
 
Secondly, D’Ancona’s account suggests that the Prime Minister did not initially emphasise 
the importance of norms against CW use, seeing Ghouta instead as an opportunity to bomb 
Assad into considering negotiations. When describing the initial discussions between Cameron 
and Miliband, he writes of how Cameron informed the Labour leader that the goal was to 
‘‘shock’’ Assad to the negotiating table in order to design a new Syria, invoking an analogy 
with the Dayton Agreement for the former Yugoslavia.1053 D’Ancona does not really press the 
important implications of this revelation. If true, it would clearly suggest that the public 
presentation of Britain’s aims was not simply disingenuous but was closer to outright 
fabrication.  
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Even if the anecdote above is misleading or untrue, the government must have considered the 
implications of airstrikes in relation to the wider dynamics of the Syrian conflict and its 
policy toward it. Miliband made a point of emphatically rejecting Cameron’s effort to argue 
that the proposal should be considered in isolation from the wider conflict.1054 The Prime 
Minister therefore argued that airstrikes were consistent with Britain’s policy toward Syria, by 
reintroducing the very same arguments he had used in used when advocating arming the 
opposition. While some feared airstrikes might hinder the possibility of a second round of 
Geneva negotiations, Cameron drew the opposing conclusion, arguing that, ‘‘for as long as 
Assad is able to defy international will and get away with chemical attacks on his people, I 
believe that he will feel little if any pressure to come to the negotiating table.’’1055 This shows 
that even if this were not the primary motivation for military action, the pre-existing inclination 
to adopt a more interventionist approach to Syria would have led Cameron and others to have 
responded favourably when the opportunity to intervene arose suddenly in response to Ghouta.  
The second key motivation behind the proposal for military action was embedded in the logic of 
the red line. Specifically, military action was seen as a way of deterring the future use of CW, 
thereby upholding rules and norms against its use in conflict. While the British government 
offered a wide range of arguments in support of its case the most consistent theme in official 
rhetoric was the argument that the crossing of this particular threshold required some form of 
action, both to deter the Assad government from repeat offences, and to deter future dictators 
from similar excesses. Cameron therefore spoke repeatedly about the norm or ‘‘taboo’’ against 
the use of chemical weapons and the fact that this was one hundred years old.1056 In response to 
a direct question as to why Britain was considering military action, Clegg explained that failing 
to take such action would set a dangerous precedent, ‘‘where brutal dictators and brutal rulers 
will feel they can get away with using chemical weapons on a larger and larger scale in 
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future.’’1057 Following the NSC meeting on 28 August, Hague explained that the use of such 
weapons must be confronted because ‘‘if we don’t do so, then we will have to confront even 
bigger war crimes in the future.’’1058  The motion presented in Parliament referred to the 
objective of ‘‘deterring further use of Syria’s chemical weapons,’’1059 while the note on the 
legal position referred to ‘‘deterring or disrupting.’’1060 Cameron was therefore able to locate 
the British national interest at the heart of his argument, asking the Commons ‘‘is it not in the 
British national interest that rules about chemical weapons are upheld? In my view, of course it 
is, and that is why I believe we should not stand idly by.’’1061  
In making this argument, the government showed continuity with previous Syria policy, and 
with its intervention in Libya, through its emphasis on the costs of non-intervention. Conjoined 
with the argument about the need to defend the international norm against CW use was a 
framing of every alternative to force as form of moral indifference. Action, understood 
exclusively as military force, was contrasted with an imagined passivity. If there was one phrase 
that was repeated more than any other in the effort to mobilize public and parliamentary opinion 
in favour of air strikes, it was the argument that ‘‘the world shouldn’t stand idly by.’’1062 It was 
not only that the same basic logic was repeated by Cameron, Clegg and Hague at every 
opportunity, but that the specific word ‘‘idle’’ was frequently a key part of this binary 
distinction between action and inaction.1063  In this framing, it was not a choice between air 
strikes as a policy proposal and various alternatives that may or may not have culminated in the 
use of force, but instead between taking a stand on behalf of civilization and succumbing to a 
form of moral weakness. The latter would have its consequences. Much as had been the case in 
                                                          
1057 Deputy Prime Minister’s Office, ‘‘Nick Clegg’s Interview.’’  
1058 FCO, ‘‘Foreign Secretary Calls for Strong International Response to Chemical Attack in Syria,’’ 28 
August 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-calls-for-strong-international-
response-to-chemical-attack-in-syria 
1059 HC Deb, 29/08/2013, c. 1425. 
1060 HM Government, ‘‘Government Legal Position.’’ 
1061 HC Deb, 29/08/2013, c. 1435. 
1062 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘‘Transcript of PM’s Interview.’’ 
1063 Ibid; Deputy Prime Minister’s Office, ‘‘Nick Clegg’s Interview,’’; HC Deb, 29/08/2013, c. 1435. 
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the build up to the Libya, the interventionists in the British government reminded the sceptics 
that ‘‘inaction is not a choice without consequences.’’1064 
The third and final reason that the government sought to pursue military action is much 
harder to pin down. In contrast to the arguments about deterrence, which presented a succinct 
and rational objective for launching airstrikes, the determination to take a stand arose as much 
from sentiment and symbolism as it did from calculation. The images of the young victims of 
the atrocity, instantly beamed around the world through modern communications, provoked 
an emotional reaction. This mood is captured in D’Ancona’s account, which describes how 
the images were apparently ‘‘intolerable,’’ to those who had children themselves and presents 
a narrative in which military force can be taken for granted as necessary and inevitable in 
response to such shocking scenes on television and social media.1065 Cameron informed 
Parliament that, ‘‘I believe that anyone in this Chamber who has not seen these videos should 
force themselves to watch them. One can never forget the sight of children’s bodies stored in 
ice, and young men and women gasping for air and suffering the most agonising deaths – all 
inflicted by weapons that have been outlawed for nearly a century.’’1066 Perhaps the best 
representative of the emotional dimension to the government’s response was the reaction of 
Michael Gove, the only openly neoconservative member of the government, who lost his 
temper and began shouting at Labour MPs in the aftermath of the vote. Gove later explained 
that, ‘‘I did feel incredibly emotional, I do feel incredibly emotional, about this subject.’’1067 
The reaction of many in the British government was not simply a policy response, but a more 
general sense of outrage and indignation and military force intuitively resonated with such 
feelings in a way that alternative options or calls for greater patience did not.  
Part of this intuitive appeal can be inferred from the manner in which military force 
symbolised taking a stand on behalf of values that Britain was assumed to represent and in a 
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manner that was consistent with assumptions about Britain’s leading role in international 
society. In his article for the Telegraph on 27 August, Hague had described this as ‘‘a moment 
for democratic nations to live up to their values.’’1068 Following the NSC meeting the next day, 
he announced that, ‘‘we decided unanimously that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad 
regime is unacceptable and that the world can not stand by in the face of that.’’1069 Such 
grandiose language showed how Hague took for granted an exaggerated sense of Britain’s 
leadership in world affairs. Similarly, in closing the debate in Parliament, Clegg described the 
attack as ‘‘an affront to humanitarian law and to our values.’’1070  While notions of Britain’s 
role in the world had not been central to the discussion, the Deputy Prime Minister opined that 
‘‘there is another question facing us tonight, which is what kind of nation are we? Are we open 
or closed? Are we engaged in shaping the world around us, or shunning the difficult dilemmas 
that we face?’’1071  
Military action also fulfilled a desire to ‘‘do something.’’ Burt later recalled a general sentiment 
within the government that ‘‘something must be done.’’1072 Such a feeling naturally arose from 
the perception of the alternatives which, as described above, were seen as ‘‘inaction’’ and 
‘‘idleness’’ in the face of atrocities. Clegg therefore explained in an interview on the day of the 
debate that when facing the question of how to respond to such an atrocity ‘‘it would not rest 
very easily on my conscience, if when faced with that choice, we basically walked on the other 
side of the road.’’1073 The argument for intervention appealed because policy-makers were again 
operating at a relatively high level of abstraction. It was much easier to agree with the general 
idea that Britain ought to do something, as opposed to having to address difficult questions 
about how that ‘‘something’’ was consistent with the objectives claimed to be driving policy, 
whether it was legal and why it had to take place immediately.  
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The appeal of military force was also consistent with a desire to punish Assad. As previous 
chapters have documented, the Coalition government warmly committed itself to an agenda of 
‘‘international justice,’’ and the Prime Minister had promised a ‘‘day of reckoning’’ for the 
Syrian dictator. It was thus natural to see military force as consistent with this, a means of 
providing accountability through non-judicial means. As early as 25 August, Cameron declared 
that, ‘‘this crime must not be swept under the carpet.’’1074 Frequent description of the atrocity as 
a ‘‘crime,’’ and discussion of the need to deny ‘‘impunity,’’ while true in one sense, were in 
another implying that military force was being proposed as a form of punishment.1075  This 
rationale was picked up on and questioned by MPs, with Conservative backbencher James 
Arbuthnot referring to a ‘‘new doctrine of punishment as a reason for going to war – not 
deterrence, not self-defence, not protection, but punishment.’’1076 These objectives were not 
necessarily mutually exclusive in the way Arbuthnot was suggesting, but it remains the case 
that the rhetoric of Western governments conflated two distinct and separate areas of 
international law, namely international humanitarian law and international criminal law.1077  
Conclusions 
 
The period analysed in this chapter will long be remembered, primarily, as a major fiasco and 
an historic exercise in the House of Commons’ war powers. This chapter has suggested it 
should also be studied as an episode that sheds light on the attitudes of the Coalition 
government to the use of force. The key decision-makers in the government quickly and 
instinctively reached the judgement that military force was a necessary and appropriate 
response to the Ghouta atrocity. Rather than cautiously assessing the options, waiting for the 
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UN inspectors and legitimising its position in the Security Council, the British government 
responded quickly and favourably to US proposals for immediate military action without UN 
support. Having made this commitment in principle, Parliament had to be recalled early from its 
summer recess, a decision that was only necessary if military force was to take place as early as 
the weekend of the 31 August. Cameron and others made a series of concessions in an 
ultimately futile attempt to win Labour support, meaning that the eventual vote would not in 
any case have automatically led to military action. This episode demonstrates that the 
government was far from cautious in its approach, in contrast to the impression it often liked to 
present. The threshold that it required, in terms of defining the military objectives, providing 
evidence to support claims of Assad’s guilt and demonstrating the legality of any intervention 
was sufficiently low so as to permit a Gadarene march into the Syrian conflict in circumstances 
where military action was not a last resort. 
There was a strategic case for action. The argument that the use of these weapons represented 
the crossing of a ‘‘red line’’ requiring a strong response so as to deter further chemical attacks 
provided a clear rationale for action that linked both moral arguments with Britain’s security 
interests. Yet the motivations behind the proposals for airstrikes were more complex than the 
government was willing to acknowledge. The claim that this was solely about preventing 
further uses of CW was an argument borne of political expediency, a necessary ruse given 
widespread parliamentary opposition to further British involvement in the Syrian conflict. 
Ghouta occurred at a juncture where British Syria policy, pushed for several months in a more 
interventionist direction by a frustrated Cameron and Hague, had been rendered impotent by 
parliamentary opposition, as described in the previous chapter. Both the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Secretary were therefore already primed to lean toward military options, now that these 
became available. Additionally, military force had an intuitive appeal because it resonated with 
the powerful sense of outrage many felt in witnessing images of the attacks, it symbolised 
taking a stand and defending ‘‘values’’ in response to this atrocity and it satisfied a desire to 
punish Assad.  
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The previous chapters on Britain’s Syria policy showed that military intervention was simply 
not an option that was available to policymakers. As for the counterfactual scenario of what 
might have happened had the opportunity to intervene existed, we cannot know. What the 
Ghouta episode shows, however, is that on the one occasion that the opportunity to use military 
force did exist, the British government jumped at the opportunity without hesitation. In the 
absence of the Commons’ unexpected historic veto, this would have been the second time in 
little over two years that the Coalition would have embarked on a form of humanitarian 
intervention in the Middle East, despite all the previous indications that it would be cautious 
and restrained in its approach to such issues. Many of the assumptions and arguments that 
produced this proposed intervention were consistent with previous elements of Britain’s Syria 
policy and with the intervention in Libya. The proposals for military force retained the strong 
emphasis on morality and values as a determinant of action, demonstrated an ambiguous 
attitude toward international law and multilateral decision-making processes and placed greater 
stress on what were perceived to be the costs of inaction, while downplaying or ignoring the 






This thesis has made an empirical contribution to our understanding of contemporary British 
foreign policy by carrying out the first historical analysis of the Coalition government’s policy 
toward the conflicts in Libya and Syria, while drawing upon a range of primary sources that 
existing scholarship has not fully used or ignored altogether. The existing literature comprises 
relatively little empirical analysis of Britain’s decision to intervene in Libya in 2011 and almost 
no analysis Britain’s continued involvement in that conflict. Regarding the Syria conflict, 
despite extensive discussion of the implications of Parliament’s vote against military action in 
2013, there was almost no serious discussion of the government’s policy toward that conflict. 
The decision to call for Assad’s departure in 2011, the attempt to provide arms to the opposition 
beginning in early 2013 and the rationale behind the calls for military action in summer 2013 
have all so far escaped serious scholarly scrutiny. Taken individually, each of the chapters in 
this thesis therefore helps fill a significant gap in the literature. 
The existing accounts of Britain’s decision to intervene in Libya have stressed the dominant 
role of a Prime Minister driven by moral conviction, the presence of humanitarian objectives 
and the memory of the Bosnian conflict in the 1990s. The evidence reviewed in Chapter Three 
broadly supports the fundamentals of this narrative.  Cameron began contemplating military 
action at a relatively early stage in the crisis and he publicly advocated this option in Parliament 
as early as 28 February 2011, when many in the NSC were sceptical and cabinet was yet to 
discuss this possibility. As early as 7 March, Cameron favoured military action with or without 
UN approval and he was the dominant voice in the NSC pushing for intervention. For key 
decision-makers in the Coalition government, both those who were enthusiastic to intervene and 
those who were more cautious, it was their growing perception of the large scale threat to 
civilian life, particularly in the city of Benghazi, that moved them to act. Their collective fears 
of what might happen if military intervention was not forthcoming and their framing of the 
options before them was powerfully shaped by the memory of the Bosnian conflict and the 
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Srebrenica massacre. Evidence for much of this could be found in the contemporary public 
record but the testimony provided to the FAC’s inquiry in 2015 provided much firmer support 
for this interpretation. 
However, the conventional wisdom about this decision needs qualifying in certain respects. It is 
important to note that the Libyan crisis coincided with the apotheosis of the Arab Spring, and 
wider regional events shaped the context in which the Libyan crisis was framed, encouraging a 
strong response. The British role in the adoption of UN Resolution 1970, which imposed strong 
sanctions and referred the situation to the ICC, has generally been neglected in the existing 
accounts of British policy. This neglect is a mistake as the decisions taken at this stage were an 
important precursor to military intervention and this diplomatic action shows that Britain had 
adopted a policy of regime change before Cameron began advocating military options. In its 
efforts to secure a second resolution Britain pursued a strategy based upon the fulfilment of 
three criteria: regional support, clear legal basis and demonstrable need. These facts show that 
even if Cameron was more hawkish than other members of his government, it is wrong to 
suggest that he was the sole architect of British policy or that any concerns raised by other 
members of the government were ‘‘brushed aside’’ or ignored. The evidence reviewed in 
Chapter Three suggests that the final decision was more consensual than is generally portrayed 
in the existing accounts. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister does appear to have been relatively 
indifferent to the practical concerns about the limitations of a no-fly zone and the strain on 
British capabilities, issues that were raised by the Chief of Defence Staff and the Defence 
Secretary. Chapter Three argued that understanding the US position is important in this context 
because without the sudden intervention of President Obama, such concerns would have been 
realised on the battlefield. Finally, Chapter Three also suggested that while the primary 
motivation behind British intervention was the humanitarian goal of protecting civilian life, this 
was anchored to a strong determination to remove Gaddafi from power and facilitate a wider 
political transformation in Libya. The evidence reviewed in Chapter Three showed that this 
process of conflating the goals of regime change and civilian protection began as early as 
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February and that democratic regime change was therefore a goal of British policy from the 
beginning. 
The existing accounts of the Libyan intervention have generally failed to analyse British policy 
beyond this point, at least in any great detail. Chapter Four filled this gap. It reinforced the 
above point, demonstrating that British involvement in the Libyan conflict was shaped by a 
several objectives. In addition to protecting civilians from Colonel’s Gaddafi’s forces as 
authorised by Resolution 1973, the British government wanted the rebel forces to prevail in the 
conflict and for Gaddafi and his acolytes to face total defeat and the prospect of justice in the 
Hague. During the first phase of the conflict, British policy struggled to break the stalemate on 
the ground. A series of constraints, foremost among them the compromises necessary to 
maintain alliance unity, ensured that the use of air power could not quickly bring the war to an 
end. Toward the latter stages of the conflict, as the goal of ensuring a rebel victory became the 
dominant concern, the government took greater risks and sanctioned actions that clearly went 
beyond the remit of the resolution. This included the insertion of special forces on the ground, 
the facilitation of violations of the arms embargo in favour of rebel forces, and the use of 
NATO airpower to target Gaddafi directly and to aid advancing rebel militias in their seizure of 
territory. 
Chapter Four showed that while the decision to intervene in March may have been a last resort 
given the circumstances on the ground at the time, the decision to continue to use military force 
indefinitely was not. Drawing upon a range of sources, the evidence reviewed showed that the 
British government, having committed to military action, was not interested in anything less 
than complete victory. Even if the prospect of a negotiated solution was always unlikely, the 
government was not much interested in pursuing this possibility and actively undermined the 
efforts of others to do so. This may have arisen, in part, because the government’s strategy was 
to encourage defections from within the regime and it was calculated peace feelers might 
undermine this approach. However, it was equally a consequence of the government’s good 
versus evil framing of the conflict and the symbolic importance of a rebel victory. Chapter Four 
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also reviewed the evidence about the plans and assumptions for the post-conflict reconstruction 
period. It showed that policy-makers embraced idealistic and optimistic assumptions about the 
NTC and the prospects for a post-Gaddafi Libya and failed to devote the necessary resources 
and attention to address the potential difficulties. It further showed that, rather than blithely 
repeating the mistakes of Iraq, it was just as often the misapplication of what were taken to be 
the ‘‘lessons’’ of that conflict that contributed to erroneous assumptions in this area of policy.  
On the face of it, the Syrian crisis presented the government with a similar dilemma to that 
which it had responded to in Libya. Here was another brutal dictator, crushing popular protests 
in favour of democracy with violence and repression. Chapter Five sought to show the full 
extent of the constraints British policy faced, pointing to Britain’s lack of leverage in Damascus 
and to divisions within the EU, the UN and the Arab League. The uniquely permissive 
diplomatic environment that allowed for the passage of strong resolutions against Gaddafi owed 
much to idiosyncratic factors that were absent in the Syrian case. Furthermore, the perception 
that the Western powers had abused the UN resolutions in Libya encouraged the BRICS, Russia 
particularly, in their suspicions of Western intentions. Finally, while Obama belatedly decided 
to support intervention in Libya he remained determined to avoid being dragged into the Syrian 
quagmire. While British ministers avoided drawing to much attention to it, without US military 
capabilities the debate over possible military action in Syria was purely academic. Chapter Five 
set out the argument that these structural factors are essential to any account of British policy.  
Chapter Five also presented evidence showing that given these constraints, Britain adopted 
what was in fact an activist and hawkish position toward the conflict. Britain was consistent in 
its strong condemnation of Assad and was at the forefront of efforts to push for tough measures 
in both the EU and the UN. Britain was instrumental in securing multiple waves of EU 
sanctions and tabled three resolutions condemning Assad in the Security Council that were 
blocked by Russian and Chinese vetoes. It would therefore be wholly inappropriate to 
characterise the position of the British government as indifferent to the conflict or insufficiently 
robust in its determination to confront Assad. Britain openly championed democratic regime 
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change in Syria from as early as August 2011 and began calling for criminal accountability, 
somewhat inconsistently, in 2012. While supporting various mediation efforts during this 
period, Britain refused to retreat from the hawkish position that Assad’s departure must take 
place before any transition. By drawing upon a detailed and systematic review of the public 
statements made by ministers during this period, in addition to evidence submitted to the rolling 
inquiries of the FAC and the Liaison Committee, the analysis showed that Britain’s approach to 
Syria was often driven by many of the same ideas and assumptions that had shaped the 
intervention in Libya. Many in the government, including both the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary, adopted a moral, black and white framing of the conflict, were moved by an 
ideological solidarity with Assad’s opponents and were, in principle, sympathetic to arguments 
of a more interventionist variety. 
As Syria descended into full-blown civil war, as the sectarian divisions became a dominant 
aspect of the conflict and as militant Islamists became the largest and most effective fighting 
force within the opposition, many Western observers began to revise their understanding of the 
situation, their assessment of Western interests and the appropriate policy prescriptions. This 
was true for the US President and for some Conservative backbenchers, who called for a more 
cautious and even-handed approach. Chapter Six showed that for Cameron and Hague, 
however, the deterioration of the conflict merely reinforced their outrage with Assad, their 
ideological solidarity with what they perceived to be the more moderate elements of the Syrian 
opposition and their conviction that  such colossal human suffering necessitated increased 
British involvement in the conflict. Chapter Six traced how beginning in late 2012 and early 
2013, Britain led the way in lifting the EU’s arms embargo in the face of strong opposition both 
domestically and internationally. It argued that given the difficulties with pursuing this policy, it 
would be wrong to characterise this as a half-hearted move intended to merely broaden the 
options. The analysis showed that while Hague often justified the policy in the language of 
pragmatism, his commitment to support the Syrian opposition, despite the risks it entailed and 
the opposition the government was facing, is testament to the strength of the moral conviction 
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that drove this approach. Cameron and Hague both continued to see the conflict and their 
obligations primarily in ethical terms and viewed the existing set of policies not only as 
practically insufficient but as morally indefensible. Chapter Six also presented evidence of a 
lesser known instance of parliamentary obstructionism, showing how the House of Commons 
exercised a de facto veto over the government’s attempt to arm the opposition following the 
lifting of the EU’s arms embargo in July 2013. 
The large-scale use of chemical weapons in Damascus in August 2013 changed the calculus in 
the White House, with President Obama quickly proposing air strikes against the Assad regime. 
The key figures in the British government, including Cameron, Hague and Clegg, 
enthusiastically embraced the opportunity for military action but the House of Commons 
exercised an historic veto. Whereas the existing literature has focused on explaining the reasons 
behind this defeat and its longer-term implications for British foreign policy, Chapter Seven 
investigated the British reaction to Ghouta from a different angle. Although this chapter had to 
draw upon a more restricted range of sources it argued that, nonetheless, this particular episode 
reveals more about the Coalition government’s willingness to use force. It argued that although 
the government saw military force as a means of upholding international rules against the use of 
CW and deterring Assad from subsequent violations of these norms, British policy was not 
limited to this objective alone. This chapter argued that this episode should be located in the 
wider context of British Syria policy and the government’s ongoing failure to acquire any 
leverage over the situation. Furthermore, participation in air strikes had an intuitive appeal 
because of its ability to symbolise British hostility toward Assad and a willingness to take 
strong action in the name of values. Finally, Chapter Seven also observed how the government 
committed to a military response very quickly, when the legality of any action was ambiguous 
at best, the intelligence surrounding events on the ground was still emerging and the practical 
consequences of air strikes were not fully considered. Overall, the government’s response to the 
Ghouta atrocity showed that the resort to military options in the minds of key policy-makers 
was automatic and reflexive, not a carefully considered last resort.  
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When viewed collectively, each chapter feeds into a wider argument about the assumptions and 
ideas that shaped the use of force during the period reviewed in this thesis. Much of the 
literature on the foreign policy of the Coalition government has focused on the idea of ‘‘liberal 
conservatism’’ and has assessed British policy toward the Arab Spring and the Libyan 
intervention in reference to this set of ideas. Some have seen intervention in Libya as consistent 
with this set of ideas and while not marking a return to the approach of the Major years, as 
typical of more pragmatic tradition of British foreign policy,1078 or else have chosen to highlight 
the ways in which the Libya intervention and the approach of the Coalition differs from that 
associated with the New Labour period.1079 Other have chosen instead to note the similarities 
between the approach of Cameron’s government and those of the Blair years, suggesting it 
retained the key elements of the ‘‘liberal interventionist’’ approach despite promises to the 
contrary.1080 The argument developed in the thesis has supported the second interpretation, but 
has drawn on a much broader range of evidence and a more detailed level of analysis.  
The precursor to this argument was sketched out in Chapter Two. It showed that within the 
existing literature, terms such a ‘‘pragmatism’’ and ‘‘liberal interventionism’’ were commonly 
used to describe the ideas that shaped British foreign policy but were rarely adequately defined. 
This chapter helped develop a more robust conceptualisation of these two important analytical 
categories. It argued that while pragmatism is often depicted by its adherents as non-
ideological, it represented a theoretically distinct approach to British foreign policy that was 
consequentialist in its mode of reasoning, anchored to a conservative world-view and 
philosophy and possessing a close overlap with realpolitik. It argued that liberal interventionism 
was a distinctive approach within the wider tradition of liberal or idealist foreign policy 
thinking. This approach was idealistic, moralistic and willing to advocate force not simply for 
                                                          
1078 Daddow and Schnapper, ‘‘Liberal Intervention,’’ Daddow, ‘‘Constructing a ‘Great’ Role,’’ 309-312; 
Honeyman, ‘‘From Liberal Interventionism.’’  
1079 Ralph, ‘‘The Liberal State,’’; Daddow and Gaskarth, ‘‘From Value Protection,’’ 149-150. 
1080 Beech and Munce, ‘‘Place of Human Rights,’’; Beech and Oliver, ‘‘Humanitarian Intervention,’’; 
Oliver, ‘‘Interventionism by Design’’; Vickers, ‘‘Foreign Policy,’’ 227-233; Clarke, ‘‘Policy-Making 
Process,’’ 7-8; Garnett, Mabon and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 309-319; Sanders and Houghton, 
Losing An Empire, 189-190. 
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preventing atrocities in other states, but for the fulfilment of more substantive liberal goals such 
as democratic regime change. It located the emergence of this approach within a series of wider 
changes, such as the ending of the Cold War, globalization, new understandings of 
humanitarianism and the experience and memory of atrocities in the Yugoslav civil wars. These 
ideas provided a richer historical and conceptual backdrop for locating the emergence of 
‘‘liberal conservatism,’’ the vaguely formulated approach outlined by Cameron and Hague from 
2006 onwards. 
Chapter Two provided a more comprehensive and up to date definitional discussion than can be 
found in the existing literature, but its primary purpose was to prepare the ground for the central 
empirical claim that emerges from this research. The research in the subsequent chapters 
revealed a multitude of issues that are relevant to a proper understanding of the topics under 
scrutiny, but a recurrent theme was the notion that in its response to both Libya and Syria, the 
Coalition government exhibited many of the key elements of the liberal interventionist 
approach. To reiterate, the value of this argument is not in labelling events after the fact, but in 
demonstrating the presence of these ideas in the minds and actions of key decision-makers and 
their central importance in accounting for and explaining the direction of British policy. This 
interpretation was not conceived in order to demonstrate the relevance and validity of a 
deductive model, but instead emerged from a source-oriented methodology. The importance of 
these ideas and their role in explaining British policy was not decided in advance but emerged 
from the documents that were surveyed and evaluated in the conduct of this research.  
The first component of this liberal interventionism was its idealism, its universalism and its 
ideological self-confidence. The British response to the crises in both Libya and Syria was 
grounded in an idealistic world-view and key individuals within the British government viewed 
the crises through the lens of this idealism. The Arab Spring was seen as a vindication of 
‘‘universal’’ values, as evidence of the teleological march of human progress and as 
representing a Manichean battle between freedom and tyranny. This shaped the perception of 
both conflicts. Regardless of whether this framing was true or false, it undoubtedly provided a 
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simplified interpretation of events, encouraged a tendency to overlook the more local and 
idiosyncratic dimensions to the conflicts and made strong and hawkish shows of support for the 
rebel side seem intuitively appealing. It raised the stakes symbolically speaking, elevating the 
conflicts beyond their more specific, immediate and local consequences toward a more abstract 
battleground in which values such as freedom and democracy, and Britain’s role in defending 
them, would be played out. Throughout the conflicts, the British government showed a 
persistent optimism and ideological confidence, one that made sense in the heady days of spring 
2011 but had to reckon with a growing body of evidence suggesting a more complex picture 
was emerging on the ground from summer of 2011 onwards. While some in the government 
might have urged caution, neither Cameron nor Hague seemed to dim their sense of optimism 
and their faith in the spirit of the Arab Spring, and this optimism shaped their assessment of the 
policy options before them, priming them to take risks that others might have felt reckless. This 
optimism and idealism, for example, was borne out in the naivety of some of the government’s 
post-conflict planning assumptions in Libya and its assumptions about the relative risks of 
inserting more arms into the Syrian conflict in the summer of 2013.  
The second key feature of the liberal interventionist approach, its level of ambition and its 
instinctive faith in the utility and legitimacy of military force, was also present. In both Libya 
and Syria, the British government pursued a policy of democratic regime change, alongside the 
pursuit of international justice. These were certainly ambitious objectives and while the attitude 
toward their implementation may have appeared more modest, these goals were not 
fundamentally unlike those which were at the heart of the neoconservative project that was 
pursued in the early 2000s. The idea that air power alone could remove from power the Gaddafi 
dictatorship and that a hastily prepared, light footprint civilian intervention could ensure a 
transition to a secular, democratic state in a country with a recent history of radical Islamist 
insurgency and no experience of democratic institutions was a remarkable leap of faith. In 
Syria, it might be argued that the objectives were even more ambitious. Britain ultimately 
advocated much the same set of policies and goals that it had done in Libya, albeit without the 
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military force with which to bring them about. When finally presented with the opportunity to 
deploy military force in August 2013, the speed with which the government embraced this 
opportunity betrayed a lack of prudence and reflexive appetite for military intervention. It is 
little surprise that the relationship between the politicians and the country’s senior military 
adviser was not an entirely straight forward one during these years. 
Chapter Two also highlighted both the central role given to ethical considerations in the liberal 
interventionist approach and the specific type of ethical reasoning that it generally favours. 
Ethical considerations were at the centre of British policy in both Libya and Syria. Members of 
the Coalition government saw Libya primarily as a moral dilemma, much in the same way that 
Blair had conceived the Kosovo crisis a decade earlier. In the language they used at the time 
and in the testimony they later provided to the FAC inquiry, those in government emphasised 
ethical considerations above other matters in explaining, rationalizing and justifying the 
decision to intervene. A strong sense of moral outrage underpinned the willingness to continue 
with military action in support of the rebel cause and a reluctance to seriously consider the 
possibility of a negotiated solution. The framing of the conflict and Britain’s role within it 
continued to emphasise the importance of values, particularly the notion of fighting for 
‘‘freedom.’’ In Syria Britain had to grapple with a greater set of constraints, but the public 
insistence on regime change was driven above all by a strong moral conviction that Assad ought 
to be removed from power and the decision to move toward arming the opposition in late 2012 
was driven by an equally powerful conviction that the existing set of policies were morally 
redundant in the face of such large-scale suffering. A similar sense of moral outrage motivated 
the desire for military action in response to the Ghouta attacks, which was seen as a means of 
meting out appropriate justice to the perpetrators of the atrocities and drawing a symbolic line 
over what was morally permissible in conflict. In the main, British objectives could be loosely 
described as ‘‘humanitarian’’ but the policy choices were usually less a calculated attempt to 
pursue these and more often the result of an intuitive sense of right and wrong. 
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The approach of the coalition was also consistent with the liberal interventionist conception of 
national interest. Chapter Two suggested that from a liberal interventionist perspective, national 
interest plays less of a central role in general and particularly when determining if and when 
intervention is necessary and justified. Faced with the strategic shock of the Arab Spring, 
national interest was an indeterminate calculus and its logic could be utilised in favour of 
almost any set of policy options. The British response to Libya and Syria was consistent with 
this. As stressed above, it was moral arguments rather than strategic calculations that 
dominating the minds of the key decision makers. National interest featured in debates often as 
a post-hoc justification or in contexts where its invocation was necessary to persuade sceptical 
Conservative backbenchers. Secondly, it was suggested that the liberal interventionist 
conception of national interest is both malleable and expansive, orienting its strategic compass 
in the wake of what it perceives to be the unique challenges arising from contemporary 
globalization and fusing interests and values together. This was borne out in the arguments that 
leading members of the government presented for supporting the Arab Spring. While many in 
the US administration, including the President himself, clung to a more traditional view of 
national interest and saw this as a basis for a cautious, non-interventionist stance, the British 
government concluded that as the status quo could no longer provide the stability desired, it was 
necessary to fully support the forces for change, either to encourage the process of radical 
reform or, in the last resort, actively shape the revolutionary tide.  
It would be wrong to say that the Coalition government openly flouted international law or 
eschewed multilateral diplomacy. One key difference from the New Labour period was the 
persistent emphasis it placed on ensuring regional support for its approach. In the build up to 
the intervention in Libya and during the early months of that campaign, the government 
attached greater importance to maintaining the legitimacy of its action through a multilateral 
approach. The government also sought to avoid the impression it was openly acting in 
contravention of international law and the Attorney General was a near permanent presence on 
the NSC. In responding to the crisis in Syria, the government showed a consistent preference 
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for working through multilateral channels, focusing its efforts on securing a Security Council 
resolution and only moving toward serious consideration of more high risk options when this 
approach was shown to have failed completely toward the end of July 2012. In many instances, 
the preference for multilateralism and for acting consistently with international law set 
constraints on British action that left policymakers frustrated. However, it is difficult to assess 
whether this was reflective of a principled commitment to international law and multilateral 
diplomacy, as is typical of classical liberal approaches to foreign policy, and how much was 
imposed out of necessity due to Britain’s diminished status, paltry leverage and the reputational 
damage caused by Iraq.  
In other respects, the relationship between British policy and international law was quite 
ambiguous. The official British position was that UN support was desirable, not essential. In the 
build up to the Libya intervention, Cameron was reported to have informed his cabinet as early 
as 7 March that he favoured military action with or without UN approval. From the outset of the 
campaign, the military actions taken by Britain and its allies violated the spirit of 1973 and over 
time the government was more and more willing to stray beyond the boundaries of the UN 
resolutions in its hunt for Gaddafi. In Syria, the persistent and hawkish insistence on regime 
change cut away at the possibility of international agreement, even while Britain made the 
acquisition of a UN resolution the centrepiece of its policy. Following the collapse of the Annan 
plan, Britain abandoned its more multilateral strategy, pursuing the lifting of the arms embargo 
with increasing vigour, in opposition to the majority of EU members.  As soon as Ghouta 
provided the opportunity for military action, the government rushed ahead regardless of the 
absence of UN approval, asserting that its unilaterally determined ‘‘doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention’’ provided a sufficient case for war. Much of this is consistent with liberal 
interventionism, which treats international law as an obstacle to be navigated around more than 
a principle to be upheld.  
The final core element of the liberal interventionist philosophy sketched in Chapter Two was its 
reliance on a negative argument and its reverence for the historical lessons of the Bosnian 
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conflict and the memory of Srebrenica. This type of logic and the historical inheritance upon 
which it draws was central to Britain’s decision to intervene in Libya but its role in the 
development of British Syria policy was not insignificant. Whether reluctantly as in the case of 
Fox and Richards, or enthusiastically as in the case of Cameron, policymakers drew upon their 
shared memory of the Bosnian conflict and the ‘‘lesson’’ they took from the Srebrenica 
massacre. From this perspective, non-intervention was simply not a defensible option. The 
Bosnian analogy was less a prominent feature in the debates over Syria but it was a near 
identical logic that was drawn upon in defence of the government’s efforts to amend and lift the 
EU’s arms embargo in early 2013 and again when faced with the horrors of Ghouta in August 
of that year. Hague, Cameron and Burt consistently made the case for intervention via proxy, 
less by stressing the actual benefits and advantages of this option but more by pointing to the 
inadequacy of continuing with the existing set of policies and by framing these as a form of 
inaction and worse, moral indifference. Similarly, in making the case for military action in 
response to the chemical attacks, Cameron, Clegg and Hague portrayed any non-military 
response as ‘‘standing idly by’’ and they pointed to the negative consequences of inaction as a 
powerful argument for a strong response. In sum, the evidence drawn upon in this thesis reflects 
a pattern, one that is consistent with the assumptions and ideas outlined in Chapter Two and 
largely inconsistent with the rhetoric of ‘‘liberal conservatism’’ and the claim made by the 
Prime Minister that he was sceptical and practical in his advocacy of intervention and regime 
change in Libya. The Arab Spring clearly brought to the fore the hawkish and idealistic instincts 
of many key figures in the Coalition government and showed that they were very much the 
heirs to Blair.  
A possible counter-argument might point to the signs of pragmatism in British policy. The 
research presented in this thesis has not sought to hide the fact that there were elements of 
pragmatism in the British response. The three criteria, particularly the calls for regional support, 
can be read as a pragmatic adjustment to the lessons of Iraq. The effort made to sustain the 
legitimacy of the operation, by minimising civilian casualties, retaining Arab support and 
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avoiding openly transgressing the UN mandate, were all pragmatic calculations. In Syria, the 
initial emphasis on multilateral approaches was similarly reflective of practical assessments of 
what was realistic and it was only when policy-makers became convinced that the diplomacy-
first option had reached a cul-de-sac that they began considering more high risk and unilateral 
options. There are three drawbacks to this interpretation. Firstly, the objectives that were 
shaping British policy were idealistic and ambitious to the point of being decidedly impractical, 
particularly in the case of Syria. Secondly, while the government sometimes used the language 
of scepticism and practicability to explain and justify its approach, the overall thrust of official 
rhetoric emphasised the role of values in guiding policy and an idealistic forecast about the 
Arab Spring. Finally, no set of policies will consistently adhere to any single set of 
philosophical assumptions. Even the most committed champion of liberal interventionism will 
on occasion indulge in the practice of realpolitik.  
However, this argument about inconsistency cannot be so easily set aside. If there is a major 
weakness or flaw in this argument, it is likely to stem less from any facts about the nature of 
Britain’s approach to Libya and Syria, but instead from reflection on British policy toward other 
countries and issues. For example, on whether to vote on upgrading Palestine’s diplomatic 
status at the UN in late 2012, Hague justified Britain’s unwillingness to support this by telling 
Parliament that, ‘‘in international diplomacy, when our heart and our head pull in different 
directions, we have to give precedence to the considerations of our head.’’1081 Whether this 
position is right or wrong, it was a quintessentially conservative and realist position to take, one 
profoundly at odds with the ideas and values that shaped the approach toward Libya and Syria 
and, indeed, one at odds with the version of liberal interventionism outlined above. There is no 
easy or simple way of overcoming this objection, but a few counterpoints are worth 
considering. Firstly, the same arguments about inconsistency made above would apply here 
also. It is ironic that Tony Blair, the most illustrious champion of liberal intervention, was the 
architect of Britain’s rapprochement with Gaddafi in 2004, but this single episode does not 
                                                          
1081 HC Deb, 20/11/2012, cc. 451-452.  
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make the Labour leader a realist in sheep’s clothing. Secondly, one cannot jump to quick 
conclusions derived from other, seemingly incongruent aspects of British foreign policy, 
without first carrying out a detailed empirical examination of those aspects, such that does not 
currently exist. It is better to recognise that some inconsistency appears to exist and that its 
proper investigation may ultimately jeopardise any interpretation which tends toward greater 
levels of generalization. However, that remains an implication for future research and its 
premature advancement would be unhelpful to both sides of the debate.  
The final weakness that requires open acknowledgment is the nature of the sources and their 
necessary limitations. Without access to the internal government records, our understanding of 
the detailed discussions that were taking place behind the scenes is likely to be sometimes 
superficial and sometimes speculative. The full documentary record will no doubt be able to 
add greater in-depth understanding of the position of various Whitehall departments; of the 
intelligence picture; of discussions in the NSC and of internal divisions. It also remains the case 
that, Richards aside, most of the key individuals are yet to release their memoirs and 
autobiographies, accounts that will shed further light on the events analysed in the preceding 
chapters.1082 The future availability of these sources will no doubt encourage revisions, both 
minor and major, to some of the arguments advanced in preceding chapters. Furthermore, a 
reliance on parliamentary debates and other sources that were produced for public consumption 
might lend itself to an interpretation that privileges the public presentation of policy.  
These drawbacks should not be overstated. Most of these limitations are not unique to this work 
and apply with equal force to any work of contemporary history. Although access to the full 
government record might provide grounds for refinement, it is unlikely to force a fundamental 
change in the narrative or the interpretation being advanced here. As Richard Vinen has 
suggested, when writing about the Thatcher era, we should be ‘‘sceptical about the idea that 
there is some pot of gold at the end of the archival rainbow.’’1083 Such scepticism seems even 
                                                          
1082 At the time of writing, Cameron’s memoirs are about to be released. 
1083 Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 313. 
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more appropriate when writing about the Coalition government, which operated in a more 
transparent political environment and whose foreign policy was subjected to far greater levels 
of parliamentary scrutiny, probably, than any of its predecessors. The increased reliance on the 
parliamentary record is also an appropriate reflection of changes in the making of foreign 
policy, such as the increased importance of domestic opinion and the media. The research in 
this thesis has taken advantage of a far broader range of sources than has informed many of the 
articles and books currently written on British foreign policy and it therefore represents a first 
step in the direction of more fully source-based accounts and, hopefully, something on which 
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